Just as 2011 in Iraq ended with a political crisis following the
issuing of an arrest warrant by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
against Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi on allegations of running a
death squad, so 2012 has rounded off with another political crisis:
this time involving the Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi, a member
of Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc.
In this case, the arrest warrant is not against Issawi himself,
but rather some members of his security entourage, charged with
aiding Hashemi’s men in the Vice President’s alleged death
squad.
As always, media outlets were
quick to note the ethno-religious backgrounds of the men
involved in this current political crisis: namely, Maliki as a
Shi’ite versus Issawi, who is a Sunni Arab.
Reporting on demonstrations that subsequently arose in the
predominantly Sunni Arab province of Anbar in protest at the move
against Issawi, an
Associated Press piece printed on the Guardian’s
website came with the headline, “Iraq protests signal growing
tension between Sunni and Shi’a communities.”
The piece then affirmed in the main text: “The unrest is part of
broader sectarian conflicts that threaten the stability of the
country.”
On this view, the current political debacle is indicative of a
deepening Sunni-Shi’ite crisis in the country. So is the
Maliki-Issawi crisis a sectarian affair?
In short, the answer is both yes and no.
Start off with some of the evidence that points in the
affirmative direction in answer to the question. Both Maliki and
certain opponents of his in this crisis have played the sectarian
card, hurling accusations at each other of stirring up sectarian
strife, while portraying themselves as defenders of the
ethno-religious communities they claim to represent.
For example,
in an interview with al-Hayat, Tariq al-Hashemi
claimed: “What is happening to my colleague Dr. Rafi al-Issawi is
further proof that there is a plot to exclude Sunni Arabs from the
political process.” Hashemi went on to say that Maliki is “an
extremely sectarian man,” even as he also affirmed that Maliki’s
targets are not limited to Sunni Arabs.
Hashemi has portrayed the arrest warrant against himself in
similar terms, urging Iraqis not to allow Maliki and his allies to
get their supposed wish of “sectarian
strife.” In a similar vein, Maliki has accused the reaction in
opposition to his move against Issawi of taking on a “sectarian”
dimension against Shi’ites.
Further, people on both sides have depicted the crisis as a
sectarian game instigated by foreign powers in the region. Thus,
protesters in Anbar have burned Iranian flags, with
one Iraqiya MP accusing Maliki and his allies of being traitors
serving Iran, and some banners calling for a “Sunni” liberation of
Iraq from Iranian occupiers.
Meanwhile, Maliki himself has hinted that there might be a
Turkish and Syrian rebel hand behind the protests, drawing
attention to the fact that some protesters were holding portraits
of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Free Syrian Army
flags.
Similarly,
Press TV — Iran’s English-language outlet — claims that
“Turkey is working closely with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and al-Hashemi
to design tensions with the present Iraqi government,” a sentiment
shared by many of Maliki’s supporters.
What this rhetoric foremost illustrates is how many of Iraq’s
politicians play the sectarian card in an attempt to rally support
when they feel that they are under fire.
Concomitant with this approach is a mindset of victimhood that
naturally entails allegations of foreign powers playing a role in
stirring up unrest. This rhetoric in turn helps to arouse sectarian
sentiment in demonstrations and counter-demonstrations.
Does it follow that Maliki went after Issawi just or primarily
because he is a Sunni Arab? No. The fact is that Maliki will go
after any politician he perceives to be too much of a threat to
himself or a person who works in a government institution and over
whom he feels he does not have enough control.
That is, Maliki did not target Issawi because of his
ethno-religious identity, but rather because he perceives Issawi to
be a longstanding personal rival who needs to be put in his
place.
For comparison, one should note Maliki’s attempts to crack down
on the Shi’ite MP Sabah al-Saidi, who is not tied to any political
bloc. Saidi has been an ardent critic of corruption in the
government, and has most recently
appeared live on TV purporting to expose a number of corruption
scandals in the highest ranks of the Maliki administration.
Since September 2011, there has been an arrest warrant against
Saidi, which came in the context of Saidi threatening to expose
how Maliki was using the intelligence agencies against him.
Related to the Saidi case is the arrest warrant against the head
of the Central Bank: Sinan al-Shabibi. Like Saidi, Shabibi is a
Shi’ite, and while the official pretext for the arrest warrant
pertains to allegations of corruption, most politicians outside
Maliki’s State of Law bloc simply saw the move as a unilateral
attempt by the premier to assert greater control over the Central
Bank.
Thus, even the Citizens Bloc — headed by Ammar al-Hakim, who is
an ally in the Maliki coalition government and leader of the
Shi’ite Islamist Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq — warned that the
move against Shabibi risked becoming a stepping-stone towards
“one-man
dictatorship.”
Those outside Maliki’s own faction have perceived the move
against Issawi in the same way. For example, the Sadrists, who have
been at odds with the premier not only for the arrest warrant
against Shabibi but also for the Russian arms deal corruption
scandal, have indicated
their sympathy for the demonstrations protesting against
“corruption and dictatorship.”
Earlier on, some of the Sadrists even went to Anbar province to
show their support. The “Majlis
al-A’yan” in the Shi’ite province of Basra (council of tribal
sheikhs) has also expressed solidarity with the protests in
Anbar.
At the same time, the Sadrists have made it clear they will not
participate in any protests in which the FSA flag is present or
in which there are sectarian slogans.
Above it was noted that certain figures both for and against
Maliki have played the sectarian card in their rhetoric about the
current political crisis. The main exception has been none other
than Issawi, who at a demonstration in Ramadi emphasized that the
protests should represent all Iraqis and that
Maliki targets all his opponents, not just Sunni Arabs.
This illustrates, as Najaf-based analyst Fadel
al-Kifa’ee suggested to me, that Issawi is much more of a
moderate figure than Hashemi, whom I consider to be guilty of the
charges against him, even as the arrest warrant was issued in a
political context (i.e. Hashemi’s rivalry with Maliki).
It must be admitted that the nature of the pretext
against Issawi’s entourage has a sectarian flavor. When Maliki goes
after his opponents, it is to be expected that serious allegations
of involvement in terrorism will play a part if the rivals in
question happen to be Sunni Arabs. In contrast, arrest warrants
against Shi’ite opponents entail less serious pretexts.
Should Maliki ever perceive the anti-American Shi’ite cleric
Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers to pose too much of a threat to
his power, it is likely that an arrest warrant against Sadr over
allegedly ordering the murder of the cleric Sayyid Abdul-Majid
al-Khoei will be revived. Even as we can acknowledge that the
context of reviving the arrest warrant would be political, it does
not diminish the validity of the accusations any more than for
Hashemi.
Yet against Shi’ite opponents (including Sadr), Maliki would
never use the pretext of allegations of running sectarian death
squads, because in the all-out sectarian civil war of 2006-7
centered on Baghdad, Maliki was protecting the Shi’ite militias, as
he feared that the Sunni insurgency posed an existential
threat.
In sum, it is clear that Maliki did not go after Issawi simply
because he is Sunni Arab. Rather, as Maliki’s record in dealing
with rivals elsewhere illustrates, personal enmity between the two
played the biggest role, even as it is apparent that people on both
sides have stirred up sectarian rhetoric to rally support, and that
the demonstrations in Anbar (now
occurring in the northern city of Mosul) have increasingly
taken on a sectarian character over time.
In any event, the reaction of Iraq’s other political factions
outside the State of Law bloc — overwhelmingly criticizing Maliki
for his move against Issawi — still tells against a monolithic
sectarian analysis of the current crisis. The main issue instead is
the ongoing absence of proper rule of law in Iraq.
What next for Maliki? It seems he has recognized that he has
gone too far in going after Issawi’s entourage, and accordingly has
made a concession to appease protesters by ordering the transfer
from Baghdad to Anbar of some female prisoners who have complained
of torture in prisons in the capital.
Just as Maliki eventually reached a concord of understanding
with the Sunni Arab deputy PM Saleh al-Mutlaq, who had openly
accused Maliki of being a dictator worse than Saddam (and was
recently attacked by demonstrators in Anbar), thus he will
attempt to do so with Issawi.
Yet it should not be thought that Maliki will have gained
anything from this debacle. On the contrary, his standing among
Sunni Arabs in the disputed territories will likely be diminished
for the provincial elections this year as a result of his move
against Issawi, even as his brinkmanship game over the past month
or so with the KRG had helped him build up a support base among
Arabs — both Shi’ite and Sunni — in the disputed areas.
On a final note, be careful about drawing any connection between
the current political crisis and a likely upcoming wave of bomb
attacks by the likes of al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Analysis of data on
violence illustrates that the remaining insurgents launch a
campaign whenever major Shi’ite festivals like Arba’een come up
(Arba’een is
happening right now), in which the numerous pilgrims who have
come to Karbala are particularly vulnerable targets.
