Over at the Foreign Policy Association, I’ve written a brief
review of a memo
published by the Council on Foreign Relations, titled “Renewed
Violence in Iraq.” Authored by Douglas Ollivant of the New America Foundation, the report
offers practical recommendations as to how the U.S. can help the
Iraqi government cope with a number of relevant security
contingencies.
“To what end..?” you may be asking yourself. These days, if we
speak of the war in Iraq, we do so in brief, terse terms reserved
for an ultimately unpopular war. A war best remembered for false
start declarations of missions accomplished and the slow bleed of
American blood and treasure. Not a popular subject…but one that
demands our attention.
Ollivant summates the security implications, expertly:
“Iraq is also not only an influencer but a participant in the
“Arab-Persian” axis. It is primarily an Arab country like much of
the Middle East, but it has a Shia majority like Iran that
exercises political control. Similarly, Iraq is a frontline state
in the conflict between moderate Islam and al-Qaeda, a battle for
ideas that will continue to be of major import in the fight against
terrorism. Iraq has a significant minority Kurdish population, a
distinction it shares with the otherwise dissimilar Iranian,
Turkish, and Syrian regimes. With the world’s fifth-largest oil
reserves, Iraq’s output can stabilize or roil markets, directly
affecting the U.S. economy. As Iraq moves back into the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota system,
how it aligns within the organization—whether with the
stability-oriented bloc of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States or with
the more ideological bloc led by Iran and Venezuela—will have clear
implications for U.S. energy policy.”
As I wrote for FPA, that list provides an effective aggregate of
America’s enduring interest in the future of Iraqi governance and
energy output.
Having detailed all the internecine and intra-national spats
that have plagued the country since the 2003 invasion (plus newly
emergent ‘Shi’a vs. Shi’a’ frictions), Ollivant pleads stubbornly
optimistic that the state has potential as an “emerging regional
power.” In theory, he’s correct.
As I wrote for
the Foreign Policy Association, Iraqi oil production now outpaces
Iran, while the parliamentary democracy (although fragile) and
“quietest Shi’a tradition” (as embodied by Grand Ayatollah Ali al
Sistani’s opposition to Khomenei’s vision of Islamic guardianship)
remain obstacles to the brittle legitimacy and power of Iran’s
titular theocracy.
Of course, Iraqi opposition to Iranian influence is a matter of
profound intricacy, hinging on matters of religious, social and
political identity. Although it’s a matter many would like to
forget, U.S. policymakers would alienate Iraq at our peril…as
Ollivant suggests,
delicate American assistance, regional, bilateral partnerships
(e.g., with Ankara) and electoral stability could still
prove an effective counterbalance Iran’s regional sway.
