George Packer made a serious accusation against Indiana governor
Mitch Daniels yesterday, which has been
echoed by other commentators. Reacting to Ross Douthat’s
Times article
praising Daniels and portraying him as potentially the best
Republican candidate for 2012, Packer
wrote:
Daniels was Bush’s head of the Office of Management and Budget
from 2001-2003…. He was responsible for forecasting the
budget in the event of a war with Iraq. His number came in at
fifty to sixty billion dollars. Compared to what
some experts were
forecasting, it was an astonishingly low figure. But even
Daniels’s projection was too much for the Bush White House,
which was intent on keeping unpleasant scenarios about the war
out of the public eye…. Lawrence Lindsey, Bush’s top economic
adviser, had said the war could cost as much as two hundred
billion, and Daniels had dismissed the figure as “very, very
high.” As for the cost of rebuilding Iraq, by April of
2003-with the war already under way-O.M.B. had asked Congress
for the paltry sum of 2.5 billion. By the end of last year, the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had cost over a trillion dollars.
Packer’s claim here, that Daniels’s 2003 forecast of Iraq war
costs was short by 900-plus billion dollars, is inaccurate. The
forecast that Packer is referring to, the one about which Lindsey
and Daniels disagreed, is the forecast for Iraq war
appropriations supplemental to the 2003 budget. The “fifty to
sixty billion dollars” that Daniels projected were only supposed
to cover the costs of the war for
the
next six months — through the end of fiscal year
2003.
And Daniels’s projections turned out to be too high, not
too low. The chart below can be found on Page 5 of the 2007 CBO
report on the
costs from the war on terrorism:
As you can see, military operations in Iraq totaled $46 billion
in 2003, far less than the $63 billion Daniels budgeted.
Packer uses the false claim regarding the 2003 supplemental Iraq
appropriation in his denunciation of Daniels. Emphasis
mine:
What worries me is that Daniels’s projection was the budgetary
equivalent of the Rumsfeld Pentagon’s failure to commit enough
troops for the occupation. “Very, very high” reminds me of what
Paul Wolfowitz said in response to General Eric Shinseki’s
estimate that stabilizing Iraq would take several hundred
thousand troops: he dismissed it as “wildly off the mark.”
Wolfowitz and Daniels weren’t just mistaken. They were
guaranteeing that the Administration wouldn’t be ready if
things went wrong. They were contributing directly to the
disaster that followed the fall of Saddam. And
they were acting out of ideological conviction or bureaucratic
loyalty rather than cold analytical judgment. In
short, when the stakes were as high as possible, Daniels showed
very little independence or common sense, the qualities that
Douthat credits him with.
That’s a damning accusation to make without checking that the
main premise is correct. Unless Packer is withholding other
information that shows that Daniels intentionally downplayed the
expected costs of the war, his diatribe seems awfully close to
pure slander.
In the remainder of that post, Packer makes another, separate
charge against Daniels — that he “nickeled and dimed” the
Coalition Provisional Authority tasked with stabilizing Iraq.
This is also a very serious claim, but given the level of caution
that Packer showed in his first accusation, I’m tempted to
disregard it.