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Losing Mali

The administration will not avoid further involvement in an African tribal war.

(Page 3 of 5)

One of the themes of Saharan history is that no one can expect to completely dominate the Saharans. They are too contrary. Like our Plains Indians, the Saharans are related tribes sharing a number of habits, borne of the harsh environment in which they evolved and the cruel history they never made, leaving them with a stubborn pre-modern sense of themselves, a refusal to be economic men as we know them.

The Tuareg took part in the French colonial drive in North Africa, sometimes serving as auxiliaries to military conquerors, sometimes resisting their advance, and sometimes playing both roles in turn. More recently, their raiding parties welcomed support from Moammar Gaddafi, who viewed them as instruments to destabilize the fragile regimes of the newly independent Sahel countries on the Sahara’s southern shores. He played both sides, investing in Mali, Niger, and other places. Evidence of this can be seen in Mali’s capital, Bamako: a school named for Gaddafi, luxury hotels he built used by American military missions and U.N. development teams.

The hell of it was, the recent events in Mali likely would not have happened without Libya, and for that matter, it is quite possible the outcome in Libya would have been better had we given some forethought to the connections between that country and the Sahel.

When the Libyan civil war began in 2011, Tuareg who had been serving in Gaddafi’s military and security agencies for many years were among the most reliable troops against the NATO-supported rebellion. At the same time, countries like Mali and Niger were among those cautioning the Western powers that their democracy crusade might be admirable in intention, but unwise strategically.

They feared that the likely winners in another Western regime-change scheme would be not liberal democrats but Arab Islamic radicals, the kinds of people whom they, the black Africans, had no reason to trust. They knew that Gaddafi feared and hated the Islamists, and so long as he competed with them for influence in the Arab world, he was more likely to make friends in (and give money to) sub-Saharan Africa than to foment subversion there.

Also, they worried about what would happen to Africans in a post-Gaddafi Libya, which, with its oil money, had attracted tens of thousands of black construction workers, domestics, kitchen helpers, and then, little by little, more skilled workers. All of them contributed to Libya and gave back to their countries by sending money home. Unlike the nomads and highwaymen of the desert, these were modern economic migrants.

They were despised and even hated by the democrats we helped bring to power. Even before the regime fell, Africans were being lynched in rebel-controlled areas. The Tuareg (who do not consider themselves black) saw the writing on the wall and left, taking their weapons with them. These were modern arsenals—Gaddafi did not skimp.

What would they do next? The Tuareg are poor, primitive people. Their traditional way of life was disrupted by the great droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, with the decimation of camel herds, the desertification of date orchards, and the drying up of wells. They began to feel hemmed in by the post-colonial borders representing the power of incursive, often black-dominated states.

The French promoted the idea of a Tuareg state in the late 1950s so they could keep a base in the southern Sahara. Nothing came of it, and the former French Sudan became Senegal and Mali. Tuareg tribes launched their first rebellion even before Mali declared its independence.

The leader of Mali’s national movement and the new nation’s first president, Modibo Keita, was a black power, Africa-for-Africans man, which in the Sahel means he distrusted and disliked the whites, the Saharans. (Though the Saharans were not all white; Moors and Arabs and Tuareg mixed and competed with the black Fulani and Songhai.)

There are deep historical and cultural differences among the tribes on either side of the great Niger River, not to mention geographic facts that encourage different modes of existence.

The river peoples are more sedentary and settled than the desert peoples. The desert peoples also practice slavery, one of the factors of distrust between blacks and whites in Mali. They want their own state, the southerners ask, for smuggling and criminality? And to maintain slavery? You can denounce the post-colonial borders all you want, say they are the phony lines drawn by imperialists meeting in Berlin a long time ago. But then what? It was to liberate Africans from their ancient, often cruel practices that Modibo and the other black power men preferred not to redraw the map. They reasoned that changes could be made within the boundaries they controlled. If they abandoned chunks of territory here and there to tribal majorities, who knew where it would stop and who would be in charge?

We went for a visit deep inside Bamako’s neighborhoods, the ones away from the great river, where the streets are not paved, and away from the fine hotels where the lobbies are made of marble and the men wear suits and carry briefcases. We asked the doctor for his opinion on democracy and free markets. “Our children do not see doctors, and our daughters, no matter what I tell their parents, are still cut, you understand? And why does your government certify our elections when less than a third of the people even know they can vote?” The doctor said Modibo was for democracy. Thomas Sankara was for democracy. Patrice Lumumba was for democracy. All were murdered, the doctor said, by the ones we now call democrats. “Why are your soldiers here? Are they here to protect us from the Arab slavers? Are they here to save the north of the country from the Taliban? Are they here to let us sell our cotton on the American market?” Outside the doctor’s office, women were waiting patiently, breastfeeding babies and cooking rice over a pit.

 Ag Gamou’s War

FOR MALIAN army Colonel Alhaji Ag Gamou, desert warrior, it was not a matter of options. Tuareg tribesmen, many of whom he knew, were routing the ill-trained recruits the army sent to the desert regions of the country. He had to defend the north, which as a practical matter meant defending the north-south axis of Mali on the eastern frontier, from Algeria to Niger. The “Libyans,” as the Tuareg who served under Gaddafi were known, had returned home, hardened and well armed.

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About the Author

Roger Kaplan, a Washington-based writer, covers the Middle East and Africa (and tennis) for The American Spectator.

Letter to the Editor View all comments (14) |

MelvinNC| 1.4.13 @ 7:50AM

I first instincts would say, "F-ck em." I know my opinion is a bit course and not worthy of some who post eloquent and deep thought remarks, but maybe that is why I am not a diplomat.
Being a former infantryman I am sick and damn tired getting involved in little brush wars that we have no intention of winning, but merely keeping the status quo from spreading.
Another major fact is that I am also sick and damn tired of allegedly saving Nations and ungrateful residents who call me and my Nation a bunch of infidel S.O.B.'s, and then join the enemy that I and my fellow grunts are trying to save them from.
We're trying to save them, but from what, they don't want to be saved and we don't have the heart to stick with it. The residents know this and the enemy knows this. So that is the main reason the residents won't lift a finger to help themselves.

"So f-ck em." This remark is also to include the politicians who are the ones that are not dying and comeing back in pieces from some 6th world shit-hole.

OP4| 1.5.13 @ 2:12PM

This old Infantry Marine seconds that opinion.
Before WWII we fought our numerous "small wars" better in 2 ways.

1. The JAG's, Lawyers, and bureaucrats weren't invited. Marines and soldiers got the dirty work done out of sight and weren't second guessed.

2. Those Banana Wars at least made American businesses money and were not just a needless drain on the economy.

Those days are gone. Time we let the Third World sort itself out.

markenoff| 1.6.13 @ 3:45PM

Ditto. No oil? Who cares. Artificial borders drawn by European powers. Let them deal with it.

Tomper| 1.4.13 @ 8:16AM

Our muslim president will be no help.

Joellen| 1.4.13 @ 8:16AM

Why would the democrats do anything in Africa, when they refuse to bring order and peace right here in oh I dont know let's say CHICAGO!

Please, Mr. Kaplan, with all due respect, this administration doesnt have the moral authority to stop a fist fight within their own headquarters.

cicero| 1.4.13 @ 9:24AM

This appears to be just another event where we feed the locals so that they will be healthy enough to support their Muslim conquerors after the rape, murder, and pillage is over. If we were serious about winning this war against violent Muslim expansion, we would destroy every Muslim incursion into new territory. However, this would require that we use the power that we have,. and not try to buildd nations where none exist. The only viable strategy is to run them to ground where ever they appear, and kill them before they can kill those who do not submit to them. Perhaps burying them with a ham sandwich in their pockets would take some of the religious fervor out of the jihad. (Just kidding - but maybe not.)

Pecos Pete| 1.4.13 @ 9:25AM

Is Mali another Afghanistan? Yes indeed. Tribal affiliations and religions that our "statesmen" don't understand. Mali is not worth one American death, nor one American dollar, until our Lords deign to fight a war that requires winning instead of slowly giving way as they play their diplomatic games.

Mnestheus| 1.4.13 @ 9:47AM

Having eaten a ham sandwhich while flying over Mali. I fail to see what the fuss is about.

BShep| 1.4.13 @ 10:03AM

I do believe that my Middle Eastern policy can be easily applied to the continent of Africa.

In any conflict, arm the losing side until they become the winning side, then arm the other side until the conflict is over, and then send in the CIA to start the cycle over again. Eventually, they will run out of people to wage war and in the meantime they will leave us alone, win – win all the way around.

In addition, provide an AK47 and 250 rounds of ammunition to any female who asks. That will really make the males upset, especially the muslims.

If the above is too simplistic, then please, someone explain to me why I should care at all about this. I am sure not a one of them cares a whit about, say, the murder rate in Detroit or Chicago. While explaining, please use small words and type slowly so my poor brain can understand. BTW, do not bother with the “no man is an island” argument. I am not buying it.

wombat1| 1.4.13 @ 1:02PM

Since when was Mali ours to "lose"?

Have we learned nothing from Iraq and Afghanistan? We can defeat any foe militarily, but that's it . Unless we are willing to stay 50 years, as in occupied Germany and Japan, there is no hope of transforming a nation's character. In this case, the situation is that much worse because there is, properly speaking, no such thing as a nation to work with, And not only are the people effectively living in about 500 A.D., they are willing to fight and die for the privilege of staying there.

But, as usual, any patch of desert or jungle can be declared "strategic" as soon as some gun toting nitwit can be found screaming "death to America". Then the good old circus begins again. "Advisors" and "trainers" give way to combat troops. Billions of dollars are spent on the military effort, which mainly consists of shooting ammunition into the blue and getting our troops ambushed. More billions go to the country building /pacification effort, which means transferring the money from the American taxpayer to Zurich via our " allies".

I vote we pass on this one.

The way to get out of trouble here is to keep out.

Stan Redmond| 1.4.13 @ 2:07PM

If we could somehow get the Mali citizens to vote democrat we would be there in a second.

Pecos Pete| 1.4.13 @ 2:30PM

Stan: In that case they would become the 58th state.

cicero| 1.4.13 @ 3:41PM

Since we' re not serious, and not willing to actually fight to win, I agree that we best stay home. However, if we are going to do that, we also should stop funding either side in these regime change/wars of conquest. If and when they come here, retribution must be severe and swift, with the end result being the totat destruction of those who attacked us or gave them comfort and aid. Not like last time, where we kicked the smot out of them, then stayed to build them up better than they were before they attacked us. Pakistan, anyone?, Iraq?, Afghanistan?,

air max en france | 1.5.13 @ 3:52AM

You can listen to music or read a book or discuss various matters with your mates—does God exist, should you marry your girlfriend, the reports on the outbreak of African tribal war.

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