Since the onset of the 1979 Revolution, Iran has adopted a strategy to engage and neutralize external threats far from its borders in tacit acknowledgment that their military has a minute chance of surviving a conventional force-on-force encounter with technologically and militarily superior adversaries, such as the United States. To manifest this strategic depth, since being branded as a member of the “axis of evil”, Iran has developed a hybrid doctrine of layered instruments of coercion. By blending the plausible deniability of its sponsorship of armed proxies, industrial-scale cyber-attacks and social media influence capabilities, it aims to capitalize on the weaknesses of its rivals, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been prioritizing the application of military power through drones and surface-to-surface missile capabilities.
The current U.S. foreign policy of limited engagement, indirect talks, or muted responses has not lived up to the challenges posed by Iran.
Iran’s latest gambit of using Hamas as a sacrificial pawn is just one facet of a larger strategy that has no downside for Iran. The sheer brutality of the resultant carnage is intended to be as much of an instructive message to the southern gulf states as it is to Israel and the West. It serves as a reminder to the world of the tangible price that has to be paid for sidelining Iran, which perceives itself as an emerging superpower, without whose counsel no substantive issue should be resolved. The U.S., however, has just as many arrows in its quiver and should adopt a more stratified posture towards the multiple vulnerabilities that Iran has created for itself by over-extending its reach beyond its borders. (READ MORE: Russia and Iran’s Deadly Terrorist Diplomacy)
The savagery of the Hamas attack was premeditated and designed to elicit an inevitable hardening of Israeli public opinion and generate a proportional response from the Israeli government. If Hamas manages to survive the Israeli response, even as an underground organization, it would have the bona fides to be a major player in the Muslim world. And if does not, legions will be willing to take up the cause and join what Iran wryly refers to as “the axis of resistance.” Regardless, a cascade of events will be set in motion drawing in a hodgepodge of regional armed groups from Syria to Yemen and Morocco into the conflict, rallying the Muslim world to the Palestinian cause. Muslim leaders fearing the spread of violence will hedge their bets to spare their countries from any spillover. Saudi Arabia, being more vulnerable to Iranian coercion due to a sizeable Shiite minority, has already suspended its negotiations to normalize relations with Israel.
However, in the past year, certain events have exposed a kink in Iran’s well-considered armor present literally since the day the British ended their residency in the Persian Gulf, on November 30, 1971. The vulnerability comes in the form of three small islands, straddling the shipping lanes, near the mouth of the Persian Gulf, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa. (See map) Wresting away these islands — currently unlawfully occupied by Iran — could be the key to the long-term stability of the gulf and afford the U.S. an excellent opportunity in the region to counter the prevailing specter of Sino-Russian influence, tilting the balance of power irretrievably for the next century in favor of the United States.
In December 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping on a diplomatic visit to entice the southern gulf states into joining the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa economic group (BRICS), stated in conjunction with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), “The leaders affirmed their support … to reach a peaceful solution to the issue of the three islands.” The Iranians loudly voiced their “strong dissatisfaction” regarding the statement with the Chinese ambassador. Beijing issued a public statement in support of Iran’s territorial integrity and considered the matter closed. Then in July 2023, Russia on a duplicate visit also sided with the UAE and issued an identical statement. Iran protested openly to the Russian ambassador and reportedly paused drone shipments for the Russian effort in Ukraine for several days in retaliation.
In January 1968, Great Britain announced that it would withdraw her forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 and commenced protracted negotiations regarding the future of her gulf protectorates with all stakeholders. In November 1971, a memorandum of understanding was signed under duress by the newly formed UAE that in short stated that Abu Musa was to be jointly administered by both countries with equal rights, but the question of sovereignty over the island was not addressed.
The largest and most habitable of the islands, Abu Musa, could serve as a wholly American Diego Garcia in the Straits of Hormuz.
The sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah, one of the emirs of the UAE, confident in his claims of sovereignty, refused to negotiate with the Iranian government and Iranian troops occupied the two islands of Greater and Lesser Tunb by force. Both islands have remained in Iranian hands ever since. The occupation was carried out one day before the retreat of the British forces from the Gulf. Without the agreement between Iran and Britain and without the tacit approval of the U.S., the Iranian occupation of these islands would have never occurred. The UAE has never relinquished its sovereignty over these islands and periodically petitions the world powers to intervene on its behalf. (READ MORE: Iran Deal II: Biden’s Next Disaster)
In 1992, in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the Iranian regime began to breach the terms of the Abu Musa memorandum sparking a diplomatic clash between Iran and the UAE. Iran started by refusing entry to non-native-born Arab residents, such as teachers, health workers, technicians, and other support staff who were working in the UAE designated area, unless they first obtained an almost unobtainable Iranian visa. The Iranian government had effectively begun asserting sovereignty over the whole of the island and has since been regularly refusing entry even to many UAE citizens and prohibiting vital goods and supplies from disembarking.
A lot has changed on these islands since 1992 and none of it for the better. The IRGC has transformed all three islands. The Greater and Lesser Tunbs which had been traditionally considered as navigation hazard now each boasts an airstrip and have been transformed into garrisons, replete with naval stations, air hangers, and their required support facilities. By far the greater transformation has happened on Abu Musa. It is now a major IRGC naval base that deploys land-based long-range anti-ship missiles, littoral surveillance radar systems, both indigenous and Russian- and Chinese-produced surface-to-air missile systems, and conventional anti-aircraft guns. Iran has been reportedly improving command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance stations both above and below ground. Iran has also placed GPS jammers on Abu Musa, which U.S. officials reportedly believe have interfered with commercial aircraft and marine vessels’ navigation systems and have caused them to wander into Iran’s air and naval territorial claims providing a pretense for Iran to seize these vessels while minimizing the risk of escalating the operation into a force-on-force conflict.
Abu Musa’s GPS jammers are not just the latest addition to an island that has been the recipient of significant military assets in recent years. Having relentlessly marketed the island as a tourist destination, Iran has also encouraged the settlement of its own citizens on the island, hoping to strengthen its claims of sovereignty and pose challenges to suggestions of surgical strikes or invasion options that would inevitably incur collateral casualties.
Iran’s claim to these islands is one held singularly by Iran and therefore a very sensitive subject in Iran. The islands are upheld by the regime as symbolic validation of the superiority of the Iranian nation and its armed forces and allow the regime to perpetuate the perception that Iran has managed to single-handedly strong-arm itself into the role of the policeman of the Persian Gulf. The Western powers’ reticence in the face of this self-aggrandizing aggression has allowed the IRGC to promote the rhetoric, both domestically and to their intended audience in the Muslim world, that Western silence is a testimony to their power, their resolute spirit, and righteousness of cause.
As of this writing, the implemented policy of the Western powers regarding the Persian Gulf does not match their rhetoric or their stated commitment to their regional allies or the stability of the region. It should come as no surprise to these policymakers that the southern gulf states would look to other alliances to hedge their bets against Iranian aspirations as a regional superpower. Acquiescence to Iran’s belligerence has not only failed to resolve the regional geo-political issues, it has served to harden Iranian attitudes and expand their sphere of influence.
The U.S. could and should remove all nuance and ambiguity from its intentions and as a first step bring up the case of these islands to the forefront of the UN agenda. Tepid episodic statements echoing those of their Chinese and Russian counterparts, like the one made on September 20, 2023 by U.S. diplomats when they called for “a peaceful solution to the dispute over the three islands,” do not project American resolve. The attack on Israel should change the calculus for U.S. policymakers.
The U.S. could at the same time openly advance the possibility of the occupation of the disputed islands upon acquiring from the UAE a long-term concession to provide security and to develop the islands. The specter of the outcome of these negotiations would hang over Iran, rendering Iran more prone to enter genuine broad-scope negotiations, not just limited to its nuclear capabilities within narrow time constraints but also its expansionist ambitions, its offensive missile program, and the ultimate fate of the islands. Regardless of the outcome, a strategic retreat or military defeat, seismically deep and unwelcomed reverberations throughout the Iranian establishment will propagate. If nothing else, a well-publicized debate regarding the fate of these islands on Capitol Hill will go a long way to recalibrate Iran’s threat assessment. (READ MORE: Israel Reaps What Jimmy Carter Sowed)
Corollaries to this arrangement would be to limit Beijing’s inroads into the region as delineated in the Belt and Road Initiative, and the proposed expansion of the BRICS economic block to include Iran and the southern gulf states. In addition, both China and Russia would be highly motivated to exert their influence with the Iranians to reach an agreement with the U.S. and prevent the unwelcome presence of an autonomous U.S. base at the mouth of the Straits of Hormuz for the next century.
The current U.S. foreign policy of limited engagement, indirect talks, or muted responses has not lived up to the challenges posed by Iran and has only served to make their leadership more audacious — and for good reason: Iran has deftly mastered the art of proxy wars. While their enemies are engaged and left bloodied by conflicts, Iran bearing little liability escapes unharmed. This is plausible deniability as practiced by professionals.
Should the broad-scope U.S.-Iran negotiations fail, the UAE will likely welcome the offer to lease the islands in return for a U.S. commitment to long-term regional security, and a minority stake in the development of the area’s extensive hydrocarbon resources. Such an arrangement would also in time negate the need for the U.S. to keep bases in the southern gulf states and would create a readymade, constraint-free platform to project American power in the region well into the next century. The largest and most habitable of the islands, Abu Musa, could serve as a wholly American Diego Garcia in the Straits of Hormuz. The U.S. arrangement with the United Kingdom regarding Diego Garcia has a sunset clause that will trigger in 2036, and all sides will certainly want to renew the arrangement. It would be prudent for the U.S. to keep its options open.
