Neil M. Barofsky, the departing special inspector general for
TARP I mentioned in my
earlier post, has an op-ed in the New York Times
today, in which he restates the downsides of the bailout:
The biggest banks are 20 percent larger than they were before
the crisis and control a larger part of our economy than ever. They
reasonably assume that the government will rescue them again, if
necessary. Indeed, credit rating agencies incorporate future
government bailouts into their assessments of the largest banks,
exaggerating market distortions that provide them with an unfair
advantage over smaller institutions, which continue to
struggle.
…
In the final analysis, it has been Treasury’s broken promises
that have turned TARP - which was instrumental in saving the
financial system at a relatively modest cost to taxpayers - into a
program commonly viewed as little more than a giveaway to Wall
Street executives.
It wasn’t meant to be that. Indeed, Treasury’s mismanagement of
TARP and its disregard for TARP’s Main Street goals - whether born
of incompetence, timidity in the face of a crisis or a mindset too
closely aligned with the banks it was supposed to rein in - may
have so damaged the credibility of the government as a whole that
future policy makers may be politically unable to take the
necessary steps to save the system the next time a crisis arises.
This avoidable political reality might just be TARP’s most lasting,
and unfortunate, legacy.