From the Mobile Press-Register yesterday, about the
much-fought-over contract for a desperately needed new Air Force
tanker, in light of a visit there today by Defense Appropriations
Chairman John Murtha:
Murtha has emerged as the leading proponent of a compromise
that would divide the contract between the two manufacturing
teams. Murtha and other officials have said that a "dual buy"
might be the only practical way to avoid litigation and other
protests that could further delay the contract.
"The Air Force will have no choice but to split the ... tanker
award between rivals Boeing and Northrop Grumman-EADS if it
wants to receive a new tanker anytime soon," Murtha told Inside
the Air Force, a military trade publication, in an article
published in September.
Gates said he adamantly opposes a split deal, warning it would
come at a high cost to taxpayers with no justifiable benefit to
the Air Force. He told lawmakers Tuesday that any move to split
the contract would be "an absolutely terrible idea and a very
bad mistake for the Air Force." Boeing and its legislative
backers have also vowed to fight any attempt to buy two
different planes.
I will say it as plainly as possible: I don't trust Gates on
this. I do not think he is impartial on this. I see him with his
home for retirement already sitting there in the Seattle area
(traditional corporate HQ for Boeing and still site of huge
Boeing installations), and with one of his children living and
working in the Seattle area and another one with longstanding
ties to the area. I watched as he pulled the rug out from under
the previous contract award to Northrup/EADS and from the
fast-track post-appeal reconsideration of the award -- a
reconsideration Boeing was so sure it would lose again that it
threatened to pull out altogether -- and I watched as that very
night Pentagon brass wined and dined at the Boeing table for a
gala celebration.
Now I see somebody as experienced as Murtha, with no real dog in
the fight but a real record (whatever else you think of him) of
wanting to get good equipment to our military personnel, saying
that it makes good sense to split the contract. And I am told
that a split contract could be awarded as early as late spring,
whereas the full new competition Gates wants will put off the
award until next year at the very earliest. Yet Gates insists
that a split award isn't doable, offering utter tommyrot about
increased costs and additional training. The "increased costs"
idea is an utter red herring, though, because part of the benefit
of competition is that it keeps BOTH companies' feet to the fire
to do the job efficiently and well, in light of the fact that
this first award is only for 68 planes of a first batch of 179,
witha total of 510 eventually needed. In short, a split
contract would give both companies an incentive to keep cost down
and performance up in order to better position themselves for
much bigger awards for the same fleet of planes down the road.
But no -- Gates says he won't consider a split award. Isn't it
funny how Gates was the only Cabinet member kept around by the
incredibly Boeing-friendly Obamites? Isn't it funny that Gates
himself has so many ties to Boeing-heavy Seattle? Isn't it funny
that the new National Security Advisor, James Jones, was on
Boeing's board until mid-December?
In Gates' obstinance against a split award, I smell a rat. I call
on John McCain to investigate.
I agree with your assessment that there is an appearance of a
lack of impartiality in Secretary Gates handling of the tanker
acquisition because of his ties to Boeing. However, a split
contract is just "plane" stupid, from a logistical point of view.
Consider this. Aircraft procurement, indeed any equipment
procurement, is not limited to the aircraft themselves. It also
includes ancillary components and spare parts. Now, with two
distinct aircraft, manufactured by two competing companies, just
how many of their components are going to be compatible cross
platform? Not very many. So you have to stock twice the number of
spare parts for two distinct aircraft as you do for one. Add to
that the problem of having those spare parts available over a
long period of time in a variety of locations worldwide even
during time of international unrest and the possibility of a
parts shortfall because of a disruption of overseas production of
some parts and... well I'm sure that you can see the problem.
Cost is not, as you say, "a red herring".
Now, there are other problems with the initial award procedure
that are to time consuming to go into here. Suffice it to say
that the process was slanted toward the Airbus aircraft, very
possibly for political reasons having to do with making our
European friends feel loved. But slanted none the less. And the
recommendation to re-let the contract came not from Secretary
Gates, but from the GAO.
This should be entirely about which company can provide an
aircraft that best meets the needs of the military mission for
which is to be used and that can supply sufficient U.S. based
support for that aircraft. Not on "political" considerations.
Quin| 1.29.09 @ 1:16PM
The process wasn't slanted one bit. If you want to talk about
slanted, look back at the original lease contract signed with
Boeing, because of which several people went to jail! As for
cross-training for both planes, etc., that's almost no problem.
It's no more difficult than, say, having U.S. Air cross-training
mechanics and pilots to work on both a DC-10 and a 747, or
whatever. If the Air Force can't handle that -- or use the two
different planes in two sets of bases for two slightly different
purposes, thus taking better advantage of slightly differing
capabilities -- then we're all doomed.
Thomas| 1.29.09 @ 1:50PM
You're missing my point, Quin. I am not talking about training
pilots to fly both type of aircraft or mechanics to work on them.
The airplanes use different parts and the parts are very often
incompatible. For instance, the Boeing aircraft uses a control
yoke, that is a steering wheel. The Airbus uses a joy stick
beside the pilot. Now,before you make the point that yokes and
joysticks rarely need replacement, multiply these two parts by
literally hundreds. So, you are forced to stock replacement parts
that are unique to each aircraft and that means that you have to
duplicate parts stores. Of course, the Air Force could duplicate
parts stocks worldwide or even use one plane in one area and the
other in another. But, other than making the two aircraft
companies happy, what is the point? It is still going to cause
additional problems and cost additional money.
As to the GAO report. It noted some instances when the Airbus was
given higher marks for things that were not stipulated in the
original bid specifications and that in some cases slight
deficiencies in the Boeing design as opposed to the Airbus design
were given a higher weight than deficiencies experienced in the
Airbus design in similar circumstances. [For the GOA report see:
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.htm]
Now, it is entirely possible that the Airbus design will, indeed,
prove superior to the Boeing design. If such is the case than all
replacement aircraft should be the Airbus design. Politics have
played a part in this entire process, as well as procurement
processes historically, and it is time for that to stop. In this
case, the original process was flawed, it was found to be flawed
and the DOD should go ahead quickly to allow both competitors to
address the situation and pick the best aircraft possible for the
job.
Peter| 1.29.09 @ 2:55PM
I agree Hillyer. Without a split aware we will be years away from
new tankers being available. The military has gained much
efficiency in splitting contracts. Not only could the Air Force
use planes asap from both manufacturers, but also a split
contract would put 100,000 people to work this spring. Boeing is
laying off 10,000 now. These would be put back to work now - not
a year from now. This is better stimulus in many ways than much
of the 900 billion being voted in Congress. The US needs the
stimulus. Mobile and Seattle need to be building planes now for
the Military and later for civilian use as the economy turns.
Dennis| 2.1.09 @ 8:40PM
If we need larger tankers like an A330 then make half of the
tankers 777 and the other half 767's and out source 1/2 of the
work to Northrop Grumman so two USA firms get the work instead
Thomas| 1.29.09 @ 12:09PM
I agree with your assessment that there is an appearance of a lack of impartiality in Secretary Gates handling of the tanker acquisition because of his ties to Boeing. However, a split contract is just "plane" stupid, from a logistical point of view.
Consider this. Aircraft procurement, indeed any equipment procurement, is not limited to the aircraft themselves. It also includes ancillary components and spare parts. Now, with two distinct aircraft, manufactured by two competing companies, just how many of their components are going to be compatible cross platform? Not very many. So you have to stock twice the number of spare parts for two distinct aircraft as you do for one. Add to that the problem of having those spare parts available over a long period of time in a variety of locations worldwide even during time of international unrest and the possibility of a parts shortfall because of a disruption of overseas production of some parts and... well I'm sure that you can see the problem. Cost is not, as you say, "a red herring".
Now, there are other problems with the initial award procedure that are to time consuming to go into here. Suffice it to say that the process was slanted toward the Airbus aircraft, very possibly for political reasons having to do with making our European friends feel loved. But slanted none the less. And the recommendation to re-let the contract came not from Secretary Gates, but from the GAO.
This should be entirely about which company can provide an aircraft that best meets the needs of the military mission for which is to be used and that can supply sufficient U.S. based support for that aircraft. Not on "political" considerations.
Quin| 1.29.09 @ 1:16PM
The process wasn't slanted one bit. If you want to talk about slanted, look back at the original lease contract signed with Boeing, because of which several people went to jail! As for cross-training for both planes, etc., that's almost no problem. It's no more difficult than, say, having U.S. Air cross-training mechanics and pilots to work on both a DC-10 and a 747, or whatever. If the Air Force can't handle that -- or use the two different planes in two sets of bases for two slightly different purposes, thus taking better advantage of slightly differing capabilities -- then we're all doomed.
Thomas| 1.29.09 @ 1:50PM
You're missing my point, Quin. I am not talking about training pilots to fly both type of aircraft or mechanics to work on them. The airplanes use different parts and the parts are very often incompatible. For instance, the Boeing aircraft uses a control yoke, that is a steering wheel. The Airbus uses a joy stick beside the pilot. Now,before you make the point that yokes and joysticks rarely need replacement, multiply these two parts by literally hundreds. So, you are forced to stock replacement parts that are unique to each aircraft and that means that you have to duplicate parts stores. Of course, the Air Force could duplicate parts stocks worldwide or even use one plane in one area and the other in another. But, other than making the two aircraft companies happy, what is the point? It is still going to cause additional problems and cost additional money.
As to the GAO report. It noted some instances when the Airbus was given higher marks for things that were not stipulated in the original bid specifications and that in some cases slight deficiencies in the Boeing design as opposed to the Airbus design were given a higher weight than deficiencies experienced in the Airbus design in similar circumstances. [For the GOA report see: http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.htm]
Now, it is entirely possible that the Airbus design will, indeed, prove superior to the Boeing design. If such is the case than all replacement aircraft should be the Airbus design. Politics have played a part in this entire process, as well as procurement processes historically, and it is time for that to stop. In this case, the original process was flawed, it was found to be flawed and the DOD should go ahead quickly to allow both competitors to address the situation and pick the best aircraft possible for the job.
Peter| 1.29.09 @ 2:55PM
I agree Hillyer. Without a split aware we will be years away from new tankers being available. The military has gained much efficiency in splitting contracts. Not only could the Air Force use planes asap from both manufacturers, but also a split contract would put 100,000 people to work this spring. Boeing is laying off 10,000 now. These would be put back to work now - not a year from now. This is better stimulus in many ways than much of the 900 billion being voted in Congress. The US needs the stimulus. Mobile and Seattle need to be building planes now for the Military and later for civilian use as the economy turns.
Dennis| 2.1.09 @ 8:40PM
If we need larger tankers like an A330 then make half of the tankers 777 and the other half 767's and out source 1/2 of the work to Northrop Grumman so two USA firms get the work instead
sidnee| 12.12.09 @ 12:39PM
jack wills
ugg new arrivals