When it comes to Middle East analysis, one of the conventional
lines of approach taken is to assume the sectarian paradigm whereby
regional developments are interpreted through the lens of
Shia-Sunni relations that are perceived as becoming ever more
tense.
To an extent, this paradigm does have valid explanatory power.
For example, on the subject of Syria and what role Assad should
play in the country’s future, it is clear that the region’s nations
are divided along a clear sectarian line on the matter, with
Shia-led governments in Iraq and Iran, as well as the Lebanese
faction Hezbollah, rejecting the idea that Assad must step
down.
However, differing approaches towards Syria on a sectarian basis
do not necessarily serve as a means to determine how the countries
in the region might maintain economic relations with each other.
The case of Egypt, whose government insists that Assad be removed
from power, is the most recent example that demonstrates this
point.
That Egypt is facing a severe economic crisis is not in doubt.
The main cause is the ongoing political infighting as the current
government under Morsi tries to consolidate its power base.
With general instability aggravated by protests, the country has
seen a slump in tourism, and fears of provoking further unrest with
cuts in subsidies have contributed to a vicious cycle delaying the
negotiation of an IMF loan deal of $4.8 billion.
Facing a looming “economic cliff” and finding that aid from the
Gulf states has on the whole been stingy (with Qatar’s aim in
giving aid being particularly apparent: to prevent total economic
collapse while keeping Egypt weak), the Egyptian government has
accordingly turned for aid to two countries often considered to
form part of the so-called “Shia Crescent” in the Middle East:
namely, Iran and Iraq.
In the case of the former, one can note Egyptian Tourism
Minister Hisham Zaazou’s recent trip to Iran in an effort to
encourage Iranians to visit archaeological sites at Aswan, Luxor,
and Cairo, together with a memorandum of understanding signed at
the end of last month between Egypt and Iran for the promotion of
tourism.
Like Ahmadinejad’s earlier visit to Cairo for the Organization
of Islamic Conference meeting, Zaazou’s initiative was
unprecedented in the history of Egypt-Iran relations since the 1979
Revolution.
To be sure, this turning to Iran for economic help has aroused a
good deal of suspicion within Egypt itself. This suspicion
unsurprisingly takes on a sectarian dimension.
For example, the
Salafist an-Nour party released a statement on February 25 as
Zaazou headed out to Tehran, viewing any development of tourism
ties as a scheme for Shi’i infiltration and highlighting in
particular the difference between Sunni reliance on Qur’an and
Sunna as opposed to Khomeini’s doctrine of vilayat
al-faqih (“guardianship of the jurist”), which an-Nour imputes
to the Shia as a whole.
Likewise, the prominent Salafist preacher Safwat Hegazy has
raised similar anxieties, attacking Ahmadinejad’s visit to Cairo
and equating Shi’i Islam with “blasphemy.”
The paranoid fear of Shia encroachment at the hint of forging
economic ties or meeting with Iranian officials is even reflected
in otherwise more politically moderate outlets like El-Watan
News, which I frequently link to on Twitter and can hardly
be called pro-Islamist.
Though on a side note, it should be pointed out that
El-Watan News has also run pieces featuring typical
anti-Coptic conspiracy theories, such as the claim that the
Coptic
Church is running its own militia to use against opponents (cf.
al-Jazeera
Arabic documentary that made similar allegations, while the
El-Watan piece cites a supposed Coptic convert to
Islam).
In light of these fears, Zaazou has tried to make clear that the
plans for tourism ties have nothing to do with
political or religious cooperation between the two countries.
Rather, it is a purely economic initiative.
Zaazou is of course correct: forging economic ties is not the
same thing as sharing a strategic approach towards the region.
Thus, the Egyptian government’s move should not be interpreted as
an ideological “rapprochement” with Iran, but rather as economic
pragmatism.
In a similar vein, we can understand the just concluded visit of
an Egyptian delegation under the Prime Minister Hesham Qandil to
Iraq to discuss strengthening of bilateral ties between the Cairo
and Baghdad, with particular emphasis on economic cooperation.
This visit appears to have achieved a number of results,
including an agreement to establish a joint
Egypt-Iraq business council with focus on reconstruction, a
lifting of an Iraqi ban on Egyptian dairy products, implementing of
an oil pipeline project running from Iraq through Jordan and to
Cairo, and the return of
Egyptian workers to Iraq.
Al-Masry Al-Youm also reported that Iraq had agreed to
provide Egypt with four million barrels of Basra crude oil per
month. The figure may be open to dispute, but there are no doubt
plans to import Iraqi crude in light of the
fuel shortages afflicting Egypt.
Egypt’s fuel crisis has undoubtedly been the primary motivation
for Cairo’s economic outreach to Baghdad, despite differing views
on Syria that were apparently meant to be discussed during Qandil’s
visit.
Analytically, Jordan is an identical case-in-point. In November
of last year,
Iraq offered a “gift” of 100,000 barrels of oil to Jordan amid
protests in the latter country sparked by an announcement of a rise
in fuel prices. More recently, Iraq has started technical work on
an
$18 billion oil-export pipeline from Basra to Aqaba.
Indeed, Jordan-Iraq ties run deep, with a large Iraqi expatriate
community in Jordan. Even so, the extensive economic cooperation
does not translate to a shared regional outlook, as Baghdad still
refuses to call for Assad’s removal and has been passively
supporting the Syrian regime in allowing flow of arms from
Iran.
In contrast, Jordan, which like Iraq has concerns about general
“spillover,” has almost certainly been facilitating a Saudi-led
initiative to supply better weaponry to Syrian rebels not deemed
extremist.
In short, the lesson is that however much the countries of the
Middle East might view developments such as the Syrian civil war
through a sectarian lens, the prospects for economic cooperation
can quite easily transcend sectarian boundaries if circumstances
require, as the case of Cairo’s outreach to Tehran and Baghdad
illustrates.
Granted, suspicion of these government initiatives within Egypt
takes a sectarian angle, but it seems unlikely that the
Brotherhood-led government — eager to secure its grip on power —
will cave into ideologically-driven domestic pressure.
For Morsi’s government, the need to secure fast relief from the
economic crisis is becoming ever greater, and there is no doubt
that it feels at this stage that outreach is the only option when
even securing the IMF loan is in doubt. If it means forging ties
with Shia-led countries so hated by Salafists who also oppose the
IMF loan on strict Islamic principles, then so be it.
