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Feature
Losing Mali
The administration will not avoid further involvement in an African tribal war.
(Page 5 of 5)
Who Lost Mali?
WHY DO THE WOMEN of the Sahel have seven, eight children before they are out of their 20s? Because several of them are expected to die before they can help the family in any way. When this is the overwhelming fact of your life, you can’t get terribly upset about who has the power over your government.
But of course, there is a difference between the MNLA and jihadist Ansar Dine. And by the early days of March, the difference was becoming all too clear. The war was lost, for now. Alhaji Ag Gamou knew that and bluffed his way through enemy lines to escape with his men and rifles into Niger. Tessalit fell, and it seemed there might be a Tuareg nation.
Instead, there came into being a radical Islamist zone, quite possibly doubling as a narcostate, a lair of “armed bandits.” The drop was done (not by the Blackjacks, who stayed on task; humanitarian supplies only, according to the Air Force), but it fell into the enemies’ hands. That was it for us. Headed home. The decision isn’t ours, you know, not our pay grade.
Policymakers at both State and Defense, and their big-thinking hierarchical superiors in Washington, said they could not: Could not do anything until the situation was clear, could not do anything with the forces at hand, could not do anything given the state of the Malian army (now they noticed), could not do anything prior to in-depth consultations with the West African leaders and the French. As Justin Lenz says, “If you say you can’t, it means you won’t.”
Later, however, it seemed that the State Department and those at the higher pay grades had seen things clearly. Just what exactly could we do in Mali, for Mali? We had misunderstood and misjudged Mali from the moment we assured ourselves President Touré was some kind of Jeffersonian liberal setting forth on the path to democracy and prosperity. We pretended the venality and corruption in his entourage and army was of little consequence. We assured ourselves Touré was uniting all Malians, even though his northern development program was viewed as patronizing peanuts by the northerners and handouts if not blackmail by the southerners.
By the time the Tuareg war began, our idea of liberal, harmonious Mali was set in stone. Regardless of the degree to which it was incorrect, its consequence was that the whole weight of our government was against the idea of a military intervention to save our model West African nation. In an election year especially, there was no likelihood of deploying a reaction force into northern Mali.
Well, there was a way. There always is. But there was no will. The French, three or even two decades earlier, probably could have airlifted a battalion of Foreign Legionnaires into Tessalit or dropped them over Kidal and turned the tide of battle. They had bases from which to do this in Abidjan and Libreville. But they were in an election year too, and, moreover, they have been abandoning the chasse gardée, the private reserve. Our own gradual development of African bases, from which to launch humanitarian and military rescue missions, is taking its time. AFRICOM has a plan, but one step at a time.
Since this was the reality, they let it go, choosing to bide their time and see what happened. After the fall of Tessalit, the spiral accelerated. The Tuareg forces soon invaded Kidal. Then there was the army coup against President ATT in Bamako, led by a young captain, Amadou Sanogo. He promised to enforce the inviolability of Malian territorial integrity, but the immediate issue was power and how to keep it. By then the U.S. had cut off aid, including military aid, definitively putting an end to any notion of short-term rescue. And neighboring West African nations were blockading Mali and demanding that civilian rule be restored. Sanago insisted that he wanted nothing better than to return power to civilians. Meanwhile, Gao fell without a fight, as did Timbuktu.
On April 6, the MNLA declared Azawad an independent state and appealed to the community of democracies to recognize it.
Nothing happened, because by that time the MNLA was rapidly losing ground to the combined forces of Ag Ghali and his allies. In Gao and Timbuktu, perforce the smaller localities, the Islamists did what they always had promised to do: impose and enforce Islamic law. Women and girls who escaped with just a whipping for acts of indecency learned to consider themselves lucky they were not machine-gunned. The same went for musicians who might be caught performing at a wedding. Or restaurateurs (there are some even in these remote lands), who could at least reflect that seeing their stock of alcoholic beverages destroyed was preferable to seeing their own blood soak the desert sand. Talk of an independent Azawad was forgotten: Ag Ghali was not interested. He continued to say his aim was to impose Islam, as he understood it, throughout all of Mali.
In September, in the corridors of the United Nations headquarters at Turtle Bay, the Malian delegation lobbied for an armed intervention by the West African community, backstopped by the U.S. and France. The French supported this plan: They wanted to clear the southwestern Sahara of the bandits who kidnapped their nationals. And with their newly restored influence in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, it was not unreasonable for the French to want clout in Bamako. The Americans were not against the idea. But first things first, including presidential elections—ours and theirs—because we would not think of intervening until they restored constitutional order. Might happen, might not. The Hellfighters are ready. But do not say you can, unless you will.
About the Author
Roger Kaplan, a Washington-based writer, covers the Middle East and Africa (and tennis) for The American Spectator.
MelvinNC| 1.4.13 @ 7:50AM
I first instincts would say, "F-ck em." I know my opinion is a bit course and not worthy of some who post eloquent and deep thought remarks, but maybe that is why I am not a diplomat.
Being a former infantryman I am sick and damn tired getting involved in little brush wars that we have no intention of winning, but merely keeping the status quo from spreading.
Another major fact is that I am also sick and damn tired of allegedly saving Nations and ungrateful residents who call me and my Nation a bunch of infidel S.O.B.'s, and then join the enemy that I and my fellow grunts are trying to save them from.
We're trying to save them, but from what, they don't want to be saved and we don't have the heart to stick with it. The residents know this and the enemy knows this. So that is the main reason the residents won't lift a finger to help themselves.
"So f-ck em." This remark is also to include the politicians who are the ones that are not dying and comeing back in pieces from some 6th world shit-hole.
OP4| 1.5.13 @ 2:12PM
This old Infantry Marine seconds that opinion.
Before WWII we fought our numerous "small wars" better in 2 ways.
1. The JAG's, Lawyers, and bureaucrats weren't invited. Marines and soldiers got the dirty work done out of sight and weren't second guessed.
2. Those Banana Wars at least made American businesses money and were not just a needless drain on the economy.
Those days are gone. Time we let the Third World sort itself out.
markenoff| 1.6.13 @ 3:45PM
Ditto. No oil? Who cares. Artificial borders drawn by European powers. Let them deal with it.
Tomper| 1.4.13 @ 8:16AM
Our muslim president will be no help.
Joellen| 1.4.13 @ 8:16AM
Why would the democrats do anything in Africa, when they refuse to bring order and peace right here in oh I dont know let's say CHICAGO!
Please, Mr. Kaplan, with all due respect, this administration doesnt have the moral authority to stop a fist fight within their own headquarters.
cicero| 1.4.13 @ 9:24AM
This appears to be just another event where we feed the locals so that they will be healthy enough to support their Muslim conquerors after the rape, murder, and pillage is over. If we were serious about winning this war against violent Muslim expansion, we would destroy every Muslim incursion into new territory. However, this would require that we use the power that we have,. and not try to buildd nations where none exist. The only viable strategy is to run them to ground where ever they appear, and kill them before they can kill those who do not submit to them. Perhaps burying them with a ham sandwich in their pockets would take some of the religious fervor out of the jihad. (Just kidding - but maybe not.)
Pecos Pete| 1.4.13 @ 9:25AM
Is Mali another Afghanistan? Yes indeed. Tribal affiliations and religions that our "statesmen" don't understand. Mali is not worth one American death, nor one American dollar, until our Lords deign to fight a war that requires winning instead of slowly giving way as they play their diplomatic games.
Mnestheus| 1.4.13 @ 9:47AM
Having eaten a ham sandwhich while flying over Mali. I fail to see what the fuss is about.
BShep| 1.4.13 @ 10:03AM
I do believe that my Middle Eastern policy can be easily applied to the continent of Africa.
In any conflict, arm the losing side until they become the winning side, then arm the other side until the conflict is over, and then send in the CIA to start the cycle over again. Eventually, they will run out of people to wage war and in the meantime they will leave us alone, win – win all the way around.
In addition, provide an AK47 and 250 rounds of ammunition to any female who asks. That will really make the males upset, especially the muslims.
If the above is too simplistic, then please, someone explain to me why I should care at all about this. I am sure not a one of them cares a whit about, say, the murder rate in Detroit or Chicago. While explaining, please use small words and type slowly so my poor brain can understand. BTW, do not bother with the “no man is an island” argument. I am not buying it.
wombat1| 1.4.13 @ 1:02PM
Since when was Mali ours to "lose"?
Have we learned nothing from Iraq and Afghanistan? We can defeat any foe militarily, but that's it . Unless we are willing to stay 50 years, as in occupied Germany and Japan, there is no hope of transforming a nation's character. In this case, the situation is that much worse because there is, properly speaking, no such thing as a nation to work with, And not only are the people effectively living in about 500 A.D., they are willing to fight and die for the privilege of staying there.
But, as usual, any patch of desert or jungle can be declared "strategic" as soon as some gun toting nitwit can be found screaming "death to America". Then the good old circus begins again. "Advisors" and "trainers" give way to combat troops. Billions of dollars are spent on the military effort, which mainly consists of shooting ammunition into the blue and getting our troops ambushed. More billions go to the country building /pacification effort, which means transferring the money from the American taxpayer to Zurich via our " allies".
I vote we pass on this one.
The way to get out of trouble here is to keep out.
Stan Redmond| 1.4.13 @ 2:07PM
If we could somehow get the Mali citizens to vote democrat we would be there in a second.
Pecos Pete| 1.4.13 @ 2:30PM
Stan: In that case they would become the 58th state.
cicero| 1.4.13 @ 3:41PM
Since we' re not serious, and not willing to actually fight to win, I agree that we best stay home. However, if we are going to do that, we also should stop funding either side in these regime change/wars of conquest. If and when they come here, retribution must be severe and swift, with the end result being the totat destruction of those who attacked us or gave them comfort and aid. Not like last time, where we kicked the smot out of them, then stayed to build them up better than they were before they attacked us. Pakistan, anyone?, Iraq?, Afghanistan?,
air max en france | 1.5.13 @ 3:52AM
You can listen to music or read a book or discuss various matters with your mates—does God exist, should you marry your girlfriend, the reports on the outbreak of African tribal war.