Robert Samuelson has a fine column on Bill Bishop’s
interesting book The Big Sort. He points out that there is
much to Bishop’s thesis that we have sorted into little red and
blue enclaves — to cite just one statistic, 48 percent of counties
went for one presidential candidate over the other by 20 points or
more even though the national popular vote was split 51-48 — but
concludes Bishop’s “argument is slightly overdrawn.” That’s my own
view too, though I think aspects of Samuelson’s counterargument are
overdrawn as well.
Samuelson counters that there is a greater difference of opinion
between the ideological extremes in both parties than among the
general public. Like Bishop, I think he’s on to something. The two
parties are more homogenously ideological than ever before (even if
principled liberals and principled conservatives could and should
still criticize the Democrats from the left and the Republicans
from the right) and that has made some people feel politically
homeless. Both the Republican president and the Democratic Congress
are deeply unpopular. Both major-party presidential candidates are
having trouble getting more than 44 percent of the vote. But
Samuelson’s examples of how the two parties ignore the “vital
center” leave much to be desired:
Consider two decades of polls from the Pew Research Center. On
many questions, there was little change. One question asked whether
“government should care for those who can’t care for themselves.”
In 1987, 71 percent agreed; in 2007, 69 percent did. Or take
immigration. In 1992, when the question was first asked, 76 percent
of respondents favored tougher restrictions; in 2007, 75 percent
did. On some cultural issues, opinions converged. In 2007, only 28
percent thought school boards should be able to “fire teachers who
are known homosexuals,” down from 51 percent in 1987. In 1987, only
48 percent thought it was “all right for blacks and whites to date
each other”; by 2007, 83 percent did.
It’s not that everyone agrees on everything (divisions remain
strong on the Iraq War, abortion, gay marriage). But growing
polarization predominates among political elites of both left and
right. The “Big Sort” of residential segregation is still reshaping
the political landscape, though more indirectly. With fewer
competitive congressional districts, the real political struggles
now often take place in primaries, where activists’ views count the
most. Candidates appeal to them and are driven toward the
extremes.
But is precisely on the Iraq War, abortion, and gay marriage,
the truly polarizing issues, that the two parties are divided.
Neither the two parties, nor the left and the right, are divided
over interracial dating, even if there are some outliers. Ronald
Reagan opposed a ballot initiative that would have banned known
homosexuals from teaching in public schools back in the 1970s; such
a ban is hardly a major priority of any socially conservative elite
today. Neither party is dedicated to the proposition that
government shouldn’t help those who can’t take care of themselves,
though they might have different definitions of who would actually
qualify for help. The only issue Samuelson mentions where you could
truly make the case that public opinion is being ignored is on
immigration. But support for immigration restrictions tends to be
labeled far-right, not centrist.
