Nobody will be surprised at this, because I am so openly a fan
of SEC Chairman Chris Cox, but it is worth positing that if the
current financial woes had hit about 18 months later, Cox would
have been in position to do a lot more to head them off -- in part
because of reforms Cox already was in the process of making. Here's
yesterday's testimony by Cox to the Senate Banking Committee,
which shows a man firmly in control and readily believable,
somebody who inspires confidence. It is worth noting several
things: First of all, Cox mentions that new technology allows for
greater success in tracking down illegal rumor-mongers/stock
manipulators. What he doesn't say is that until Cox joined the SEC
three years ago, the SEC was backwards technologically, and that it
was specifically because of reforms pushed by Cox -- who long was
by far the most tech-savvy member of Congress -- that the SEC has
such technological prowess. Critics who don't know better will say
tht Cox, on this front and on others, is fixing the stables after
the horse is out of the barn. What they miss is that the sort of
stuff Cox has done in response to the Bear-Stearns mess and other
problems is stuff he was already working on before Bear Stearns
collapsed, stuff nobody had worked on before, and that the measures
he has implemented would have been implemented, under his
direction, regardless of whether Bear Stearns collapsed or not; in
short, he anticipated some of the problems and for the first time
ever was getting the SEC in position to head them off, but the
problems happened first. Another few months and the safeguards
would have been in place -- or, put another way, if Cox had taken
over the SEC in, say, 2003 instead of 2005, the safeguards probably
would have been in place.
Likewise, he had begun asking for more statutory authority
vis-a-vis investment banks before the Bear Stearns mess; as even
Chuck Schumer noted, Cox can't be blamed for not exercising
authority he didn't have in the first place. He now is getting that
authority, via congressional action.
Finally, there may be some question about his announcement
yesterday of new rules against naked (or semi-naked) short selling.
Some critics have called it a panic move. It's just the opposite:
It is the result of a longstanding Cox belief that short-selling
can be abusive. I know this personally because of a small project I
worked on with Cox when I was Bob Livingston's press secretary,
during which I heard first-hand, in private meetings, Cox's strong
beliefs on this issue. For the record, I agree with him:
Short-selling is a form of market manipulation that amounts to
betting against a company and in effect against the whole economy.
If I remember correctly, the great James Glassman (longtime media
giant and AEI fellow) once called short-selling, (and this is a
quote from memory so it might be not exact, but the words I
remember were:) "fundamentally unpatriotic." At the very least, the
short sale itself ought to be done with actual, honest-to-goodness
stocks, not with phantom stocks that haven't actually been borrowed
yet. (It's sort of complicated stuff; if you don't understand the
lingo, I suggest you do a web search for "short selling.")
All of which is to say that, watching the video linked above
makes me sorry that Cox is relegated to talking about such
technical stuff rather than outlining economic policy more
generally. He is articulate and persuasive, but he suffers from a
degree of fastidiousness that means he is hyper-vigilant against
stepping outside of the bounds of his own authority. He just will
not allow himself to be seen encroaching on somebody else's turf.
More's the pity: He could do the cause a lot of good if he were out
front in proposing and explaining the sound economic policies he
has always believed in and that he effectively promoted in
Congress.