There is no question that the Syrian government of Bashar
al-Assad has been strongly supported by its formal Russian
alliance. Not only has the steadfastness of the entente been
manifested by regular supplies of war materials, but perhaps as
important has been the political encouragement that the Kremlin has
offered. This public alignment at the UN has given credence to the
internationalization of the civil conflict.
China has maintained its commitment to the Assad regime and Iran
has positively reveled in its self-assumed role as “protector of
established government.” Only recently has it been reported that
the friendly government of Russia has made an effort to nudge
Bashar al Assad to seek a safe haven while developing negotiations
for a solution to the ongoing chaos. At the same time, however,
there is the countervailing influence of Lebanon’s Hezbollah backed
by their Iranian patron urging continuing battle. These important
Shia brethren appear to be willing to do everything they can to
maintain the Assad regime in power.
In specific terms, reports have indicated that battle-tested
Hezbollah personnel have trained Syrian troops in urban fighting
techniques, as well as organized the former crime gang and
pro-regime Shabiha militia into what has been termed “an effective
paramilitary force.” From the standpoint of the Free Syrian Army
(FSA), the Hezbollah fighters are “mercenaries” and are to be
treated as such.
Five miles north of the border of Lebanon near the Syrian town
of Qusayr is a group of Shia-dominated villages that have been the
target of FSA rebel forces. Hezbollah fighters have defended these
areas and now have introduced rocket bombardments to assist in
these efforts. The rebels view this escalation as an expansion of
outside military participation beyond existing Hezbollah aid to
regime units and have said this justifies their call for foreign
intervention.
Lebanese Sunnis have rallied to counter the participation of the
Shia of Hezbollah. In spite of the urgings of Lebanese Christians
that any and all of their Moslem countrymen stay out of the Syrian
conflict, Maronite Christians of the Franjieh clan have continued
their alliance with the Assad family’s Alawite sectarian
connection. Interestingly, while not becoming directly involved in
the conflict, the Kurdish population of northeast Syria — aided by
Iraq Kurdistan and the paramilitary abilities of the PKK — have
utilized the civil war to secure greater autonomy.
Conspicuous by their absence, however, is the United States and
the European Union who had loudly proclaimed their political
support for the National Coalition formed several months ago to
represent the Syrian people. The rebel forces expected to have the
Western rhetoric backed up with arms and equipment. Anti-aircraft
and anti-tank weapons were emphasized as needed to match the
regime’s technical superiority. Covert European and American field
operatives in liaison with various rebel groupings have found
themselves politically undercut by the lack of any supply of
advanced military equipment.
An ancillary effect of the inability of the military wing of the
National Coalition to gain stronger materiel support from the West
is their consequent inability to attract and retain fomer regime
military personnel. The principal sources of aid to the rebel
movement have come from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but this aid has
been short on the heavy military equipment desired. This aid tends
to favor the jihadists who have good contacts with Saudi
intelligence and the Syrian wing of the Moslem Brotherhood who get
most of the Qatari support.
A group of about 75 Chechnyan fighters have made their way to
Syria, but aside from their availability for photo ops, these
ferocious-looking veterans don’t seem to be quite sure for whom
they are supposed to fight. Military attachés in Beirut have simply
included these Chechnyans in their lists of generally available
jihadist mercenaries. The Saudis and Qataris act as if they never
heard of Chechnya.
The Russians and Iranians have no trouble in identifying those
portions of the Assad military machine they aim to supply with arms
and equipment. President Bashar al-Assad’s relatives and close
Alawite associates direct his most dependable battalions and they
are the ones that can expect first call on the military assistance
being supplied by Moscow and Tehran. Fuel and ammunition flows
through the Russian-protected Syrian ports. Tehran’s political
operatives keep an eye on the interests of the loyal Shia
minority.
While some of the Alawite leaders admit their patience has been
sorely tested by the regime’s inability to overcome the Sunni-led
opposition, Syria is dividing into special interests of local
warlords, jihadists of varying stripes, and just plain
turf-controlling armed partisans. It’s not an environment that
encourages support for democratic principles.
The reality is that the late Hafez al-Assad held the country
together through the allegiance of his relatives and friends of the
Alawite sect, the secular strength of the Baath Party, and the
careful distribution of privilege throughout the country regardless
of religious or ethnic orientation. It was a balancing act that was
reinforced by an intricate security system. This entire political
structure has been irreparably fractured.
Photo: UPI
