There is something about communist Asian nations that encourages
their political elite to exploit the advantages their party status
affords them — contrary to the repeatedly claimed equality of their
political philosophy. A typical case of special treatment for the
princes and princesses of communist Vietnam was most fashionably
displayed last spring by the attractive 25-year-old daughter of a
member of the country’s politburo. Wearing a pink near-thigh length
dress with matching high heeled shoes, To Linh Huong
toured a construction project in her role as the recently
appointed head of a state building enterprise. Her principal
qualification for the job was the hard hat she wore most
splendidly.
This absurd sense of privilege that used to be a major complaint
against the often corrupt South Vietnamese government — and a
constant theme of the anti-war left in the U.S. — is now part and
parcel of the new communist ruling class in today’s “democratic”
Vietnam. It seems that except for the Spartan period of Ho Chi
Minh’s authoritarian wartime rule, the leadership class of
Vietnam’s triumphant communist power cadre has outdone in
“capitalist” excess the defeated South Vietnamese bureaucrats and
politicians.
The power of the communist elite is such that Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung, who presided over the collapse of various
state-owned companies in his first term, was given another
five-year term in 2011. His daughter and sons have been
particularly successful in the private sector as well as the
state-run enterprises. It seems that there is something in these
heirs of the revolutionary greats that drives them to the nepotism
and slick business practices that were the worst aspects of
Saigon’s late unbridled effort to accrue wealth.
At the same time that scandals and outright criminality in
state-run corporations plague Hanoi’s governance, the worst aspects
of Vietnamese communism remain active. In its political paranoia,
Vietnam’s judiciary and security community remains convinced that
any dissenting voices in the population must be part of some
externally directed cabal. As was the case in the North going back
all the way to the 1954 Geneva Accords and the original division of
the country along the 17th parallel, the Roman Catholic Church is
seen as a source of much anti-government dissent. It’s a very
convenient charge as organized Christianity in all forms is viewed
as intrinsically anti-communist and thus a continuing enemy of
Vietnam.
Of various Vietnamese groups in exile, Viet Tan is considered
one of the most aggressive when it comes to building support for
what the authorities call political dissidence. Human Rights groups
defend activists supposedly associated with the exile organization
as interested only in “community improvement.” The government sees
these mostly Catholic adherents of Viet Tan as working toward
attempting to encourage revolt against Vietnam’s lawful policies.
Thirteen activists were jailed recently for up to 13 years on
charges of spreading propaganda aimed at undermining the state.
The official preoccupation with perceived anti-government
activity runs directly counter to its apparent disregard of the
abuse of privilege by Communist Party members and their families.
Another characteristic of the vast gap between the poor and the
wealthy is the discrepancy of living standards in urban and rural
Vietnamese communities. Despite more than a decade of highly
stimulated financial and industrial growth, the farmers of the
countryside — still the majority of the population — remain in
their traditional peasant environment. There is little or no chance
for ordinary farm families to rise up in a society that firmly
continues to exclude them from the advantages of advanced education
and other social services. These seemingly are a limited
prerogative of the politically acceptable, more sophisticated,
party members.
The reality is that the communist governance of Vietnam carries
with it the same sense of special privilege for the party elite,
its family members, and close friends as did the similar class in
the Soviet Union and is continuing in China today. The veneer of
private enterprise that the West — and the United States in
particular — seeks to extol in contemporary Vietnam provides no
bridge to overcoming class distinction between the poor and rich,
the disadvantaged and the advantaged. The leadership in Hanoi may
make use of recent self-criticism to pretend to show its awareness
of the socio-economic discrepancies, but this is nothing more than
a replay of early Maoist theological self-flagellation. It is pure
propaganda that will not be believable until the rigid political
regimentation ends.
Unfortunately Vietnamese communism does not allow for any such
change, at least in a peaceful manner. Perhaps the entire issue was
best summed up in 1981 by then prime minister, Pham Van Dong,
himself an old and trusted associate of the late Ho Chi Minh. Pham
told the author, Stanley Karnow: “You know, waging a war is simple,
but running a country is very difficult.” As Vietnam slides
backward today, one wonders what Pham Van Dong would say. Uncle Ho
would certainly be furious.
