It had to be embarrassing for the new leader of a major global
power to believe he had to stress his commitment to halt pervasive
corruption in the political party he now leads. Nonetheless, that
is exactly what was done by Xi Jinping, the presumptive president
of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) due to take office in
March. Xi is not the usual Chinese leader. He is six foot tall,
married to one of his country’s most famous singers, and has a
daughter attending Harvard University. The “princeling” son of one
of Chairman Mao’s confidantes who was later thrown in jail during
the Cultural Revolution, Xi has worked his family’s way back up
Beijing’s complicated political social ladder
Mr. Xi specifically criticized China’s Communist Party in his
initial speech after the Party Congress last November. He left no
question in the minds of his national television audience that the
ten years of his presidency will be devoted to political reform
aimed at improving the life of the individual citizen. While
emphasizing in general terms the need to wipe out official
corruption on all levels, Xi chose not to be specific regarding his
program for improving such things as incomes, social services, and
living conditions. This did not really matter because his promise
to attack the criminality within the Party’s leadership was
adequate to appeal to the everyday desires of the populace. It
seemed logical to a nationalistic citizenry that “good things”
would follow.
By placing a special emphasis on bribe-taking by government and
party officials, Xi sent a signal to his law enforcement and
judicial community that the days for a crackdown had arrived. As
lavish gifts have been for years a standard of “friendship” with
China’s ruling clique — including the Xi Jinping family — it is not
clear to the expatriate and indigenous business community just what
will replace this traditional method of recognizing status and
authority.
The governmental problem of dealing with acts of corruption and
favor is actually secondary to the lack of a sustainable
countrywide economic growth model. Xi will have to direct his
team’s attention to the massive spending on high profile
infrastructure projects during this last year of Hu Juntao’s
presidency. This heavy investment in major programs such as railway
construction gave the appearance of positive economic activity, but
it did not foster the needed increase in consumer spending. Indeed
the large infrastructure expenditures acted to obscure the
shortfall on the consumers’ side.
Economic reform will be the primary target for the next premier,
Li Keqiang. As a PhD economist from Peking University, Li has the
intellectual and political credibility necessary to do the job. The
problem he faces is that while China has made great strides in
building its welfare state, the ordinary citizen has not responded
by putting his saved money back into the system through increased
spending. In simple terms, the Chinese people as a whole are very
protective of their hard-earned savings accounts and hesitate to
shift to a more active consumerism. To quote the Financial
Times, “The rising consensus among economists is that the
export-oriented investment-led growth model that has sustained
China for more than three decades is running out of steam and major
reforms are needed for growth to continue.” That will be Li
Keqiang’s job — and it’s immense.
The person on the new Standing Committee of the Politburo who
will have the primary trouble-shooting responsibility in the field
of corruption investigation is another “princeling,” Wang Qishan.
He too is the son of a revolutionary comrade of Chairman Mao
Zedong. More important, Wang is considered a specialist in
financial matters and is expected to institute stock market and
financial regulation that will do away with — or at least diminish
— corruption at all levels of political leadership. The problem is
that vulnerability to payoffs is increased by the low salaries of
most officials. No one is immune to the colored envelopes received
at state occasions. It will be Wang Qishan’s unenviable
responsibility to put the brakes on this practice as well as the
even more insidious distribution of new ventures’ shares to chosen
relatives of key politicians.
Xi Jinping chaired the committee that provided the preceding
president, Hu Jintao, with the posture statement on Chinese Armed
Forces capability that Xi will now have to oversee. This definitive
study subtly shifted China’s military strategy from its
oft-publicized “defensive character” to an emphasis on mounting a
force structure, as the report said, “commensurate with China’s
international standing.” This theme underpins what in the next ten
years is expected to become a Chinese military with a new air,
space, and naval advanced capability.
Fixed wing technological advances will compete for priority with
missile development. Carrier battle group formation is aimed at
altering the so far limited defense nature of Chinese naval assets
constructed to repel theoretical invaders. Altering the strength
and structure of the Chinese navy is symptomatic of building a
modern and powerful military capable of operating at a distance no
less than the U.S. Pacific Fleet. This is all consistent with
Beijing’s concept of acting accordingly to its “international
standing.”
In defense matters Xi Jinping is in charge of building a nation
far different from what it has been in the past. The new president
is well known to have a special interest in and relationship with
the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA). Beijing now has its own version
of a foreign affairs and defense pivot that calls for a strategic
buildup just when Washington appears to be moving toward a
reduction in its force projection capability.
Xi Jinping and China will have a busy next ten years. Both are
very ambitious.
