War Warning Part 5, United Nations Security Council Plan
1. The UNSC has accepted the IAEA report that Tehran is in
flagrant violation of the NPT.
2. Tehran makes it a policy to boast that it is in violation of
the NPT and that it will not acknowledge the UNSC authority with
regard the NPT. Tehran’s policy includes continuing public
statements that are aimed to provoke and humiliate the UNSC.
Tehran is following the North Korean path exactly. Tehran does not
regard the UNSC as a threat.
3. The UNSC is divided into at least three hardened factions:
The US is allied with the EU three of UK, France, and the de facto
member UNSC of Germany; Russia is a faction; China is a faction.
The US led faction wants to move the UNSC as quickly as possible
(four to eight weeks) toward Chapter 7 sanctions. Russia does not
want to move quickly though it is most decidely against Iran
bolting from the NPT or otherwise continuing on a path to acquire a
full industrial cycle for both uranium and plutonium warheads:
Russia’s policy is driven by Gazprom politics: Russia must deal
with Iran going forward: more below. China does not want to break
with Iran in any fashion and is in fact responsible for Iran’s
acquisition of both nuclear and ballistic missile technology; China
also does not have a coherent policy: China is a fickle,
treacherous, hostile, brittle adversary.
4. The US faction is pushing hard for Chapter 7 in order to
begin the sanctions process that is believed will weaken the Tehran
regime. The EU 3 — UK, Fr, and DR (Germany) — do not want
Chapter 7 sanctions that bite since it is believed this will
trigger and oil crisis; however collectively they accept the fact
that the Tehran regime believes it can bully the UNSC without
consequences and therefore the UNSC must show a united front. The
UK and FR position is voluble, agitated, informed and hardened.
The German position is less harded but is useful because a number
of German firms have dual use contracts with Iran, and therefore
Germany represents a country that is prepared to suffer economic
penalties in the event of sanctions against dual use
technology.
5. The Russian position is sophisticated. No one on the UNSC
has better intelligence sources inside Iran, inside the Tehran
regime, inside the IRGC and Council of Elders, than the Russian
military. The Russian intell is better than first rate and dwarfs
whatever UK has with its nascent rebel faction in Khuzistan or what
the US has with its tentacles through the Kurds into northwest
Iran. The Russian intell is so good that the Russians have offered
to assist in the event regime-change is required. The US faction
rejects the Russian offer. Russia is frustrated and at the same
time patient. Russia does not want a beggarly Iran. If the choice
for Russia is between a nuclear tipped Iran and a beggarly Iran,
Russia will choose the status quo. Russia needs Iran as a wedge
between the Wahhabists in the Ummah and the oil-soaked Central
Asian client states; also Russia knows that only Iran is capable of
matching the connections the Wahhabists have with the Chechen
martyrs. At the same time, Russia needs Iran as an ally in order to
fend off the Chinese aim to consolidate its power across the
Ummah.
6. The Chinese position at the UNSC is weak and inarticulate
and partially out of date. The Chinese strategic policy since the
1980s and the fall of the Soviet empire has been that the US
strategic power must be overwhelmed with hotspots. Hence the nuke
and ballistic missile proliferation to North Korea and Pakistan;
then to Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Libya. (The
next phase of proliferation calls for Africa: Sudan, Nigeria,
Zimbabwe, South Africa.) (Mention that Venezuela is now a fresh
concern, along with Bolivia, Cuba, Peru, Mexico.) The Chinese
strategic position favors proloferation like cancer because it
obsolesces the US strategic power. This is the Jiang Zemin policy
as designed and prosecuted by the PLA. The difficulty is the that
PLA vision is now not the only policy at Bejing. The new policy is
to cooperate with the Bejing custormers in order to keep the cash
coming. China now speaks with two voices — one that favors
continuous proliferation, one that favors continuous profit. The
proverb says that when the emperor speaks with two voices, China is
week. Therefore: China is weak at the UNSC and depends upon the
pressure of the US faction to direct its path.
7. The Tehran regime regards the UNSC as impotent. The regime
holds that it can provoke the UNSC as much as it wants and still
suffer no penalty. Tehran believes that neither Russia nor China
will permit Chapter 7 sanctions without severe fracturing of the
UNSC. Then again, at all times Tehran acts as if Russia and China
may vote on precedural matters toward Chapter 7 in order to
pressure Tehran to make concessions. Tehran believes that the
opposition in the West to the US hegemony will splinter the UNSC.
Tehran believes that it can prolong the UNSC debate through the
summer months.
7a There is an alternative scenario that argues that Tehran
means to drag out the UNSC debate into the indefinite future: this
view believes that Tehran can play Russia off the US, that Tehran
can play China off the US, that envy of the US can be used to slow
and even wreck whatever agreement can be reached at the UNSC. This
alternative scenario does not
8. The US position is to press the UNSC as heavily as possible
through the next four to six weeks. This can look like at least
two rounds of consultations with member governments. The
US-UK-FR-DR coalition believes it can win nine votes at the UNSC
and that Russia and China will not use the veto. Importantly, the
US position does not ask for Chapter 7, Article 41 and 42; the US
position asks for an array of sanctions against providing Iran with
dual use nuclear and or ballistic technology. The US position is
firm, focused, well-planned, extremely well-informed of the major
players.
9. The US position will be strengthened by the negotiations in
Nigeria with regard Sudan and the Darfur chaos. The Darfur crisis
is a model of how the US can maneuver its coalition at the UNSC
against the intransigence of Russia and China. China does not want
sanctions against the Khartoum regime. At the same time China does
not believe it can risk using its veto if the UNSC pushes for
sanctions. Note that Sudan is on the Chinese strategic list for
proliferation.
10. The United Nations Charter, Chapter 7, Article 42, is a
potent weapon. The Tehran regime does not fear it. Tehran
believes that the overwhelming force represented by the UNSC is
satanic, and that the more powerful the UNSC adversary, the more
Allah will provide. Tehran does not recognize what is understood
as rational deterrence.
11. Emphasize that Tehran does not calculate rationally.
More soon (Next: United States War Plan S)
