George Soros
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Former Colorado state rep. Rob Witwer has an excellent article in
National Review on what the Weekly
Standard’s Fred Barnes has dubbed the Colorado Model.
The Colorado Model refers to liberal activists’
political strategy to make Colorado safe for Democratic
candidates for years to come. The strategy, as Barnes described
it, consists of seven different “capacities”: 1) “to generate
intellectual ammunition,” 2) “to pursue investigations,” 3) “to
mobilize for elections,” 4) to combat media bias, 5) to sue
strategically, 6) “to train new leaders,” and 7) “to sustain a
presence in the new media.” The Colorado left now has all seven
in place, according to Barnes.
James Dellinger and I examined the rapid conversion of
Colorado from red state to blue state in our most recent profile
of George Soros’s
Democracy Alliance. (Capital Research Center’s Foundation
Watch, December 2008)
The left accomplished this transmogrification by pumping millions
of dollars into select activist groups and institutions. The
money came from the Colorado Democracy Alliance (CoDA), a
state-level spinoff of the national Democracy Alliance, a
billionaire leftists’ club.
Funders of the takeover push included Pat Stryker, Tim Gill, and
Al Yates. Newly minted congressman, Jared Polis (D-Colorado), while not
a funder, was involved in planning the onslaught.
An excerpt from Witwer’s article:
In hindsight, what Colorado Democrats did was as simple as it
was effective. First, they built a robust network of nonprofit
entities to replace the Colorado Democratic party, which had
been rendered obsolete by campaign-finance reform. Second, they
raised historic amounts of money from large donors to fund
these entities. Third, they developed a consistent, topical
message. Fourth, and most important, they put aside their
policy differences to focus on the common goal of winning
elections. As former Democratic house majority leader Alice
Madden later said, “It’s not rocket science.”
In a larger sense, this is also a story about the unintended
consequences of campaign-finance reform. In 2002, Congress
passed McCain-Feingold. That same year, Colorado citizens
enacted Amendment 27, a constitutional amendment that capped
state-legislative contributions at $400 per donor. By lowering
the amounts candidates could raise and spend, these laws
effectively took message control out of the hands of candidates
and handed it to outsiders.
Campaign spending in large quantities can now be accomplished
only through the “independent sector” - a collection of
nonprofit organizations that has stepped into the role once
occupied by political parties. […]
The cost of participation in elections through the independent
sector is high, especially at the state level. Political
nonprofits are subject to byzantine tax, corporate, and
accounting rules, and require constant guidance from lawyers
and accountants. That guidance is expensive, which is why
there’s no such thing as a “mom and pop” 527. Small and medium
donors need not apply. […]
By leveraging big dollars against traditionally sleepy local
races, Colorado Democrats raised the ante to a level once seen
only in federal campaigns. The influx of congressional-level
cash has turned state-legislative races inside out. What used
to be a local affair of meet-and-greet coffees and door-to-door
campaigning now consists of paid staff, television and radio
ads, glossy mailers, and platoons of hired door walkers. […]