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Buy the Book
Suicide of the West
It is also known as World War One, as in Norman Stone’s short history.
World War One: A Short History
By Norman Stone
(Basic Books, 240 pages, $25)
The pacifist’s preferred term for any war is “senseless,” but more troubled observers would be hard-pressed to apply such a judgment across the board. Even seemingly senseless wars are fought over something in the end. World War I, or the Great War as it was originally known, often seems as close to being about nothing as any war can. Perhaps that’s because its various causes— nationalism and empire and a dangerously embedded alliance system—don’t resonate in contemporary minds in the way that ideas like independence or emancipation or the fight against totalitarianism do. It doesn’t help, either, that on further examination the war seems inextricable from the idea of honor, another discredited abstraction. Those who see the war as meaningless, though, generally refer to its justifications, not to its results. The war left an unholy litany of consequences, starting with millions dead and winding like an intrepid virus through history’s immune system ever since.
Norman Stone’s World War One: A Short History, makes for a difficult reckoning because the book’s subtitle is so apt. In fewer than 200 pages of text and seven chapters—one for each year of the war, plus an introduction and conclusion—Stone breathlessly subsumes so much history and scholarship that the general reader (for whom, presumably, short histories are intended) may feel that he’s missing the war. It raises the question of whether such compressed accounts are the best guides for readers coming to momentous subjects unacquainted. They tend to be written, necessarily, in a kind of shorthand. Still, Stone is able to pack an enormity of information into the smallest space, and with a remarkable eye for detail. We see soldiers drowning in puddles at Third Ypres in 1917, commonly known as the Battle of Passchendaele: “Wounded men who had crawled into shell-holes for safety found that the rain caused the water in them to rise and rise, so that they could see their own deaths by drowning approaching, fractions of an inch at a time.” We see the Italian general Luigi Cadorna, whose disastrous character and judgment helped sink the Italians at Caporetto, and who “even adopted the Roman practice of decimation, shooting every tenth man at random in a regiment that had done badly,” including a father of seven for being last man in formation because he had overslept. We see Germans pushing lorries at Amiens with wheels made of iron or wood because of a rubber shortage; the wheels break up and damage the roads, slowing their progress.
The wonder is that Stone is able to create a narrative of this sweep and brevity while also providing such evocative descriptions. He excels as well at aphorisms, which tend to emerge suddenly out of a thicket of detail. British general Sir Douglas Haig, in command at the horrific Battle of the Somme, was “the best kind of Scottish general, it was said, in that he killed the most Englishmen.” And Stone isn’t all smoke and cannon. After relating the bloodbath that was Verdun, he matter-of-factly concludes that “in a sense it broke the French army, or at any rate strained it to such a degree that the country never really recovered: France’s last moment as a Great Power. When she did fall in 1940, this was partly because her people did not want to go through Verdun again.”
Except in his introductory and concluding chapters, Stone focuses mostly on the decision-making and tactics of generals rather than of political leaders. And as in most World War I histories, they don’t fare terribly well. Stone cites C. S. Forester’s postwar novel, The General, which described the western front’s military leaders as “trying to hammer in a screw and, when it resisted, trying to hammer it harder.” He saves most of his praise for an eastern front general, Aleksei Brusilov, whose Brusilov
Offensive constituted one of Russia’s few shining moments in the war. He credits Brusilov with being among the first to understand the need for new tactics, particularly the need to attack in smaller units and hit strategic targets, especially enemy reserve forces, simultaneously with assaults on the front lines. The ever-hapless Russians failed to build upon Brusilov’s successes during the rest of the war; the Germans, never missing a trick, adopted them in due haste.
Stone’s devotion of nearly equal space to the fighting in the western and eastern fronts might surprise general readers but not those who know that his major work is the definitive The Eastern Front 1914–1917, which he published in the 1970s. “The Russians should have made it obsolete a long time ago,” he writes with typical pungency in his source notes, which alone make the book worthwhile. Unlike some recent historians of the war, like Hew Strachan and John Keegan, Stone does not expound much on the war’s sweeping, debilitating legacy. He does point out that “in four years, the world went from 1870 to 1940,” referring to how military technology—and modern medicine—made amazing leaps during the course of the fighting (by the last year of the war, just 1 percent of wounded men died.) And he notes crucially that at the war’s outset, Western civilization stood at its high-water mark. It even had an end-of-history-like tome to anchor its complacency, à la Francis Fukuyama: Norman Angell’s 1910 book, Great Illusion, which argued that the European powers had so much common economic interest that the idea of war was unthinkable. Prosperity and comity had rendered war obsolete.
Four years later, the West marched off to slaughter. We never regained Angell’s optimism, and who can blame us? It’s been a slow, steady, but relentless decline in purpose, conviction, and cultural vigor. And now, with falling birth rates in Western nations, cultural vigor is beside the point. The saddest part is that the West, unprompted, chose to destroy itself, starting with this miserable war. Perhaps even more than the horrific human cost, this realization that the cataclysm was self-willed must have played a role in stripping the West of its idea of itself and in time, rendering so many of us dubious, ironist—and childless.
Letter to the Editor View all comments (46) | Leave a comment
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Tim| 7.15.09 @ 10:58AM
In Flanders Fields
In Flanders fields the poppies blow
Between the crosses, row on row
That mark our place; and in the sky
The larks, still bravely singing, fly
Scarce heard amid the guns below.
We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Flanders fields.
Take up our quarrel with the foe:
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow
In Flanders fields.
L. Ross| 7.15.09 @ 11:17AM
Well, since we are posting WWI poetry, try this one. By the way, great synopsis.
Dulce Et Decorum Est
Bent double, like old beggars under sacks,
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge,
Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs
And towards our distant rest began to trudge.
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots
But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind;
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
Of disappointed shells that dropped behind.
GAS! Gas! Quick, boys!-- An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time;
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling
And floundering like a man in fire or lime.--
Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,--
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.
cary loos| 7.15.09 @ 11:51AM
These poems, like "Johnny Got His Gun" of a later time depict the horror of early modern warfare. Unlike "Johnny" the poems seem to call out the inevitability of duty and honor. Warfare since the Great one has moved toward a design where stand off killing is sought. The best possible protection for our combatants. It hasn't lessened the horror of the outcome and it hasn't lessened the casualty figures. I find reading about WWI facinating; like a window out on an unlived,
but known past. I appreciate reviews like this one. I don't know where else one would ever even learn of this books existence (NR, Weekly Standard, maybe.)
Steven Weingartner| 7.15.09 @ 12:45PM
The war had both meaning and purpose. It was fought to forestall German expansion and agression and to prevent Germany from establishing herself as Europe's hegemon. That's a worthwhile reason to fight.
J.C.Eaton| 7.15.09 @ 12:47PM
Second the motion foe huzzahs on the quality review. I'll look for the book asap. I find the study of the Great War fascinating as well; so many firsts...so many mistakes....so many lessons. First time the Allied Powers looked to America big-time to pull chestnuts out of fires. Yes, the Great Powers had put in their years of slaughter and commitment but it was left to America to finish the job. Mistakes in strategy[Allies wasting precious men and materiel defending empires that they effectively would soon enough lose anyway]. And armistices....the way to insure that eventually, the job will have to be undertaken again Of course the Germans never believed they were fairly beaten and the simmering led to you know who and you know what. Caesar was not a very nice guy, but he knew how to end wars. Parading Vercingetorix through Rome in a cage wasn't stylish or compassionate, but it was final.
scott| 7.15.09 @ 1:08PM
the idea that the West went from peak to trough after WWI is unsettling. it also makes Britain's heroic response during WWII all the more incredible. the rejection of its infamous hero, Churchill, after the war-stupefying. truly a nation bent on suicide after an unbelievable "been there, done that" trajectory.
Steven Weingartner| 7.15.09 @ 1:08PM
America did not pull the Allies' chestnuts out of the fire. America's material and military contributions were negligible. American troops in Europe were mostly armed and equipped by the French and took part in very little actual fighting. What made America's involvement significant was the realization by all parties that it would enable the Allies to go on fighting into 1919 when Germany couldn't. In other words America's involvement was important mainly for what it portended. The war was won militarily by the British and French, by a combination of naval blockade and grinding ground warfare. Also, the Allies weren't defending their empires--they were defending themselves. Verdun didn't destroy the French army; if anything, it put paid on German notions that she would be able to defeat France. The French army emerged from the post-Verdun crisis stronger than before: strong enough to beat the Germans.
Steven Weingartner| 7.15.09 @ 1:20PM
If anything the war should have continued into and through 1919--or long enough for the Allies to march to Berlin. They should have taken Berlin and occupied the German lands. They quit at precisely the wrong moment, when they had the wherewithal to achieve a decisive victory.
Doctor Right| 7.15.09 @ 1:41PM
The worst moment of the 20th century?
American involvement in World War One.
Why did we need to get involved in a large-scale, family squabble among the great Empires of Europe? What national purpose did it serve?
What would have been so bad about a German victory in "the great war"? Would transatlantic trade with Europe have ceased simply because Germany controlled large swathes of France?
And what made Imperial Germany worse than Imperial Britain, or Imperial France?
Frankly, the world and the 20th century would have been better off if the USA had stayed-out of it, and if Germany had won the war.
A German victory in World War One would have prevented the disaster of the Treaty at Versailles, the humiliation of the German nation, the rise of the Nazi Party, and the horror of World War Two. It would have allowed a victorious Germany and the United States to focus on the defeat of Bolshevism in the east, and probably would have led to the downfall of the Soviet Union and global Communism.
Tim| 7.15.09 @ 1:54PM
As a young soldier, my father stopped in Verdun in 1944. No great ephiphany but he said the shell craters were still visible and he was struck by the millions of bones stacked in a crypt. He counted himself lucky to have missed any battles like that.
Steven Weingartner| 7.15.09 @ 1:56PM
What I am implying in my preceding comments is that there is nothing original in Norman Stone's analysis. Rather it is yet another in a long line of historical treatments that view the war as unnecessary and therefore a waste. Stone, like so many historians before him, conflates the horrors of the war with the reasons for fighting it. As if those horrors obviate the reasons. A truly original treatment of the war would be one that recognized that the war was fought to prevent German domination of Europe, which Germany was bent on achieving either by bullying or by force.
Steven Weingartner| 7.15.09 @ 2:02PM
"What would have been so bad about a German victory in "the great war?"
Ask the French. Ask the Russians. Ask the Jews. Ask the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe. Ask all of Europe, which would have had to dance to the tune Germany played. Ask the United States, which would have been progressively diminished as a world power in the face of German dominance on the continent.
And, yes, German governance would have been far more repressive--"worse"--than that provided by the comparatively liberal democracies of Britain and France.
Roy| 7.15.09 @ 3:47PM
Re: L Ross:
I've always wondered about that poem, because with a little more imagination the author might have realized that the entire poem prior to the last two lines explains why soldiers actually are respected. His point is "war isn't glorious; it isn't a picnic with trumpets in the bright sunlight, it consists of exhaustion and gas attacks" then I would have to say "that's exactly why those who go through it deserve to be glorified".
Ellie Mayhem| 7.15.09 @ 4:23PM
Mr. Beston:
"Enormity" refers to the seriousness of a situation, not the size of it. I think you might mean that Stone "packs an 'enormous amount' of information into the smallest space".
Reinhard| 7.15.09 @ 4:27PM
Steven "Germophobe" Weingartner:
The truth is that the Germans were pulled into WWI thought treaty obligations. No doubt you feel they started it.
Odd that based on the following list, Germany seems to be the extreme minority in declaring war.
Detailed below is a list of the nations who formally declared hostilities during World War One, along with their date of entrance. Nations of the British Empire, e.g. Australia, Canada and New Zealand, automatically entered the war with Britain's decision to enter the fray on 4 August 1914.
Note that on numerous occasions hostilities were assumed without a formal declaration, e.g. Russia with Germany and Austria-Hungary in August 1914.
Australia
Entered war together with Britain on 4 August 1914
Austria-Hungary
Declared war with Serbia on 28 July 1914
Declared war with Russia on 6 August 1914
Declared war with Belgium on 28 August 1914
Declared war with Portugal on 15 March 1916
Belgium
Invaded by Germany on 3 August 1914
Bolivia
Severed relations with Germany on 13 April 1917
Brazil
Severed relations with Germany on 11 April 1917
Declared war with Germany on 26 October 1917
Bulgaria
Declared war with Serbia on 14 October 1915
Declared war with Romania on 1 September 1916
Canada
Entered war together with Britain on 4 August 1914
China
Severed relations with Germany on 14 March 1917
Declared war with Germany on 14 August 1917
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 14 August 1917
Costa Rica
Severed relations with Germany on 21 September 1917
Declared war with Germany on 23 May 1918
Cuba
Declared war with Germany on 7 April 1917
Ecuador
Severed relations with Germany on 8 December 1917
France
Invaded by Germany on 2 August 1914
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 12 August 1914
Declared war with Turkey on 5 November 1914
Declared war with Bulgaria on 16 October 1915
Germany
Declared war with Russia on 1 August 1914
Declared war with France on 3 August 1914
Declared war with Belgium on 4 August 1914
Declared war with Portugal on 9 March 1916
Greece
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 27 June 1917
Declared war with Bulgaria on 27 June 1917
Declared war with Germany on 27 June 1917
Declared war with Turkey on 27 June 1917
Guatemala
Declared war with Germany on 23 April 1918
Haiti
Declared war with Germany on 12 July 1918
Honduras
Declared war with Germany on 19 July 1918
Italy
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 23 May 1915
Declared war with Turkey on 21 August 1915
Declared war with Germany on 28 August 1915
Declared war with Bulgaria on 19 October 1915
Japan
Declared war with Germany on 23 August 1914
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 25 August 1914
Liberia
Declared war with Germany on 4 August 1914
Montenegro
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 5 August 1914
Declared war with Germany on 8 August 1914
Declared war with Bulgaria on 15 October 1915
New Zealand
Entered war together with Britain on 4 August 1914
Nicaragua
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 8 May 1918
Declared war with Germany on 8 May 1918
Panama
Declared war with Germany on 7 April 1917
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 10 December 1917
Peru
Severed relations with Germany on 6 October 1917
Portugal
Entered war against Germany on 9 March 1916
Entered war against Austria-Hungary on 15 March 1916
Romania
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 27 August 1916
Exited war with Treaty of Bucharest on 7 May 1918
Re-entered the war on 10 November 1918
Russia
Declared war with Turkey on 2 November 1914
Declared war with Bulgaria on 19 October 1915
San Marino
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 3 June 1915
Serbia
Declared war with Germany on 6 August 1914
Declared war with Turkey on 2 November 1914
Siam
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 22 July 1917
Declared war with Germany on 22 July 1917
Turkey
Declared war with Romania on 30 August 1916
Severed relations with United States on 23 April 1917
United Kingdom
Declared war with Germany on 4 August 1914
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 12 August 1914
Declared war with Turkey on 5 November 1914
Declared war with Bulgaria on 15 October 1915
United States of America
Declared war with Germany on 6 April 1917
Declared war with Austria-Hungary on 7 December 1917
Uruguay
Severed relations with Germany on 7 October 1917
CS Lewis| 7.15.09 @ 5:29PM
No one has mentioned Turkey and their involvment in WWI. I googled for some info and this book came up, a lot to be brought out about the Muslim/Islamic connection to the Germans.
http://books.google.com/books?id=uI5Osq9_WKkC&dq=the+Muslim+connection+to+World+War+1+&+World+War+11&printsec=frontcover&source=in&hl=en&ei=ZEReSoSCGoT-MPGLta4C&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=13
"Just before Britain's entry into the war, "Hell in the Holy Land, World War I in the Middle East", Turkey had concluded a secret treaty with Berlin. London tried to keep Turkey neutral. The Turks however, egged on by the German Military Mission, prepared plans to attack both the Russians and British... (page 2) Turkey responded by invoking a jihad, or holy war against the infidels.
CS Lewis| 7.15.09 @ 5:32PM
sorry about that long link... just the way it came up.
J.C.Eaton| 7.16.09 @ 1:28AM
Sorry Steve, we disagree on just about everything you wrote. Comparatively, American losses in the Great War were a fraction of the Allies, but they were substantial. While you may consider Chateau Thierry in general and Bellau Wood in particular insignificant, the Germans did not. Had it not been for the Americans the Germans could well have taken the road to Rheims, and having gotten to the railyards there, have doubled their resupply capacity.The Americans also did the lion"s share in breaking the St. Mihiel salient which had been[as you no doubt know] in German hands since 1914. Having said all that, the Americans had 25 divisions inEurope in 1917 and were unloading 250,000 more troops per month. Four million more were being trained in the States.So yeah, I guess the Americans were a bit of a portent. As far as your dismissive denial that the Allies were defending their empires, you are simply mistaken. The Allies were all wrapped around the axle in Africa, and the the Middle East by Germany in the former and their Turkish allies in the latter. A tiny contingent of German-led Afrikaners and black Africans troubled them for most of the war. This forced the Brits to use men and materiel they needed desperately on the Western Front. The Germans never bothered to surrender in Africa; they were never defeated and their leader enjoyed a hero's welcome at war's end.The French Army was shattered by their offensive strategy....they finally mutinied, remember? At least you concede my point about the effectiveness of the Armistice; it didn't provide anything beyond time for Germany to catch her breath.
J.C.Eaton| 7.16.09 @ 1:36AM
Sorry Steve, again. The" 1917" should have been 1918. Best,
Nastyunya | 7.16.09 @ 4:21AM
Good post, very senk!
Thunderbottom| 7.16.09 @ 11:11AM
I found this book by chance in the "New Books" display of my local library. I found it a quick and enlightening read . I thought that Norman Stone found plenty of blame to pass around : from the petulant behavior of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to the nihilistic Serbian nationalists who assassinated him; from the Russians with their clumsy mobilization system that drew Germany into the war to the Germans whose offensive sweep through a neutral country (Belgium) drew Great Britain into the war. Furthermore, from the first chapter, I gathered that Germany sooner or later would have found reason to declare war on Russia which was improving and expanding its railway system (which meant greater mobility for her troops). Had Germany not declared war on Russia, the czarist regime would not have totally collapsed and Lenin's Bolsheviks would have been denied the opportunity to seize power. The war led to the downfall of four ruling dynasties (Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, Romanov, and Ottoman) and destroyed the confidence in the social democracies ruling Britain, France, and Italy. It also marked the emergence of the U.S. as a world power.
Steven Weingartner| 7.16.09 @ 1:10PM
J.C. Eaton:
I subscribe to Fritz Fischer's views. I suspect you do not.
As for your assessment of the importance of American operations at Chateau Thierry and St. Mihiel: you're wrong. In the big scheme of things, they were indeed insignificant--and quite small in terms of scale. The fact that American forces suffered substantial casualties does not obviate this point. The truth is, the Americans suffered substantial casualties not because their contribution was substantial but because, being newcomers to warfare on the Western Front, they weren't very proficient at it. Yes, they won those two battles, but in doing so made just about every mistake their British, French and Belgian allies had learned over the course of the war not to commit.
As for your assessment that Africa was important: again, you're wrong. The Great War in Africa never even rose to the level of a sideshow. The British commitment of men and material to the war in Africa in general and chasing Lettow-Vorbeck was negligble compared to other theaters of war. And, BTW, you're also wrong in saying that the Germans in Africa never surrendered. Lettow-Vorbeck did indeed surrender to the British on 23 November 1918, which is ipso facto an admission of defeat--not the act of a victorious army. It is true that he wasn't defeated in the field, but he lost the war in Africa nonetheless, and he admitted it.
The French army was not shattered by its offensive strategy, it was grievously wounded: a distinction with a difference. Elements of the army did mutiny in 1917: emphasis on "elements." The French army remained intact, which is one reason why the Gemans could not take advantage of the situation. In the event, the French leadership quickly addressed, and redressed, the situation, and the French army went to achieve victory.
I would note in this regard that French operations at Verdun were initially defensive in nature, for the very logical reason that it was the Germans who attacked. If anything it was the German army that was ruined by its offensive/attrition strategy at Verdun.
The German army's 1918 offensives are only supercially impressive. They had no real strategic goal other than to compel the Allies to throw in the towel before the Americans arrived in overwhelming force. But the Allies weren't going to throw in the towel because ... they knew the Americans were going to arrive in overwhelming force. The Germans pushed forward, but with no certain aim.
J.C.Eaton| 7.16.09 @ 2:50PM
Steve, Lettow-Vorbeck was defeated in about the same way and to a lessor extent as Nathan Bedford Forrest. Which is to say he led the Brits all over southwest Africa with no money, no supplies and no umbilical cord to Germany for the duration, and was not beaten in the field. He ran his war on smoke, mirrors and stolen British equipment and good for him. You won't convince me and don't care, and back at ya.Actually, you inadvertantly made my initial point yourself. America DID pull chestnuts and you as much as admit it with your "portended" comment. If as you say, the German 1918 offensives were calculated to stampede the Allies before the Americans could arrive in force, then logically, both sides expected the Americans to be determinative. As for your thinly veiled disparagement of the American fighting men, the Germans never referred to the Frogs as Teuffel-hunds[Devil dogs] as they did after a brushup with the Marines. sorry, gotta go.WW2 next time. Best,
charles hatvani| 7.17.09 @ 12:14AM
It's sad to read denigration of the US involvement in Europe in some of these contributions. The US was seen in Europe during both WW1 & 2 as the bearer of democratic & humanitarian ideals, & the so called american & in general western way of life infinitely preferable to that represented at the time by the Germans, later again by the Germans, Russians & their sundry allies. Long live the sacred memory of Lusitania, the Doughboys, etc., etc.
jordan 6 rings | 7.17.09 @ 4:53AM
Good post, very senk!
ARealist| 7.18.09 @ 2:11PM
WWI is a war in which the USA never should have been involved.
We had no business getting involved nor was the USA threatened in any way.
The Germans only feared the USA would enter on the side of the UK and they hoped the USA would not. They had no plans or desires to invade or attack the USA.
Wilson, in his narcissism and elitism, wanted to be a world leader , and by god, involving the USA in that bloodbath was a sure way to do that.
It is a fact that the USA's entry into the war convinced the Germans to surrender.
Prior to the US entry AND subsequent to the US entry the Germans had NEVER LOST A SIGNIFICANT BATTLE (one which required the Germans to retreat over a large areas).
The American battle victories only pushed the Germans back in limited areas; that's it, and perhaps required the Germans to re-think any new offensive plans.
It did however demonstrate to the Germans that the USA entry into the war would be a real big problem for them if millions of Yanks were ultimately to be placed on the front lines under AMERICAN CONTROL (not French or English).
The war was at a stalemate before the US entry; both sides were exhausted and did not have the werewithal to make decisive advances. Aside from holding on to territory already gained, both sides were basically stuck were they were.
But, with the US involved, the Germans realized that their goals - first developed immediately after the Franco-Prussian War - could not be realized; the military defeat of France.
Recall that in 1914 the Prussians still ruled the roost in a country that had only become a united "country" about 50 years prior to WWI.
If their goals could not be realized, there was no point in continuing, esp. given the food shortages and economic hardships within Germany.
They sued for peace.
What if the Germans had won?
They probably would have imposed upon France a treaty similar to that which ended the Franco-Prussian War, and would have forced the British (whose Royal Family was GERMAN- the House of Hannover !! Also, the Kaiser was Queen Victoria's first grandchild, and very jealous of his English cousins' navy and colonies ), to trade some of their foreign colonies. The Germans also would have been more aggressive in their goals in Africa and Asia.
In either case, the USA would not have been threatened.
Many German Jews fought in the German Army in WWI. There was no Nazi party at that time and German Jews were more assimilated into German society than probably any other country in the world. Many German Jews considered themselves German first and Jewish second. Intermarriage was common, and economically, German Jews were very will off.
For the USA, WWI was a huge mistake because it set the stage for the US to intervene in European affairs, directly contradicting the advice of Alexander Hamilton and George Washington who insisted the USA not get involved in the affairs of foreign nations, esp. in Europe.
Wilson ignored this advice, and established a template, that to this day, has led to the USA becoming ceaselessly embroiled in the affairs of foreign nations.
Ark Ashamed of Bill| 7.22.09 @ 9:29PM
The big World War I question is raised by Thomas Fleming’s “Illusion of Victory,” which says that the war dragged on for as long as it did because Woodrow Wilson refused to enforce neutrality laws, thus making the US the Allies’ supply depot and bank. Fleming says that in the absence of American supplies and financing the Allies would have been forced to negotiate peace in 1916. Since this work restricts itself to the military commanders this point is not addressed.
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