As Israel counted votes in its legislative election in January,
your humble correspondent joined reporters at an election night
event in Tel Aviv hosted by The Israel Project, where politicians
and analysts from across the political spectrum either stopped by
or (more often) called in to comment on the news. Among the most
amusing was Tamar Zandberg of the far-left Meretz party, who urged
the centrist and center-left parties to eschew a coalition with the
right. She was only repeating a position her party had staked out
in the campaign. But it rang especially hollow in light of the
evening’s big news: Yesh Atid, a new centrist party founded by
erstwhile journalist Yair Lapid, would hold the second largest
number of seats in the Knesset after Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s Likud, which had merged for this election onto a joint
list with the secular nationalist party, Yisrael Beiteinu.
Netanyahu will again lead a governing coalition, and while
negotiations over its exact shape are ongoing at press time,
there’s little doubt that Lapid’s party will join.
Lapid’s success came as a shock to the international media. From
the New York Times to the BBC, the established
pre-election narrative pointed to a hard-right turn and a
government that would be full of men ready to annex all or part of
the West Bank. Several moderate Likudniks had been squeezed out in
the Likud-Beiteinu merger, and the big story was supposed to be
Naftali Bennett and his religious nationalist Jewish Home party—the
focus of a 9,000-word New Yorker profile by David Remnick.
The mistake here was viewing Israeli politics through the lens of
the conflict with the Palestinians; this was a campaign as focused
on domestic politics as any in decades. Bennett’s temporarily
soaring poll numbers were driven by his charisma, and his
background as a successful businessman and special forces veteran.
He avoided talking about the Palestinians as much as he could, and
when he couldn’t avoid it, his poll numbers fell back down to
earth.
Lapid, on the other hand, ran a campaign focused on issues like
the economy, education, housing reform, and the extension of
national service requirements for the Haredim (also known as the
ultra-Orthodox). The last issue was especially prominent—the law
that allows the Haredim to defer service expired last year, and the
question of how to replace it was punted to the next Knesset.
(Remnick’s New Yorker piece managed not to mention this
issue at all.) Labor leader Shelly Yachimovich likewise returned
her formerly moribund party to the top of the center-left through a
domestic focus. Running on the slogan “It could be better here,”
Labor rebounded to nearly twice as many seats as it had in the last
Knesset, and will now be the third-largest party. Presenting itself
as something other than the party of the Oslo Accords was crucial
to Labor’s resuscitation. Most Israelis, while supportive of a
two-state solution, believe that the peace process is stalled for
the foreseeable future for reasons that are outside Israel’s
control, and have naturally turned their attention inward.
BACK IN WASHINGTON the following week, former senator Chuck
Hagel, President Obama’s nominee for secretary of defense,
floundered through his confirmation hearing, garbling, among other
things, the president’s policy toward Iran. Hagel’s apparent
confusion was, in the words of an anonymous Obama adviser,
“somewhere between baffling and incomprehensible,” according to the
New York Times, and could potentially undermine Obama’s
diplomatic message that containing a nuclear Iran is not an option.
Who thought it was a good idea to nominate this buffoon,
anyway?
Among Hagel’s biggest boosters was J Street, an organization
that disingenuously styles itself as “pro-Israel, pro-peace.” Hagel
addressed the group’s first national conference, and its leaders
have attempted to push back on criticism of his nomination with,
among other things, a fundraiser with the witless slogan “Don’t
smear Hagel, smear a bagel.” J Street is in part a creature of the
Israeli far left—one of its cofounders worked for Meretz—which is
attempting, through pressure from America, to push Israeli politics
back to the left in quixotic pursuit of a revived peace process.
But there’s a dishonesty at its core, as it cultivates the support
of not only liberal Zionists dissatisfied with Israel’s politics,
but also with anti-Zionists dissatisfied with Israel’s very
existence. “Pro-Israel,” it turns out, can mean “anti-Israel.”
Hagel shares the J Street preoccupation with putting pressure on
the Jewish state. He’s said that our alliance with Israel, while
important, “must not come at the expense of our relationships with
our Arab allies and friends.” In fact, Hagel has probably already
dismayed our Arab allies, some of whom are nearly as horrified as
Israel is by the prospect of a nuclear Iran. But Hagel views the
region through the prism of “linkage,” the idea that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the source of all problems in the
Middle East. “Like a stone dropped into a placid lake, its ripples
extend out farther and farther,” Hagel says of the conflict in his
2008 book America: Our Next Chapter. It’s total nonsense,
of course; after two years of upheaval from Libya to Egypt to Syria
to Yemen, does anyone think the region would be a “placid lake” if
only there were a Palestinian state?
But this is how Hagel thinks. And while he used his confirmation
hearing to repudiate many of his past statements, he wasn’t really
probed on the linkage question. The president who nominated Hagel,
and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, are already making
noises about attempting to revive the peace process. As Israelis
turn toward internal concerns and away from the conflict with the
Palestinians, is the second Obama administration poised to turn
toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and away from more pressing
matters in the region and around the globe? If so, we’re in for a
long four years.