Not even midway through President Donald Trump’s second presidency, the American and Western foreign policy establishment is already planning for a post-Trump world. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) website features “The Future of American Strategy Initiative,” which is described as a “multiyear effort” to fundamentally reevaluate American strategy by “leading CFR scholars.” The initiative, according to Rebecca Lissner, who was a national security adviser to Vice President Kamala Harris, will “incorporate views from across the political spectrum.” Judging by the first installment, the CFR’s “political spectrum” doesn’t include those who support an America First foreign policy.
Many of the expert contributors are openly derisive of Trump’s approach to the world. Charles Kupchan accuses Trump of practicing “unilateralism” that is “magnifying the centrifugal forces that are fueling international instability.” Trump’s promotion of reindustrialization, Kupchan writes, is a “delusion.” Gideon Rose writes that the current administration is retreating from “global leadership” and not pursuing American “ideals,” leaving behind the gains of the post-World War II international order. Paul Stares accuses Trump of upending and, possibly, eviscerating “long-established principles of U.S. foreign policy,” causing “profoundly disruptive consequences for the rest of the planet.” He suggests that we’ll have to “start from scratch” using a “zero-based assessment” after Trump leaves office. (RELATED: Leaks, Bureaucracy, and the Battle Over US Foreign Policy)
Stephen Sestanovich, who served in the Clinton administration, writes about “shocks” to the international system and suggests that the Trump presidency “could prove to be the biggest shock of all,” requiring his successors to “restore previous relationships and institutions.” He criticizes Trump’s “narrow focus” on the Western hemisphere and his unilateralism in the use of military force. “Trump’s foreign policy,” Sestanovich suggests, “could, ironically, generate a consensus on the need to rebuild those elements of a multilateral order that he has been most determined to tear down.” (RELATED: The Myth of the ‘Liberal International Order’)
Elliott Abrams, a member of the discredited neoconservative movement, decries the lack of bipartisanship in foreign policy that dangerously (in his view) inhibits and constrains a president in conducting an activist foreign policy. Manjari Miller notes Trump’s “hostility toward the United States’ old alliances,” and his “disdain for established norms” that have resulted in allies questioning U.S. reliability. Future U.S. administrations, she writes, will “need to rebuild and reinforce partnerships” after Trump leaves office. Shiela Smith accuses Trump of ushering in “an era of retrenchment” in foreign policy that is causing our Indo-Pacific allies to question U.S. reliability. Future presidents, Smith writes, will need to rebalance the “strategic bargain” with our important allies in the region.
Liana Fix characterizes the current international scene as one of “transition and disruption,” and claims that the Trump administration is retreating from Europe, but she believes that Europe can provide for its own non-nuclear security. She is less critical of Trump than most of the other contributors, noting that a “Europe that is strong militarily, economically, and technologically — serves U.S. interests, even if it increasingly acts on its own.” Fix’s views are echoed somewhat by Matthias Matthijs, who contends that the U.S.-Europe alliance relationship “will have to become more reciprocal, more selective, and more grounded in capabilities, because the old model of asymmetric dependence is no longer politically sustainable.” The United States, he writes, “will remain the anchor of European security, but Europeans will do far more for themselves.” I think Trump would agree. (RELATED: NATO Commits Suicide — All We Can Do Is Bury It)
Steven A. Cook actually gives Trump credit for recognizing the changes in the security architecture in the Middle East, especially the more prominent role played by the Gulf states. And he recognizes that Trump regards the Middle East — except for the Iranian nuclear threat — as less important to U.S. security than the Indo-Pacific. Will Freeman, on the other hand, accuses Trump of “playing a mostly coercive hand” in Latin America that may result in short-term gains but will not likely “restore lost influence across much of [South America].” Freeman appears to view Trump’s attempt to consolidate hemispheric security as counterproductive, or at least, ineffectual. Michelle Gavin, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Botswana and U.S. representative to the South African Development Community during the Obama administration, accuses the Trump administration of having “anachronistic and dismissive ideas about Africa,” which, if not changed, will prevent the United States from competing with other powers (i.e., China) for influence in Africa.
Edward Fishman, who served in the State Department under John Kerry during the Obama administration, writes about geoeconomics and scolds the Trump administration for waging economic warfare “against adversaries and allies alike,” which has eroded trust within the Western economic bloc that won the Cold War, and is leading to “economic fragmentation.” Another Obama state department official, Heidi Crebo-Rediker, blames Trump for damaging alliances, weakening institutions, and erasing the line between economic policy and national security. Trump’s “more nationalist posture” has “called into question whether the United States is bound by the norms and values it has long demanded that others respect.” The next administration, she writes, will need to rebuild trust and restore respect for “multilateral institutions.”
Biden administration official Brad Setser criticizes Trump for “weaponizing” trade by using tariffs to “compel U.S. trading partners to accept unequal terms.” The next president, Setser contends, will need to birth a new economic order. Ben Steil accuses Trump of undermining the “multilateral trading system” that emerged from the aftermath of World War II, and calls for a revival — even on a smaller scale — of multilateralism. Alice Hill, who served on Obama’s National Security Council and in the Department of Homeland Security, criticizes Trump for ignoring the threat posed by climate change.
Biden national security official Rush Doshi writes that Trump has ruptured U.S. alliances, which he views as our greatest asset in a strategy to balance China. The next administration, Doshi says, will need to rebuild trust and credibility that Trump squandered. Trump, he writes, by “acting alone,” has made it more difficult to balance China. Stuart Reid believes Trump is being unrealistic in trying to divide Russia from China because “unlike in the 1970s, there is not a split to exploit” the way Nixon did. The best we can do, Reid believes, is to strengthen our alliances to combat the Sino-Russian axis — and Trump has weakened, not strengthened, our alliances, according to Reid.
Max Boot, another neocon whose past misjudgments about U.S. military strategy should give pause to anyone who reads what he writes about war and strategy, is pro-Ukraine War and seemingly pro-Iran War, but faults Trump for lacking a strategy designed to translate military victories into desired political outcomes. Erin Dumbacher, another Biden official, seems to blame Trump for everything that is wrong in the world. Trump, she writes, has lost the trust of U.S. allies and squandered U.S. global leadership. She accuses the Trump administration of causing hundreds of thousands of deaths in the “Global South,” ceding the moral high ground to China. (RELATED: Max Boot’s Reagan Is the Worst Book of the Year)
There is a sprinkling of essays in CFR’s first installment that are fair to Trump — Laura Taylor-Kale and Ray Takeyh write objectively about Trump’s defense priorities. But if future installments are like this one, the “political spectrum” of CFR experts will be narrow indeed.
Why is any of this important? Because if Trump is succeeded by a more conventional foreign policy president — Republican or Democrat — America First will wither on the vine, and the new administration will be staffed by people who think as the CFR experts noted above. That would gradually undo all of Trump’s foreign policy accomplishments and return to power the “geniuses” that guided the Bush 43, Obama, and Biden foreign policies. In that regard, it is worth remembering what Jimmy Carter’s political adviser Hamilton Jordan said before the 1976 election about the Washington foreign policy establishment: “If after the inauguration you find Cy Vance as Secretary of State, and Zbigniew Brzezinski as head of National Security, then I would say we failed.” We saw how that administration’s foreign policies turned out.
READ MORE from Francis P. Sempa:
Constructive Engagement: Are We Going to Do This Again?
