In a ThinkMarkets
post yesterday, NYU's Mario Rizzo blew up the Obama
administration's arguments that the stimulus is lifting, not
hurting, the economy. Claims that the stimulus is working would
seem to contradict the evidence Harvard's Greg Mankiw
presents in graph form, which shows that unemployment has
increased even further than the administration's baseline
estimate. In other words, unemployment is worse than the
administration predicted it would be without the
stimulus:
The light blue line is the administration's baseline unemployment
prediction, the dark blue line is their prediction for
unemployment with the stimulus in place, and the red dots are
what actually happened.
Of course, without knowing what would have happened to the
economy in the absence of the stimulus, the administration can
make any claim they want. Thus they can say that they have
"created
or saved" millions of jobs even when unemployment is worse
than they said it would be without their actions because they can
also claim that they
"misread the economy" when they made their predictions.
As Rizzo shows, that's nonsense. The argument for the stimulus
was a technocratic one: they claimed that their superior forecast
showed the necessity for a stimulus. Now they are saying that
their models enable them to identify the specific effects of the
stimulus but not the underlying trends, which were worse than
they anticipated. So which is it? Do they have the expertise
required to forecast economic trends and examine the much
narrower effects of the stimulus package? Or neither? It can't be
one and not the other if they're using the same technical model.
Meanwhile, central banks' quantitative easing programs do seem to
be having the results they were supposed to. In the UK, the Bank
of England's quantitative easing program seems to have hit the
economy in August, as seen by banks' increased willingness to
lend out funds instead of holding them as reserves at the BofE.
Unfortunately, it seems that the increase is all in...mortgage
lending.
The author of that blog notes the danger the BofE faces: continue
quantitative easing and risk sparking another housing bubble, or
withdraw the easy credit and risk a double-dip recession.
And that seems to be exactly the same trade-off that the Fed is
navigating right now. Their response, however, has been to begin
to draw down the quantitative easing. As one Austrian economist
points out, the Fed's quantitative easing program has lifted
stocks and price inflation, but now the Fed is in fact has
allowed the money supply to decrease. Is Bernanke less worried
about deflation and a double-dip than inflation or a housing
bubble?