Writing in the Huffington Post, Nassim Nicholas Taleb
recounts an offer he received from Princeton professor and
former Federal Reserve vice chairman Alan Blinder. Essentially,
in Taleb’s story, Blinder proposed regulatory arbitrage: Blinder
knew of a way to game the system and offer accounts that provided
deposit insurance — then limited to deposits under $100,000 —
for any size account. “In other words,” Taleb writes, “it would
allow the super-rich to scam taxpayers by getting free government
sponsored insurance. Yes, scam taxpayers.
Legally. With the help of former civil servants who have an
insider edge.”
Reflecting on this experience, Taleb draws some conclusions about
our current regulatory environment:
First, the more complicated the regulation, the more prone to
arbitrages by insiders. So 2,300 pages of regulation will be a
gold mine for former regulators. The incentive of a regulator
is to have complex regulation.
Second, the difference between letter and spirit of regulation
is harder to detect in a complex system….
Third, regulation, like drugs, has side effects, and like
drugs, it can harm the patient…. People do not mention that
regulation helped promote the Value-at-Risk method of risk
measurement in replacement to age-tested heuristics — these
methods blew up banks.
Fourth, we need a more severe monitoring of the activities of
public officials and a solution to the following conflict. In
African countries, government officials get explicit bribes. In
the United States they have the implicit, never mentioned,
promise to go work for a bank at a later date with a sinecure
offering, say $5 million a year, if they are seen favorably by
the industry. And the “regulations” of such activities are
easily skirted.
These are lessons to keep in mind whenever you hear news about
the authors of health care reform
leaving Congress to become lobbyists or former insiders
like Blinder
praising massive government interventions and thousand-page bills
with innumerable provisions.