War Warning Part 5, United Nations Security Council Plan

1. The UNSC has accepted the IAEA report that Tehran is in flagrant violation of the NPT.

2. Tehran makes it a policy to boast that it is in violation of the NPT and that it will not acknowledge the UNSC authority with regard the NPT. Tehran’s policy includes continuing public statements that are aimed to provoke and humiliate the UNSC. Tehran is following the North Korean path exactly. Tehran does not regard the UNSC as a threat.

3. The UNSC is divided into at least three hardened factions: The US is allied with the EU three of UK, France, and the de facto member UNSC of Germany; Russia is a faction; China is a faction. The US led faction wants to move the UNSC as quickly as possible (four to eight weeks) toward Chapter 7 sanctions. Russia does not want to move quickly though it is most decidely against Iran bolting from the NPT or otherwise continuing on a path to acquire a full industrial cycle for both uranium and plutonium warheads: Russia’s policy is driven by Gazprom politics: Russia must deal with Iran going forward: more below. China does not want to break with Iran in any fashion and is in fact responsible for Iran’s acquisition of both nuclear and ballistic missile technology; China also does not have a coherent policy: China is a fickle, treacherous, hostile, brittle adversary.

4. The US faction is pushing hard for Chapter 7 in order to begin the sanctions process that is believed will weaken the Tehran regime. The EU 3 — UK, Fr, and DR (Germany) — do not want Chapter 7 sanctions that bite since it is believed this will trigger and oil crisis; however collectively they accept the fact that the Tehran regime believes it can bully the UNSC without consequences and therefore the UNSC must show a united front. The UK and FR position is voluble, agitated, informed and hardened. The German position is less harded but is useful because a number of German firms have dual use contracts with Iran, and therefore Germany represents a country that is prepared to suffer economic penalties in the event of sanctions against dual use technology.

5. The Russian position is sophisticated. No one on the UNSC has better intelligence sources inside Iran, inside the Tehran regime, inside the IRGC and Council of Elders, than the Russian military. The Russian intell is better than first rate and dwarfs whatever UK has with its nascent rebel faction in Khuzistan or what the US has with its tentacles through the Kurds into northwest Iran. The Russian intell is so good that the Russians have offered to assist in the event regime-change is required. The US faction rejects the Russian offer. Russia is frustrated and at the same time patient. Russia does not want a beggarly Iran. If the choice for Russia is between a nuclear tipped Iran and a beggarly Iran, Russia will choose the status quo. Russia needs Iran as a wedge between the Wahhabists in the Ummah and the oil-soaked Central Asian client states; also Russia knows that only Iran is capable of matching the connections the Wahhabists have with the Chechen martyrs. At the same time, Russia needs Iran as an ally in order to fend off the Chinese aim to consolidate its power across the Ummah.

6. The Chinese position at the UNSC is weak and inarticulate and partially out of date. The Chinese strategic policy since the 1980s and the fall of the Soviet empire has been that the US strategic power must be overwhelmed with hotspots. Hence the nuke and ballistic missile proliferation to North Korea and Pakistan; then to Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Libya. (The next phase of proliferation calls for Africa: Sudan, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Africa.) (Mention that Venezuela is now a fresh concern, along with Bolivia, Cuba, Peru, Mexico.) The Chinese strategic position favors proloferation like cancer because it obsolesces the US strategic power. This is the Jiang Zemin policy as designed and prosecuted by the PLA. The difficulty is the that PLA vision is now not the only policy at Bejing. The new policy is to cooperate with the Bejing custormers in order to keep the cash coming. China now speaks with two voices — one that favors continuous proliferation, one that favors continuous profit. The proverb says that when the emperor speaks with two voices, China is week. Therefore: China is weak at the UNSC and depends upon the pressure of the US faction to direct its path.

7. The Tehran regime regards the UNSC as impotent. The regime holds that it can provoke the UNSC as much as it wants and still suffer no penalty. Tehran believes that neither Russia nor China will permit Chapter 7 sanctions without severe fracturing of the UNSC. Then again, at all times Tehran acts as if Russia and China may vote on precedural matters toward Chapter 7 in order to pressure Tehran to make concessions. Tehran believes that the opposition in the West to the US hegemony will splinter the UNSC. Tehran believes that it can prolong the UNSC debate through the summer months.

7a There is an alternative scenario that argues that Tehran means to drag out the UNSC debate into the indefinite future: this view believes that Tehran can play Russia off the US, that Tehran can play China off the US, that envy of the US can be used to slow and even wreck whatever agreement can be reached at the UNSC. This alternative scenario does not

8. The US position is to press the UNSC as heavily as possible through the next four to six weeks. This can look like at least two rounds of consultations with member governments. The US-UK-FR-DR coalition believes it can win nine votes at the UNSC and that Russia and China will not use the veto. Importantly, the US position does not ask for Chapter 7, Article 41 and 42; the US position asks for an array of sanctions against providing Iran with dual use nuclear and or ballistic technology. The US position is firm, focused, well-planned, extremely well-informed of the major players.

9. The US position will be strengthened by the negotiations in Nigeria with regard Sudan and the Darfur chaos. The Darfur crisis is a model of how the US can maneuver its coalition at the UNSC against the intransigence of Russia and China. China does not want sanctions against the Khartoum regime. At the same time China does not believe it can risk using its veto if the UNSC pushes for sanctions. Note that Sudan is on the Chinese strategic list for proliferation.

10. The United Nations Charter, Chapter 7, Article 42, is a potent weapon. The Tehran regime does not fear it. Tehran believes that the overwhelming force represented by the UNSC is satanic, and that the more powerful the UNSC adversary, the more Allah will provide. Tehran does not recognize what is understood as rational deterrence.

11. Emphasize that Tehran does not calculate rationally.

More soon (Next: United States War Plan S)