Over on the main site, John has authored a
well-crafted take on Marco Rubio’s foreign policy address,
given yesterday at the Brookings Institution. There will be plenty
of time to tackle the nature of “neo-Reaganism” in a post-Cold War
world, but for now, I’ll couch my response to the timbres of
neoconservatism.
John writes:
The neocons are often cast as the villains of the Bush years,
blamed for leading the country into a calamitous Mesopotamian
misadventure. The historical record doesn’t really support this
narrative. The invasion of Iraq was supported by a broad swath of
the right, left, and center.
Fair point. In fact, 373 senators and representatives — from
both sides of the aisle — were somehow duped into believing the
following:
1. Iraq’s exaggerated power presented a critical threat to
America’s national security;
2. A de facto ally (however unpleasant) against Islamic
fundamentalism, and a strategic counterbalance to Iran needed to be
removed, as swiftly as possible;
3. The invasion and “liberation” of a Muslim country in the
Middle East would not become a recruiting poster for Islamic
terrorists;
4. The U.S. invasion of Iraq would not destabilize the region or
topple “friendly” regimes in neighboring Arab states;
5. We could create a stable, liberal democracy that would be
friendly to American interests, despite the fact that an electoral
democracy would, predictably, put Shi’a groups in power — groups
supported by Iran since Ba’athi repression drove many to seek
sectarian sanctuary; and,
6. An invasion and long-term occupation of Iraq would pay for
itself, and not cost trillions of dollars, bust the budget or throw
the U.S. economy into a tailspin.
I’m sure both John and I could go on, and on, listing the false
promises/premises of America’s efforts in Iraq. Flattening the
logic that bound presumptive fabrications is an exercise in ease.
As such, I’d respectfully counter that shortsighted, neocon-driven
consensus was just ill-advised groupthink, unimproved by
hindsight.
Now as far as the surge goes…
The instance where President Bush followed the neocons out onto
a limb against skeptical majority opinion was the troop surge,
designed in part by Bob Kagan’s brother Fred. That policy rescued
the war from totally unmitigated disaster; one would think that
would leave its architects at least somewhat vindicated.
Again, I’ll agree with John that the surge “rescued the war from
unmitigated disaster.” But its misfortune was much more refined.
The surge saved lives — this much is true. What it didn’t do was
create an environment needed for political reconciliation,
recognize that the United States — alone — cannot stabilize the
Middle East, or prevent what our presence ultimately prolonged.
And finally:
An idea isn’t necessarily bad because George W. Bush was
attracted to it. The vision of American hegemony as an engine of
freedom is one artifact of the Bush years that is worth defending,
and good for Marco Rubio for defending it.
I admire this sentiment, but I often disagree with its practical
application. I recognize that exceptionalism is native to American
soil. After decades waged in a Cold War against the evils of Soviet
Empire, our lot in this world was crisply defined as the White
Knight of international order.
After the fall of communism, America’s sense of purpose has been
reinforced by the emergence of a new, if often exaggerated, global
threat. As John notes, the Reagan doctrine is awkwardly applied
absent a Red Menace.
Neoconservatism has capitalized on our virtuous self-awareness
and our unipolar moment. As David Brooks and Irving Kristol wrote,
“Our nationalism is that of an exceptional nation founded on a
universal principles, on what Lincoln called ‘an abstract truth
applicable to all men and all times.’”
As I’ve written before,
President Wilson shared this vision. He saw the United States as
the “Sir Galahad of nations.” Such sentiment revels in American
dignity of purpose. It burst with a special zeal — one can
understand why neoconservatives boast of “hard Wilsonianism.”
But Machiavellian pragmatism, blended with Platonic idealism
(not to mention a healthy dash of Trotskyism) doesn’t change the
fact that neoconservatism is an odd duck, that’s largely alien to
authentic conservatism.
I presumed its renaissance during the Bush administration was
anachronistic. I figured that American blood and treasure spilled
in Iraq might have exhausted our unilateral leanings. That a $15
trillion debt spent fighting two ground wars, “kinetic military
actions” and a gaggle of drone campaigns might have taught us the
lessons of endless interventionism. That a strong national defense
begins on our shores, because limited government at home doesn’t
sync with big government abroad.
Of course that was right up until Marco Rubio stepped to the mic
and told me otherwise.
