Recent news reports indicate that the Chinese amphibious exercises have been ramped up, causing increased concern that the invasion of Taiwan might happen in the near future. If the Red Chinese decide to invade, and if the United States responds — and both are dependent on U.S. will to fight — this article describes how a successful campaign to thwart Beijing’s aggression in the South China Sea (SCS) should go. There have been many war games analyzing what might happen, and I have used the results to try to predict what should occur if lessons from these games are implemented.
China would likely attempt a lightning surprise attack with missiles, drones, and aircraft supporting an amphibious blitzkrieg by assault troops. The build-up would likely be disguised as one of their annual practice invasion exercises. That might have worked for Germany prior to its 1941 invasion of the former Soviet Union and for the Arabs in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, but if U.S. and allied intelligence agencies use proper overhead sensor and human intelligence assets, they would have sufficient warning. This would allow us to reinforce Taiwan with the 18th Airborne Corps and III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) by a combination of Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) and aerial reinforcement. These would help the Taiwanese hold out until further reinforcements could arrive.
At sea, the People’s Liberation Army Navy would concentrate on covering the amphibious invasion force while the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft, along with land-based Army long-range hypersonic anti-ship missile forces, disrupt that landing. Meanwhile, U.S. surface combatant ships would operate inside the South China Sea, attempting to degrade the Chinese land-based anti-navy reconnaissance-strike complex. Many of these fires would come from converted oil tankers and container ships intermingled with normal commercial ships. They would launch missiles and drones from a “rocket in a box” configuration.
That part of the operation would go smoother if we could suppress their mobile anti-ship missile launchers with a grid of small or micro sensors that could track and target the mobile launchers once a missile is fired. Dropped by drones loitering overhead, these sensors would be seeded into the area soon after a missile is fired. It would then be detected and targeted while on the move. In 1999, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab successfully tracked and targeted a mock-up SCUD launcher from Warrenton, Virginia, to Quantico. We used surrogates to simulate the sensors because the technology to build the real thing was nascent. But that technology is now mature. The Germans are actively experimenting with such micro-sensors and are planning to field them to their operational forces. We could piggyback off their program relatively quickly.
U.S. aircraft carriers would loiter outside the SCS at a relatively safe distance with their air groups disbursed through a variety of allied nations within striking distance of the SCS and mainland China. Only when the Chinese recon-strike complex had been sufficiently degraded would the carriers move in closer.
However, the decisive point of the war would not be Taiwan. Rather, it would be the key choke points of the SCS, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Bab al Mandeb on the Red Sea. There, a combination of attack submarines and Marine Corps task forces would block oil imports to China and exports going out. This would likely threaten her economy with collapse and hasten negotiations to end the conflict.
The operative word in this scenario is should. Several of the key capabilities for success are missing. First, due to the Marine Corps Force Design concept, there is a gap in the MPS program. By divesting the Marine Corps of its tanks, heavy engineering equipment, and much of its artillery, the current Corps leadership would send its forces into combat as light infantry unable to stand up against a foe armed with tanks and armored fighting vehicles. This disastrous program prevents Marines from being properly equipped for high-end conventional combat. This China-centric Force Design program has reduced the Marine Corps worldwide readiness more than any development before the Korean War. Worse, independent war games have shown that Force Design would do little to contribute to an SCS conflict. In addition, the Indo-Pacific Command has shown little interest in this “game-changing” concept. Force Design must be abandoned if the Marine Corps is to play a role in any such conflict.
Second, the sensors needed to degrade the Chinese recon-strike complex have not yet been fielded to general-purpose forces. If the CIA is using them, it is a classified program. If we had this capability in the recent war with Iran, we might have had much more success in degrading its ballistic missile program.
Finally, the rocket-in- a-box concept has been seriously considered, but not yet implemented. It would be a cheap and quick way to build up naval power until the Trump administration’s determination to fix our nation’s shipbuilding and maintenance programs is realized. Replacing the missiles and drones used on Iran has been discussed in detail in this publication, so I won’t belabor the issue.
I am convinced that if we make it clear that we could destroy their economy — not just their navy — in any Sino-American conflict, the Chinese would have second thoughts about any adventurism in the SCS. Such a war would hurt China much more than the U.S. We are energy independent and have alternative export markets that they would be denied. Such an announced strategic intent would be as much a deterrent as a war-fighting strategy.
READ MORE from Gary Anderson:
Toward a Post-Iran Grand Strategy
A To-Do List for the Next Marine Corps Commandant
Gary Anderson retired as the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and is the author of Beyond Mahan, a Proposed Naval Strategy for the 21st Century.
