The Associated Press
discovered this month that residents of Helmand province — and
presumably elsewhere in Afghanistan — are “afraid to go out after
dark because of marauding bands of thieves.” The key word is
bands. This means organized gangs are harassing civilians
in attempts to steal money and goods. This criminal activity is
reportedly to be the result of a failure of the Americans and their
allies to keep the Afghan populace safe from what is referred to as
“crime and corruption.” At least that’s the AP’s reading of the
situation.
Ah, for the good old days of the Taliban who cut off the hands
of thieves they captured. At least, according to AP, that’s
supposedly what one hears when visiting Helmand these days. These
and other news sources report the local police are running
protection rackets, taking bribes for minor offenses, and stealing
when they can’t coerce voluntary payments. And this is all
supposedly an indication of the futility of eleven years of war.
The problem is that in many parts of Afghanistan it’s not far from
the truth.
What is most disturbing is that none of this is new. It’s
certainly not the fault of ISAF troops’ inadequacy in policing.
That was never their primary job. NATO civilian leaders, however —
especially in the U.S. and UK — tried hard to create the
impression that the billions spent on war fighting also had a
target of providing a framework of “civil improvement.” From the
outset Afghanistan was seen as suffering from either strict Sharia
justice by the Taliban and/or local law enforcement by warlords
exploiting the population in exchange for keeping the peace.
The truth is that justice and policing were always a matter
primarily in the hands of tribal councils; the Americans and
British first arriving in 2001 well knew this. Punishments were
meted out consistent with traditional guidelines by these local
councils. Today this historic system has been disrupted by the
growth of power and authority of policing mechanisms that begin
with a corrupt central government and stretches down to the
provinces and villages.
Power tends to be returned to the local authorities when they
are backed by warlords with the strength to dominate their region
and defy corrupt higher level official government interests. It’s
simply a question of which “sovereign” can demand the fealty of
each community. As this has been well reported on in the past, why
is it that journalists are now “discovering” that it has been the
inadequate efforts of the Americans and NATO that have not kept the
ordinary citizens safe from crime and corruption?
The Taliban faced the same problems of law and order when they
ruled, but they had the strict guidance and drastic punishments of
their Islamic belief system to reduce the potential for
unauthorized corruption. For those living on the lower rungs of the
Afghan social order there is an expected price for an ordered life.
It is traditional to pay a tax (zagat) to a tribal
headman. In the same sense, it is accepted that profits from
illegal opium poppy production are shared with political leaders in
a farmer’s region.
It is no wonder production of poppies is favored over cotton or
wheat, however. Cotton and other exportable products do not bring a
return competitive with the acreage of opium poppies. The U.S./
NATO- subsidized government compensation for the difference then is
“taxed” by the local authorities. The final sum is less than it is
with the poppy crop. It is a matter of simple economics — and
hardly new.
Depending on the market at a given time, the return on poppy
versus wheat production, for example, is in some estimates as high
as four times in favor of the opium source. Helmand province
produces about 60% of the product that is transformed into heroin
and exported from Afghanistan. And according to the United Nations
Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), 90% of the world’s heroin is
derived from Afghan production.
Journalists reporting on studies this year have conveniently
decided to rediscover that Helmand is “the most dangerous and
violent Afghan province.” (Statement by Ryan Evans of the Center
for National Policy as quoted by AP.) Of course, the Taliban would
fight the hardest to keep itself dominant there. And what is going
to happen after 2014 that will change any of this when all combat
capable U.S./NATO forces depart?
President Hamid Karzai must have been well aware of this when he
was interviewed by NBC News on December 6 and said, “Part of the
insecurity is coming from the structures that NATO and America
created in Afghanistan.” He knows his assassinated brother, Wali,
was one of those key contractors protecting NATO supply shipments
through Taliban-infested territory. The Karzai family had well
benefited from that particular “structure.”
The violent feudal environment in which most of Afghanistan
exists is a truth that can not be ignored. To suggest that there is
American/NATO culpability for the societal wilderness that is
Afghanistan is an exercise of political convenience. Karzai is
quite knowledgeable of his own inability to govern. As with most
politicians, any fault or failure is someone else’s responsibility.
He’ll certainly talk about that with President Obama in January at
their White House meeting.
Perhaps Afghanistan was explained best by Karl Ernest Meyer and
Shareen Blair Brysac when they titled their excellent book on the
“great game” in Central Asia,
Tournament of Shadows. There is not much difference
between today and what existed in the 19th century
except that the killing in the shadows may be more easily seen. As
has been said of other times and other places, only the names have
changed.
