I agree wholeheartedly with Phil about the inadequacy of
President Obama's response to the Iran situation and what he
should say -- he should condemn the crackdown without endorsing
the protests or any Iranian political faction. (It's a little
early in this struggle to compare Mir-Hossein Mousavi to Lech
Walesa.) But his continued insistence on engagement may be less a
reflection of stubbornness or ideology, though both are surely
factors, than a realization that we don't have many good options.
The Iranian regime has been discredited in the eyes of its own
people and many of its own supporters, something more dangerous
to its legitimacy and continued hold on power than a hundred
Washington denunciations. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has revealed
himself as a thug and corrupt dictator to people who were once
inclined to support him. Nothing could do more to undercut the
protesters, rally Iranians behind their government, and allow
Ahmadinejad to divert attention from his deepening failures than
U.S. military action.
The United States is not in a good position to wage a third war
in the Middle East. Even some supporters of targeted military
strikes concede we might not be able to hit all potential nuclear
sites and could accelerate the process toward nuclearization as
an unintended consequence. Obviously, there are many options
between war and coddling the mullahs. Ronald Reagan forcefully
condemned the Communist suppression of Solidarity -- and
continued to talk with the Soviet Union. We rightly condemned the
Communist butchery in Tiananmen Square, but George H.W. Bush
did not break off relations with China. Eisenhower continued to
talk to Kruschev after the Soviets gruesomely put down the
Hungarian revolution in 1956.
No one knows what the future holds for Tehran. But that future
belongs to the Iranians, who are losing confidence in the
ayatollahs and the revolution of 1979. Let's put pressure on the
government of Iran where we can and deal with them where we must.
For now, though, we must most of all let the future unfold.