Periodically the American press, public, and politicians become
excited about something going on in Africa. The interest doesn’t
last long and neither the United States nor African nations benefit
much from the momentary excitement. President Obama recently
ordered a small contingent of troops, mainly Army Special Forces,
into the African country of Chad to assist in evacuating the U.S.
Embassy staff and other American civilians from the neighboring
Central African Republic (CAR). That this action reflected a
reaction to the recent debacle in Benghazi, there is no doubt.
During December Seleka rebels — an alliance of three
rebel movements — took over large areas of CAR. The capital,
Bangui, was endangered and the U.S and other missions bugged out.
In previous years violent outbreaks in former French colonies —
such as CAR and others — were contained or eliminated by French
troops mobilized for the occasion. Sometimes they had already been
stationed in-country; other times they would be from rapid
deployment units. Often these intervention forces were from La
Legion Etrangère (French Foreign Legion). The Americans had no
role — nor wanted any. Why has this changed?
The answer has several elements: To begin with, aside from some
special operations forces infiltrated into the target area,
American military presence actually is limited to providing
security for the crossing points into Chad. The whole operation
appears to be an Obama Administration effort to show its continuing
interest in Africa in spite of abandoning its more direct
responsibility to protect the U.S. official mission in Benghazi.
The fear exists — perhaps accurately — that the rest of the
continent took the lack of quick response as a sign the Americans
were paper tigers.
No such need to impress influenced the French, who clearly have
a more direct and historical responsibility for a former colony.
The French president, François Hollande, declared that French
forces would “… in no way intervene in the internal affairs of a
country, in this case Central Africa.” He added, “Those days are
gone.” This may be simply a timely political gesture, but it set
the tone for his view of other international issues.
The United States and France have had a tacit understanding
since 1958, the year of a referendum in which former French African
colonies chose whether or not to remain in the French economic and
political orbit. The accord implied the Americans would defer to
French interests in former French territories. The rigidly
anti-American Gaullist chief adviser on African affairs, Jacques
Foccart, made sure at every turn to challenge U.S. business and aid
programs — to say nothing of the political efforts of diplomatic
missions. There has been no love lost since then, though the French
in the recent decade reportedly have softened their proprietary
approach.
The State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs has jealously
guarded its status as the lead American representative in dealing
with the former French territories. U.S. military and intelligence
activities have had to be extremely careful to coordinate their
activities with their diplomatic cousins. Some American ambassadors
insisted on being “read-in” on even the highest classified projects
in their role as “Chief of Mission.” This is of course a two-edged
sword in that when a covert operation is compromised the diplomats
have no deniability on which to fall back.
Nonetheless, as radical Islam has developed terrorist assets and
operations in Africa, covert surveillance activities run from the
Pentagon’s Special Operations Command began in 2007 to establish a
network of militarily usable airstrips and hardened airfields
throughout the interior of the continent. Originally a tangential
responsibility of the 10th Special Forces Group, the operations
against al Qaeda-related groups came to fall under the newly
created AFRICOM. A full-scale operation to track down the Ugandan
fugitive rebel commander, Joseph Kony, also has become a major
commitment of U.S. Special Operations Forces.
The Pentagon has taken over the principal paramilitary
anti-terrorist ops mission from the CIA, a fact that veterans of
its Special Activities Division lament, but its intelligence
gathering and political action elements applaud because it has
enlarged their component of the budget. At least that’s what the
Washington Post explained in its exclusive story last
spring “blowing” the whole Africa operations story.
As difficult as it is to keep secrets these days in Washington,
anywhere in Africa it is quite impossible. There really is no such
thing as a truly covertly financed intelligence operation that can
stay that way for very long. Whether it is north or south of the
Sahara, the fact of receiving support — financial or materiel —
from the Americans is something that enhances one’s reputation and
is soon exposed. Only the deepest penetration of an enemy
organization has a chance of being held secret.
Flying small airplanes out of tens of odd airstrips and expanded
established airfields for the purpose of surveillance and supply in
key areas does attract attention to itself. Along the same line,
the 50 Army Special Forces troopers that President Obama informed
Congress on December 27 had been deployed to Chad were hardly
hidden from sight. It does send word that the Obama White House
wants it known that the U.S. is taking on a responsible role in
Africa. Is that the same as a responsibility for Africa?
And all this is happening while the White House signals withdrawal
from other more militarily demanding and strategically important
regions!
