Forgive me if I’m arriving a little late to the debate, but this
gripping discussion of the tenets of neoconservatism has prompted
my comment…with due deference to the erudite opinion already at
play.
For many Americans, nationalism is a basic element of our native
soil. We tend to subscribe to a virtuous self-awareness,
particularly after decades of Cold War tensions crisply delineated
the United States in opposition to the evils of the “Soviet
Empire.” After the fall of communism, this sense has been
reinforced by a decade of unipolarity and the emergence of a new
global threat in the wake of September 11, 2001. Fundamentally,
neoconservatism has capitalized on this attitude, both with respect
to domestic initiatives and what we, as Americans, might offer the
world; as David Brooks and Irving Kristol wrote, “Our nationalism
is that of an exceptional nation founded on a universal principles,
on what Lincoln called ‘an abstract truth applicable to all men and
all times.’”
Such sentiment revels in American dignity and purpose and
bursting with this special zeal it is understandable that
neoconservatism might boast of “hard-Wilsonianism,” a term coined
(if I remember correctly) by Max Boot. Certainly, President Wilson
shared the impression that the United States was to define its
legacy through its mission, as it assumed the role of the “Sir
Galahad of nations.”
As it happened, President Reagan offered the first and best
opportunity for neoconservative theory to be put into action.
Considerable attention was paid to the aggressive containment of
Soviet states, the near bottomless support of Israel as a strategic
asset in the Middle East, and the implementation of the
“Kirkpatrick Doctrine” in Latin America. Ultimately, such foreign
policy schemes came to represent the bullet points of the
ideology’s international agenda, characterized by an emphasis on
substantial military spending.
The valuation of Israel as a vital tactical outpost for American
influence remained at the forefront of policy initiatives, even as
a general distaste for multilateral institutions and alliances
developed. The comparable efficacy of unilateral action presented
to the lone superpower seemed all the more inviting.
Following the perceived retreat of communism as an international
threat, one could make the argument that some neoconservative Cold
Warriors found new life and fresh opportunity during the second
Bush administration. Can we call it a neo-neoconservatism? They
discovered and defined the new threat to the American way of life.
Arisen from the ashes of the communist menace, the hazy specter of
“Islamofascism” now satisfies the movement’s demand for diametric
opposition. While neoconservatives have continued to push an agenda
that they endorse in the best interests of a safer world for the
their particular sense of democratic ideals, others — such as Ron
Paul or, say, foreign policy heavy-weight Francis Fukayama — have
persisted in
warning that “The problem with neoconservatism’s agenda lies
not in its ends, which are as American as apple pie, but rather in
the overmilitarized means by which it has sought to accomplish
them.”
Thus, the export of democracy and American values has become the
star luminary purpose of a neo-neoconservative movement. And while
the true neoconservative may not want to conquer the world, the
desire clearly exists to — in the words of Ben Wattenberg —
“influence it so that it is hospitable to our
values.”
Either way, we’re a long way from Monroe, and our presence in
“Iraq or anywhere in the Middle East” and our forever war against
the phantasmal menace of “jihad” (or whatever else you want to call
it) can easily be construed as “Neocon,” if it concerns preventive
war, nation-building and reconstruction.
