There is a tendency in American political and journalistic
circles to believe there is some way to deter Iran from developing
a nuclear weapon. This is a totally false perception, as the
Iranians are already committed to the creation of a nuclear weapon
arsenal. For what other reason would they have continued to invest
in its extremely expensive and technologically difficult program?
They certainly do not need additional energy sources, and couldn’t
care less about hydrocarbon pollution. This matter already has been
closed.
The only real issue left is to determine how to counter the
possible use of a Persian nuclear weapon. Sanctions are irrelevant
in a nuclear confrontation. If a country such as Iran decides to
use a nuclear weapon, the only deterrent is to create the
expectation of an immediate and devastating counterstrike. The
Mullahs knows full well that if they allow a first strike on
themselves, any further conflict through a retaliatory strike by
them would be limited by the damage originally caused by their
opponent. Iran must strike first — and hard — if at all.
In other words, the strategic situation with Iran is a fait
accompli. The only decision left to be made is whether Iran’s
nuclear capability should be destroyed in some form of a first
strike or a method should be devised to learn to live with the new
nuclear-armed Iran. This choice also exists for North Korea, and,
in a way, they are related. The nuclear cooperation between the two
countries is supposed to be quite close. Certainly they share the
same arch-enemy in the United States. The difference, of course, is
that if South Korea is effectively North Korea’s “Israel,” there is
no question that the Americans will adhere to their defense
agreements with the South, though in the last few years a serious
debate has arisen over just how solid the U.S. commitment to defend
Israel is.
In this regard, there is no way Israel’s defense strategy can
count on serious military support from the Obama administration.
The question follows as to whether and to what degree South Korea
could depend on the U.S. to adhere to the letter and intent of its
defense accord with Washington. In fact, it would appear that the
reluctance of President Obama to use American military power brings
into question any and all American defense agreements.
This possible situation poses a serious question in world
affairs. It would appear that American military interference
worldwide is now to be limited to covert action (including, at
most, lethal drone attack) and intelligence gathering. This
relatively benign policy suggests the Obama White House actually
believes it can pave the way for other military powers to curb
their potential aggression and join Washington in a new — if
unstated — agreement to forswear traditional military action, thus
reducing the dangers to world peace.
While it is relatively easy theoretically for major powers such
as Russia and China to pretend to such a “new concept” form of
disarmament, this approach will do little to dissuade emerging
nuclear weapon nations like Iran and North Korea from using their
newly forming military strength to coerce or even attack its chosen
enemies. Rather, it is easily arguable that the Obama concept of
military preparedness and reaction is an invitation to conflict
rather than a deterrent.
The basis of strategic parity through the Cold War and the
following years has been the threat of mutually assured
destruction. This threat extended beyond the actual potential of
the major adversaries to use their massive nuclear arsenals, but
collaterally diminished even direct conventional conflict between
them. A good example might be the Russian invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979 where the U.S. became involved only on a covert basis and
earlier in Cuba where Washington was restrained from extending
conventional attacks after the Bay of Pigs failure. This is to say
nothing of various covert contests worldwide in Africa, Central
America, etc.
Such a balance of potential destruction is not at all clear in
the evolving nuclear military power of either Iran or North Korea.
For the concept of mutually assured destruction to act as an
impediment to nuclear assault, there must be a parity in the
destructive capability of nuclear arsenals. There also has to be no
religio-ideological predilection to martyrdom as in the case of
Shia Iran or, as is the case of North Korea, an acceptance of
economic privation and a commitment to national dominance.
The truth is that the esprit of nuclear powers differs
even as their nuclear capabilities to destroy tend to evolve. Will
the spirit of the Israelis to survive another Holocaust drive them
to a preemptive attack? Will the Iranians wait for Israel — an
easy target — to make up its mind? Will the North Koreans simply
unleash their limited nuclear assets as an initial barrage against
a South Korea that must respond as well to a conventional invasion
of a massive army from the north?
How does Barack Obama’s defense strategy consider these
contingencies? And does he realize “balance of power” means a
balance of physical power and the will to use it?
