How does the Ukraine-Russia war end? In an October surprise. Ukraine, which became independent on 24 August 1991, will be dissolved and a New Ukraine will come into being by virtue of a unilateral declaration by the present Government of Ukraine, with the support of the military high command. The de jure boundaries of New Ukraine will reflect and be co-terminus with the territory currently under the de facto administrative control of the present Government of Ukraine. New Ukraine will be compact; cohesive and well-integrated politically, economically, and socially (i.e., ethnically, linguistically, and culturally); and will have demonstrably defensible borders. Accordingly, New Ukraine will have the strategic autonomy to decouple from Russia’s sphere of influence without joining economic and military blocs such as the EU and NATO.
The fall of the city of Bakhmut in Donetsk province of eastern Ukraine in May 2023 signaled the end of major Russian offensive military operations in Ukraine. Since the capture of Bakhmut, the focus has been on securing the Russian Federation’s southwestern flank: tactical nuclear weapons under Russian regular army control have been moved into Belarus, and fresh, well-trained troops are entrenched in highly-visible, carefully prepared, defensive positions across the entire swathe of territories of eastern Ukraine currently under Russian control: Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk. Importantly, there are no indications of a major new Russian offensive to gain additional strategically important Ukrainian controlled territory, such as the port of Odessa on the Black Sea. Tactical attacks designed to straighten out Russian defensive lines and divert Ukrainian forces from their main counteroffensive operations do not change the strategic status quo.
[T]he central question is “which Ukraine” would be outside the sphere of influence of Russia.
Simply put, from a realpolitik perspective, Russia has achieved its necessary and sufficient vital national security objectives with respect to its southwestern flank by virtue of the earlier takeover and annexation of Crimea and the strategically vital naval base of Sevastopol in March 2014, and the subsequent annexation (September 2022) and conquest (over the February 2022 – May 2023 period) of portions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk provinces to form a robust cordon sanitaire to protect Crimea. (READ MORE from Samir Tata: Coca-Cola Faces a Challenge in Its China Market)
Moreover, per the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Russian economy grew by 3 percent in 2023 and is expected to grow by 2.6 and 1.1 percent in 2024 and 2025 respectively, which is comparable to U.S. growth rates over the same period and far better than the economic performance of Germany. The challenge for Russia is to safeguard its hard-won national security gains and have the strategic patience to allow the Government of Ukraine to recognize that pursuing the military path is a dead end.
The Government of Ukraine launched its much-heralded counteroffensive in June 2023. Within three months it became clear that the counteroffensive is more bark than bite — Kabuki theater aimed at not so much recapturing the extensive lost territory and restoring the pre-March 2014 territorial status quo as escaping from the limbo of unfulfilled promises of eventual EU and NATO membership.
The Declaration of the 2023 NATO Summit of July 11-12 in Vilnius confirmed that Ukraine was confronted with two sets of “Catch-22s” that ensured its membership status would remain in limbo for the foreseeable future. First, NATO members encouraged Ukraine’s use of military force to regain the territories seized by Russia and restore the pre-March 2014 territorial status quo. However, while Ukraine is engaged in a military conflict, no consideration can be given to possible membership in NATO.
Second, even in the absence of military conflict, there is no agreement among NATO members that Ukraine has satisfied all of the requirements for membership, and furthermore, there is no agreement among NATO members with respect to the expected timeframe within which Ukraine would meet membership requirements. It is reasonable to assume that Ukraine will be confronted with a similar set of “Catch-22s” with respect to its prospective membership in the European Union.
As early as August 2023 senior leadership at NATO, at least informally, suggested that the emergence of a downsized New Ukraine would be welcomed. On November 1, 2023 in an interview and accompanying article, General Valery Zaluzhny, then head of the Ukraine military high command, acknowledged the harsh military reality — stalemate. The Ukrainian political process of adjusting to a new reality is unfolding among the “troika” of the Rada (parliament), Presidency, and military high command — so an “October surprise” may be brewing. The unilateral declaration of a New Ukraine will reflect the troika’s consensus.
The Realpolitik of Partition
Clearly, what matters from Russia’s perspective is “which Ukraine” would fall outside the penumbra of the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation. As suggested by Vladimir Putin in his seminal speech in 2008 at NATO’s Summit in Bucharest, Ukraine as it was then constituted would break apart if there was a serious attempt to accept the invitation to join the military alliance. As Putin pointed out in the same speech, the core territories of western Ukraine were carved out of Poland and incorporated into an expanded Ukraine in 1939. Eastern Ukraine (Crimea and the strategically vital portions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk provinces) is now under de facto Russian control. A unilateral declaration of a downsized New Ukraine is unlikely to encounter a Russian objection. (READ MORE: Ukraine’s Moment of Reckoning)
Likewise, for the Government of Ukraine the central question is “which Ukraine” would be outside the sphere of influence of Russia. In fact, since 2015, IMF programs for Ukraine have not included eastern Ukraine within their ambit. As the 2015 IMF staff report on Ukraine acknowledged: “The divergence between the east and the rest of Ukraine appears to reflect the limited direct interregional linkages.” The report also notes that western Ukraine was the main beneficiary of the waiver of EU tariffs. So, in economic terms, the rest of Ukraine was better off without eastern Ukraine in 2015 and since then the economic linkages between the two regions are de minimis. Arguably, a soft partition of Ukraine has been the de facto reality, so the declaration of New Ukraine would constitute de jure recognition of this reality.
