Oct. 7, 2023, like Dec. 7, 1941, deserves the appellation “a date that will live in infamy.” In the days ahead, we will rightly focus attention on the situation in the Middle East. Still, the threats that concerned us on Oct. 6 have not suddenly gone away. Indeed, they may have become even more grave as the “axis of evil” seeks to exploit our shift in focus.
Not long ago, former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates anticipated the problem in a carefully reasoned discussion in Foreign Affairs. Gates described the simultaneous challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, observing that, increasingly, these bad actors appear to be acting in concert. The Iranian hand in the Hamas attacks on Israel and the reactions of the Chinese and the Russians would appear to bear this out; both China and Russia seek to profit from the attack and the opportunities it provides to further undermine the U.S. and its allies. (READ MORE: Putin Is Thanking His Lucky Stars for the War in Israel)
Our Asian allies, by the way, have taken note of the relationship between these attacks and their own international position. Taiwan looks upon the actions of China in the Middle East with grave concern and is watching very closely the degree to which the U.S. sustains support for Israel. The Philippines, which has an Islamic terrorism threat of its own, has been forthright in its support for Israel. Japan and South Korea have both condemned, albeit carefully, the Hamas attacks, a caution dictated by their trade ties and energy dependence on the Arab world. Not incidentally, the Biden administration’s energy policies have contributed to their dilemma; 90 percent of Japan’s oil, for example, comes from the Middle East.
Gates further notes that Xi Jinping appears to be aiming for a Taiwan resolution — by force — no later than 2027. Tellingly, he observes that our inability to focus and, frankly, the outright incompetence of our current leadership undermines our ability to respond to these varied threats. As the Middle East appears ready to boil over and the Ukraine continues its fight for freedom, we are entering a period of acute danger, above all with respect to China’s imperialist ambitions. We must be prepared for the possibility that, with new challenges at every turn, Xi may well decide to advance his timetable for the conquest of Taiwan.
This concern should come as no surprise to American Spectator readers. Our Francis P. Sempa has offered his customarily searching analysis here and here and here; I’ve also discussed the need for 2024 candidates to step up to the looming crisis. But the most telling American Spectator analysis comes from Julie Hartman, in a prescient article published last February. Cutting through the superficialities of the Biden administration’s position on Taiwan, she makes a convincing case that existing U.S. air, naval, and space capabilities are not commensurate with the Chinese threat. This was true, as Hartman demonstrates, before Oct. 7, and it’s even more true now that our attention and some critical military resources are drawn to the Middle East. (READ MORE from James H. McGee: We Must Elect a Wartime President in 2024)
If our goal is to avoid war with China, then we need to find ways to repair our weaknesses and, even more importantly, demonstrate to Xi that we are energetically doing so. We need to show that we will be ready when he is. We need to make it crystal clear that we are prepared, at every level, to make Chinese adventurism unbearably costly to China’s economic and diplomatic position in Asia and the world. Above all, we must convincingly demonstrate that, in the event of war, Xi will be playing a losing hand. How, then, do we accomplish this? How do we overcome the strategic weaknesses described by Gates and the military and naval deficiencies so cogently summarized by Hartman?
A solution stares us in the face, if only we have the good sense to grasp it. We need an “Asian NATO.” Please don’t laugh, American Spectator readers; I know what you’re thinking. We’ve become well-versed in the deficiencies of NATO, the military decline of its largest members, the divisions of strategy and purpose only barely papered over since the Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. I discussed these issues in a recent American Spectator article, and I haven’t changed my mind.
Still, it’s easy to forget how long and how well NATO served to protect Europe from Soviet aggression. The interests of its members converged around a single purpose, and this unity of purpose translated into both strategic effectiveness and tactical competence. It is precisely such a convergence of purpose that opens the door to an Asian NATO designed to deter Chinese aggression. At no time since World War II have the interests of the U.S. and the countries along China’s periphery come so closely into alignment. Herein lies both hope and promise.
Consider just the recent indicators. China’s threats to its Asian neighbors — and, by a simple extension, the U.S. world position — have grown steadily over time, and its pace has recently accelerated. The Wall Street Journal headlined, “China’s Fighter Jets Aren’t Just Flying Around Taiwan. They’re Practicing,” and described this as “honing” their ability “to block the U.S. military from responding to an invasion.” China and the Philippines are waging an escalating war of words, and, increasingly, actions, over China’s asserted ownership of small islands in the South China/West Philippine Sea — even the names are in conflict. Only a short time ago, a near collision between a Philippine patrol ship and a Chinese coast guard vessel — clearly provoked by the Chinese — drew an outraged response from the Philippine government. Chinese incursions into Vietnamese waters have become more persistent and aggressive, and the Vietnamese have become more concerned about the Chinese threat, not just afloat but along their shared border, the scene of multiple clashes over the years.
Several months ago, Japan’s leaders described the current international situation as confronting the world with the “greatest post World War II trial yet” adding that the world has “entered a new era of crises,” notably with regard to Ukraine, which has received Japan’s strong support. Japanese concern about the unraveling international order is being reflected by a dramatic increase in Japanese defense expenditures, an acceleration in its acquisition of key weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, and a newfound willingness to exercise military force, something not seen since the end of World War II. Above all, the Japanese bring a small but very useful navy to the strategic balance.
South Korea understands that Kim Jong Un operates on a short leash from China, and that catastrophic conflict on the Korean Peninsula could come if it serves Beijing’s interests — as it might well do as an adjunct to a Taiwan invasion. The Australians have suffered under Chinese economic pressure — the price for becoming too trade dependent—and have also witnessed an expanding Chinese influence in their own strategic backyard — the name “Guadalcanal” resonates when we consider China’s recent Solomon Islands diplomacy. The AUKUS pact represents an appreciation by Australia and the U.K. that the Chinese threat must be countered.
Taiwan itself represents a special case — a valuable strategic, tactical, and economic asset for any new Asian alliance but whose inclusion would provoke a violent Chinese response. Rather than offering an immediate casus belli, we might do well to first fashion the alliance and then consider how it might be possible to move beyond the “strategic ambiguity” of our current relationship. The complexities of NATO’s relationship since 2014 with Ukraine come to mind, and we would do well to take some of the lessons of that experience to heart. But no one, not the Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, nor Vietnamese, wants their position on China’s periphery to be unhinged by a Chinese assault on Taiwan. Nor should we.
In most cases, we already have bilateral ties to build upon, and while interoperability of weapon systems and command and control elements would require attention, we also start with the advantage that U.S. systems are already used, to a greater or lesser extent, by many of the potential “Asian NATO” members. An ambitious alliance diplomacy might also consider an outreach to India, a nuclear power with a large, modern, army, navy, and air force, and a country that has clashed frequently with China. Against this remains a long history of non-alignment and a focus on Pakistan as the primary threat, making early inclusion of India quite likely a bridge too far.
Some may mention the sad history of SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, as evidence of just why a new “Asian NATO” represents an exercise in futility. However, SEATO was a very different animal, largely a tool for exerting an entirely unbalanced U.S. influence that disintegrated with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Although SEATO lingered for two more years after the fall of Saigon in 1975, the images of abandonment put paid to any continuing interest on the part of our SEATO allies.
Therein lies the salience of the SEATO experience and an illustration of the single most important barrier to creating an “Asian NATO” to deter Chinese aggression. Putting things as bluntly as possible, no such alignment can take place absent resolute American leadership and a demonstrated willingness on our part to act in defense of its prospective member nations. Against our every effort to fashion such an alliance stand the images of our rush to abandon Afghanistan and our longer history of pawning the sacrifices of our allies and our own service members to gain some cheap and superficial reward.
It’s easy to focus on the significant sums spent on military assistance to Ukraine, but, since the Biden administration has doled things out in dribs and drabs, the net result has never been timely enough to be decisive. Such half measures have sent precisely the wrong kind of message. Similar questions will now be asked if we fail to support Israel in its hour of peril. Good words and aircraft carrier movements will mean nothing if we begin to pressure the Israelis to “come to terms” with Hamas — one can already see this dynamic at work, after all, in the words of left-wing politicians and the media.
Do we want peace in Asia? Do we want to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan and the assertion of Chinese hegemony across the perimeter from the Kuril Islands to the mouth of the Mekong? Do we want to see the countries of the Asian perimeter become vassals of Beijing? Contrary to some claims, it’s not simply a matter of shifting microchip production from Taiwan to Arizona. The stakes for us are immense, and, by ourselves, we lack the means of exerting the combined economic, diplomatic, and military pressure to assure a positive outcome. An “Asian NATO” could be a difference maker, both shaping a meaningful sanctions regime in terms of measures short of war and offering a range of military and naval challenges to China that extend far beyond simple mastery of the Taiwan Strait. It could force Xi Jinping to think twice before going to war.
If we’ve learned anything in the last several years, we’ve surely realized that weakness invites aggression. If we want peace in the Pacific, then strength is required. If we can’t build ships and planes sufficient to the task, then perhaps it’s time we approached the problem differently. It can scarcely hurt to try. All it would take is competent and energetic leadership on our part, starting while there is still time — starting now.
All it would take…
James H. McGee’s 2022 novel, Letter of Reprisal, tells the tale of a desperate mission to destroy a Chinese bioweapon facility hidden in the heart of the central African conflict region. You can find it on Amazon in both Kindle and paperback editions, and on Kindle Unlimited.
