Here are some further points I did not discuss in the
main article for risk of digressing too far, but are worth
noting anyway:
• The Majlis Al-A’yan in Basra that declared its solidarity with
the protests in Anbar is an example of how reactions to the current
political crisis have crossed sectarian boundaries. As Qasim Zuhair
of the Baghdad-based newspaper Al-Aalem pointed out to me,
the tribal council in question is not all that influential.
Previously, the council
has complained that the Maliki government has not done enough
to provide good public services and stimulate economic growth in
Basra. Thus, their sympathy with the anti-Maliki sentiment in the
Anbar protests is not all that surprising.
Further, it is likely that at least some of the sheikhs on the
council sympathize with the pro-autonomy movement in Basra
province, which has the same grievances against the central
government as the Majlis al-A’yan.
The autonomy movement encompasses members of mainstream parties
like the Sadrist Fadhila (Islamic Virtue Party) and some from the
ranks of Maliki’s own Islamic Dawa Party. However, as of yet it
still lacks sufficient popular support to achieve anything
meaningful on the ground, and Maliki himself remains opposed to the
idea of autonomy for Basra.
• Some might see the attack of certain demonstrators on Saleh
al-Mutlaq as indicative of openly militant sentiment in the Anbar
protests, but given that Mutlaq was once a fierce critic of Maliki
— openly describing him on CNN as a dictator worse than Maliki —
it comes as no shock that many of the protesters regard him with
such disdain. Further, it should be noted that the situation was
exacerbated when guards in
Mutlaq’s entourage fired on demonstrators who were throwing
shoes at him (a sign of extreme dislike, to be sure, but not beyond
the pale).