So President Obama agreed to negotiate with the Iranians, and he
agreed to abandon a missile shield in Eastern Europe. What did he
get for all this good will? Bubkes, it turns out. The New
York Times
reports:
MOSCOW - Denting President Obama's hopes for a powerful ally in
his campaign to press Iran on its nuclear program, Russia's
foreign minister said Tuesday that threatening Tehran now with
harsh new sanctions would be "counterproductive."
The minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, said after meeting with
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton here that diplomacy
should be given a chance to work, particularly after a meeting
in Geneva this month in which the Iranian government said it
would allow United Nations inspectors to visit its clandestine
nuclear enrichment site near the holy city of Qum.
"At the current stage, all forces should be thrown at
supporting the negotiating process," he said. "Threats,
sanctions and threats of pressure in the current situation, we
are convinced, would be counterproductive."
UPDATE: Fox New
reports that the Obama administration has reached an
agreement to allow Russia to inspect U.S. nuclear sites, "the
most intrusive weapons inspection program the U.S. has ever
accepted."
The excellent Daniel Larison addressed this silly argument in
advance, anticipating the inevitable nonsense implied in Klein's
piece:
As an advocate of scrapping the proposed missile defense system
in central Europe since it was first announced, I was pleased to
hear that the administration scrapped the system, which was
supposedly designed to defend against a chimerical Iranian
missile threat. By scrapping this system, the administration
admitted that the long-range missile threat from Iran did not
exist, which is what critics of the system had been saying for
some time. They also implicitly acknowledged that the system was
never really intended to defend against an Iranian threat.
Instead, it was always another provocation aimed at Russia by
providing a pretext for putting American soldiers in Poland and
the Czech Republic on a permanent basis. Indeed, it is impossible
to understand the Republican freakout over this decision if we do
not take for granted that the missile shield was an anti-Russian
move that was embraced by the governments in Warsaw and Prague in
no small part because it was an anti-Russian move.
Lech Walesa’s response to the President’s decision was telling.
Walesa was quoted by the WSJ in an article on the central
European reaction. He said, “It’s not that we need the shield
[bold mine-DL], but it’s about the way we’re treated here.” In
the same way, Moscow might admit that the interceptors in
themselves represented no significant military threat, but were a
symbol of disrespect and hostility. In reality, the security of
both allied nations remains as strong as it has been since they
joined the Alliance. This makes the hysterics of Republican hawks
simply comical, and it reminds us that they have virtually
nothing worthwhile to contribute to foreign policy debate. Of
course it is absurd for hawks to portray this as some kind of
betratyal of Poland and the Czech Republic. There has been no
betrayal. If Polish and Czech voters should be angry with anyone,
it is their own governments that deserve their scorn for signing
off on participating in an unnecessary system that did nothing to
improve their security just because Washington wanted it so.
The one useful thing hawks have done in their silly responses to
Obama’s decision is to abandon the weak security rationales they
have used until now to justify support for this system and reveal
that there is little more than anti-Russian paranoia behind their
“support” for U.S. allies in eastern Europe. It goes without
saying that we would defend our NATO allies in eastern Europe
against attack. Indeed, what Obama has done by scrapping this
system is to remove the bullseyes from the backs of Poland and
the Czech Republic that the missile shield had placed on them.
This reversal of foolish Bush-era policy has actually enhanced
and improved security for Poland and the Czech Republic, because
it does not expose them needlessly to new risks. The
administration has also refused to pursue a policy that gained as
much support as it did from the exploitation of anti-Russian
nationalism in eastern Europe.
All that having been said, the administration is going to be
disappointed. Having scrapped the shield, it has held out the
false promise that this decision will make Moscow more
cooperative in pressuring Iran. As I have said before, this is
not going to happen. The decsion to abandon this shield was the
right one as far as both allied security and Russian relations
were concerned, and it should be defended on those grounds.
Moscow is certainly pleased that the proposed shield will not be
built, but it would be a serious mistake to expect Russian help
in squeezing Iran on its nuclear program. Russia has no reason to
do this. If the administration insists that Russian support for
tightening sanctions or isolating Iran is the “payoff” for
abandoning the shield, the decision will be judged to have been a
quid pro quo that gained us nothing. If we see it instead not as
a concession to Moscow, but rather as a concession to reality and
common sense, it does not have to produce Russian cooperation on
Iran’s nuclear program to be regarded as the correct and
appropriate move.
One of the most-often cited reasons for the U.S. to repair its
fractured relations with Russia is the notion that the Russians
could help pressure Iran to curtail is nuclear ambitions. There
is, for sure, a big upside for the U.S. if Russia were to become
a reliable ally—but curbing Iran is not one of them. The fact is,
the assumption that Russia’s extensive energy and technology ties
with the mullahs could be used to influence Iranian nuclear
policy is wishful thinking. It also underestimates how resistant
Iran would be to any outside pressure on these issues.
This is not meant to discourage the Obama administration from
pressing ahead with a more conciliatory approach towards Russia.
It’s hardly a secret that NATO is an irritant to Russia. In a
speech to military leaders this week, Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev cited NATO’s “efforts to widen its military
infrastructure near the borders of our country” as an impetus for
Russia’s “large-scale rearming.” But the fact that our relations
with Russian are in disrepair only underscores that any attempt
to outsource our Iran problem to the Russians is misguided.
Short of war—which is all but unthinkable both on military and
economic grounds—Iran’s nuclear program is not going to be halted
by other states. The world is going to have to adjust to that
reality and figure out how best to handle it.
But it is equally important not to respond to Iranian moves with
decisions that are sure to degrade relations with Russia. That’s
why the Obama administration’s recent bid to link Russian
cooperation on Iran to a U.S. halt to planned missile defense
installations in central Europe was off base, and even
counter-productive.
Ever since the Bush administration proposed building the
installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, Moscow has viewed
the missile defense plan as a serious provocation. At the annual
security conference in Munich in 2007, then-President Vladimir
Putin gave a blunt, sharply critical speech assailing U.S. policy
and citing the missile defense plans as one of the main irritants
in Russia’s relationship with the West. One of the Western
responses to Russian objections is that the small number of
interceptors that the installations would contain could not
significantly counter Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and therefore
poses no threat. But this misses the larger problem Moscow has
with the development of the technology itself. From the Russian
perspective, the installations appear to be a test run of
anti-ballistic missile technology that could then be deployed
elsewhere, representing an extension of the earlier U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001.
Nor have the Russians been moved by the U.S. portrayal of the
installations as a defense against Iranian attack. This was
abundantly evident in November, when President Medvedev raised
the specter of deploying Iskander missiles to the Russian enclave
of Kaliningrad on the Polish border as a retaliatory measure.
Medvedev made it clear that he intended to treat the
installations as a challenge to Russia, and it has been the
smart, restrained response of the Obama administration to
Medevedev’s speech that has made improved relations between our
two countries a real possibility. That said, those relations
should not hinge on Russia’s ability to achieve unrealistic goals
in Iran.
In truth, the proposed deal of eliminating the missile defense
installations in exchange for Russian pressure on Iran is not
that balanced a trade, as it offers the Russians relatively
little incentive to jeopardize one of their better trading and
diplomatic relationships. In the Russian view, these
installations should never have been negotiated with the Polish
and Czech governments, and they represent another advance of
Western military forces into central Europe that was not supposed
to follow the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region.
Canceling the installations now appears as the elimination of
something that should never have come into being in the first
place.
This does not mean that non-proliferation cannot be an important
part of U.S.-Russian ties. Far more productive and achievable
non-proliferation cooperation with Russia regarding the security
of nuclear materials in Russia and the former Soviet Union is
possible, and it is this option that the administration should
pursue in future negotiations. A nuclear Iran would be a
candidate for a negotiated deal similar to the one reached with
India that would allow Iran to develop its program in exchange
for more stringent anti-proliferation monitoring. As with India,
this would move outside the traditional Non-Proliferation Treaty
framework, which has already been shown to be obsolete several
times over the past decade. However, it would provide significant
safeguards that Iranian nuclear material does not become a source
for any non-state actors or other regimes, reducing any potential
Iranian threat to one that can be readily contained and deterred.
S.L. Toddard| 10.14.09 @ 2:32PM
The excellent Daniel Larison addressed this silly argument in advance, anticipating the inevitable nonsense implied in Klein's piece:
As an advocate of scrapping the proposed missile defense system in central Europe since it was first announced, I was pleased to hear that the administration scrapped the system, which was supposedly designed to defend against a chimerical Iranian missile threat. By scrapping this system, the administration admitted that the long-range missile threat from Iran did not exist, which is what critics of the system had been saying for some time. They also implicitly acknowledged that the system was never really intended to defend against an Iranian threat. Instead, it was always another provocation aimed at Russia by providing a pretext for putting American soldiers in Poland and the Czech Republic on a permanent basis. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the Republican freakout over this decision if we do not take for granted that the missile shield was an anti-Russian move that was embraced by the governments in Warsaw and Prague in no small part because it was an anti-Russian move.
Lech Walesa’s response to the President’s decision was telling. Walesa was quoted by the WSJ in an article on the central European reaction. He said, “It’s not that we need the shield [bold mine-DL], but it’s about the way we’re treated here.” In the same way, Moscow might admit that the interceptors in themselves represented no significant military threat, but were a symbol of disrespect and hostility. In reality, the security of both allied nations remains as strong as it has been since they joined the Alliance. This makes the hysterics of Republican hawks simply comical, and it reminds us that they have virtually nothing worthwhile to contribute to foreign policy debate. Of course it is absurd for hawks to portray this as some kind of betratyal of Poland and the Czech Republic. There has been no betrayal. If Polish and Czech voters should be angry with anyone, it is their own governments that deserve their scorn for signing off on participating in an unnecessary system that did nothing to improve their security just because Washington wanted it so.
The one useful thing hawks have done in their silly responses to Obama’s decision is to abandon the weak security rationales they have used until now to justify support for this system and reveal that there is little more than anti-Russian paranoia behind their “support” for U.S. allies in eastern Europe. It goes without saying that we would defend our NATO allies in eastern Europe against attack. Indeed, what Obama has done by scrapping this system is to remove the bullseyes from the backs of Poland and the Czech Republic that the missile shield had placed on them. This reversal of foolish Bush-era policy has actually enhanced and improved security for Poland and the Czech Republic, because it does not expose them needlessly to new risks. The administration has also refused to pursue a policy that gained as much support as it did from the exploitation of anti-Russian nationalism in eastern Europe.
All that having been said, the administration is going to be disappointed. Having scrapped the shield, it has held out the false promise that this decision will make Moscow more cooperative in pressuring Iran. As I have said before, this is not going to happen. The decsion to abandon this shield was the right one as far as both allied security and Russian relations were concerned, and it should be defended on those grounds. Moscow is certainly pleased that the proposed shield will not be built, but it would be a serious mistake to expect Russian help in squeezing Iran on its nuclear program. Russia has no reason to do this. If the administration insists that Russian support for tightening sanctions or isolating Iran is the “payoff” for abandoning the shield, the decision will be judged to have been a quid pro quo that gained us nothing. If we see it instead not as a concession to Moscow, but rather as a concession to reality and common sense, it does not have to produce Russian cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program to be regarded as the correct and appropriate move.
http://www.amconmag.com/lariso.....e-defense/
S.L. Toddard| 10.14.09 @ 2:32PM
And here as well:
One of the most-often cited reasons for the U.S. to repair its fractured relations with Russia is the notion that the Russians could help pressure Iran to curtail is nuclear ambitions. There is, for sure, a big upside for the U.S. if Russia were to become a reliable ally—but curbing Iran is not one of them. The fact is, the assumption that Russia’s extensive energy and technology ties with the mullahs could be used to influence Iranian nuclear policy is wishful thinking. It also underestimates how resistant Iran would be to any outside pressure on these issues.
This is not meant to discourage the Obama administration from pressing ahead with a more conciliatory approach towards Russia. It’s hardly a secret that NATO is an irritant to Russia. In a speech to military leaders this week, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev cited NATO’s “efforts to widen its military infrastructure near the borders of our country” as an impetus for Russia’s “large-scale rearming.” But the fact that our relations with Russian are in disrepair only underscores that any attempt to outsource our Iran problem to the Russians is misguided.
Short of war—which is all but unthinkable both on military and economic grounds—Iran’s nuclear program is not going to be halted by other states. The world is going to have to adjust to that reality and figure out how best to handle it.
But it is equally important not to respond to Iranian moves with decisions that are sure to degrade relations with Russia. That’s why the Obama administration’s recent bid to link Russian cooperation on Iran to a U.S. halt to planned missile defense installations in central Europe was off base, and even counter-productive.
Ever since the Bush administration proposed building the installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, Moscow has viewed the missile defense plan as a serious provocation. At the annual security conference in Munich in 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin gave a blunt, sharply critical speech assailing U.S. policy and citing the missile defense plans as one of the main irritants in Russia’s relationship with the West. One of the Western responses to Russian objections is that the small number of interceptors that the installations would contain could not significantly counter Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and therefore poses no threat. But this misses the larger problem Moscow has with the development of the technology itself. From the Russian perspective, the installations appear to be a test run of anti-ballistic missile technology that could then be deployed elsewhere, representing an extension of the earlier U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001.
Nor have the Russians been moved by the U.S. portrayal of the installations as a defense against Iranian attack. This was abundantly evident in November, when President Medvedev raised the specter of deploying Iskander missiles to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Polish border as a retaliatory measure. Medvedev made it clear that he intended to treat the installations as a challenge to Russia, and it has been the smart, restrained response of the Obama administration to Medevedev’s speech that has made improved relations between our two countries a real possibility. That said, those relations should not hinge on Russia’s ability to achieve unrealistic goals in Iran.
In truth, the proposed deal of eliminating the missile defense installations in exchange for Russian pressure on Iran is not that balanced a trade, as it offers the Russians relatively little incentive to jeopardize one of their better trading and diplomatic relationships. In the Russian view, these installations should never have been negotiated with the Polish and Czech governments, and they represent another advance of Western military forces into central Europe that was not supposed to follow the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region. Canceling the installations now appears as the elimination of something that should never have come into being in the first place.
This does not mean that non-proliferation cannot be an important part of U.S.-Russian ties. Far more productive and achievable non-proliferation cooperation with Russia regarding the security of nuclear materials in Russia and the former Soviet Union is possible, and it is this option that the administration should pursue in future negotiations. A nuclear Iran would be a candidate for a negotiated deal similar to the one reached with India that would allow Iran to develop its program in exchange for more stringent anti-proliferation monitoring. As with India, this would move outside the traditional Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, which has already been shown to be obsolete several times over the past decade. However, it would provide significant safeguards that Iranian nuclear material does not become a source for any non-state actors or other regimes, reducing any potential Iranian threat to one that can be readily contained and deterred.
http://www.theweek.com/bullpen.....ia_in_Iran