When I’m not writing and blogging for the American
Spectator, or nerding out as a doctoral student, I work with
the Foreign Policy Association as an analyst focused on the Middle
East and political Islam. I was recently made aware that our
organization conducted a major survey of more than 20,000
highly-educated and involved Americans who work in foreign policy.
They were asked to provide policy prescriptions to national
security challenges amidst a gloomy global economy and suggest
techniques that have proven to be successful, and more cost
effective.
The poll, which has been run since 1955, is sent to the White
House, the Departments of State and Defense, members of Congress
and the media.
Suffice to say, the Foreign Policy Association’s National
Opinion Ballot confirmed an attitude that’s prevalent
in the foreign policy community. Key findings suggest that some
defense budget cuts are necessary, global financial regulatory
regimes are welcome and opposition to military adventurism is
robust.
Perhaps most importantly, disillusionment with the huge costs
and uncertain outcomes of major ground wars and extended
nation-building projects has affirmed a new emphasis on
counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. In line with an Obama
administration embrace of drone warfare and small-scale lightning
raids (like the one that killed OBL back in May) polled respondents
appear to have favor such tactics as the future in the fight
against international terror.
These results are indicative of a 49 percent plurality that
supports the reduction of the defense budget. But simply cutting
back totals isn’t sufficient — 71 percent of respondents answered
“in favor of a combination of counterinsurgency capability [COIN]
and traditionalist military strategy.”
While I think the poll provides a valuable aggregate of foreign
policy knowledge, I think we can also improve our understanding of
foreign policy imperatives by examining the experience of a
post-Gaddafi Libya.
From that perspective, I’d add that the importance of American
airpower cannot be ignored or denied. The Transitional Nation
Council (TNC) forces in Libya would not have achieved their victory
on the ground without NATO air superiority in the skies. Looking
back on the operation, one must agree that NATO airpower was a
necessary condition for a free Libya. Granted, airpower was not
sufficient, in and of itself, but it more than demonstrates that
our boots need not touch the ground to help us help others.
Granted, American pilots flew only a handful of sorties, but given
the evolving shape of humanitarian intervention and international
military assistance, our superiority remains an unquestionable
advantage. That we weren’t needed to conduct the majority of
missions over Libya leads to my next point…
Libya is instructive as a multilateral coordination of Western
powers. While we may have “led
from behind,” as suggested by my colleague, John Guardiano, the
Obama administration has provided a template for improving U.S.
global leadership, based on multilateral cooperation. Still, I’d
add my voice to the criticism of the mission — frankly, I’d prefer
American troops to focus on defending American citizens, as opposed
to a distant Arab backwater with no national security implication
for the U.S., but when choosing sides in a civil war for
humanitarian purposes it’s always best to get the job done…and
ASAP. However, Libya reinforced the importance of executing clear
objectives, and an international community that is prepared to
share in the burdens and risks of military intervention based on
moral imperative.
