North Korea launched a rocket. Denunciations flowed around the
world. But it was a non-event, one of the least surprising “crises”
of the year.
A year ago the much beloved “Dear Leader” died as he
indefatigably devoted himself to his people’s welfare. Wailing
crowds mourned his passing. Kim’s son, the “Great Successor” Kim
Jong-un — tagged the world’s sexiest man by the Onion —
took the helm of state.
Since then there have been stories of imminent change. The
29-year-old Kim went to boarding school in Switzerland where he
reportedly followed American basketball and lionized Michael
Jordan. He regularly speaks to the public and enjoys meeting
regular folks. He likes Disney and takes his beautiful young wife
with him. She has a taste for fine fashion and designer goods.
Obviously Kim is a liberal reformer.
North Korea watchers especially are expecting fundamental
economic reform. After all, Kim fils has repeatedly
emphasized the need to improve living standards. His uncle, Jang
Song-taek, seen by some as the real power behind the throne,
reportedly has emphasized economic policy. A top military man was
defenestrated from the corridors of power apparently to reassert
party control over civilian enterprises controlled by the army.
Reports have circulated that Pyongyang is relaxing controls over
both factories and farms.
So far, however, nothing much seems to have happened. It’s a bit
like the appointment of KGB head Yuri Andropov as the General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. He reportedly enjoyed jazz
and Gypsy music, drank scotch whiskey, wore tailored clothes,
laughed at political jokes, and collected abstract art. Never mind
the many human rights violations committed on his watch, observers
tagged him as a liberal reformer. Alas, Andropov merely reinforced
the status quo. The USSR actually grew more repressive and
enfeebled on his watch.
Still, serious people have been hoping for reform in Pyongyang.
Alas, the dream has died with the so-called Democratic Republic of
Korea’s latest rocket test.
The Kim government insisted that it was merely sending a
satellite into space. However, few observers believe that
Pyongyang, with active missile and nuclear programs underway, had
such limited objectives. Moreover, the North tested another rocket
in April, which proved to be less successful, wrecking a deal
reached shortly before with the Obama administration. .
There are several important lessons from the latest incident.
First, Kim Jong-un — whether as symbolic leader or genuine ruler
— is acting as a true successor to his father and grandfather.
There has been no improvement in human rights; to the contrary, the
regime has tightened border enforcement, sharply reducing the flow
of refugees across the Yalu into China. So far the leadership has
exhibited greater interest in increasing party control over
government economic activity than in relaxing party control over
private economic activity. The hint of “glasnost” after the failed
rocket launch in April has not been followed by any evidence of
“perestroika.”
Second, North Korea’s problem is the system. Undoubtedly, there
are “moderates” and “technocrats” within the DPRK government. There
may even be a few “liberals.” However, there is no evident opening
for them to influence policy. Any serious reform would threaten the
positions, livelihoods, and even lives of a regime full of
apparatchiks. It would be hard enough for Kim Il-sung or Kim
Jong-il at the height of their powers to drag the Korean Workers
Party and Korean People’s Army into the 21st century. A newer, less
certain, and likely collective leadership isn’t likely to try.
Third, Kim Jong-un and Co. continue the regime’s “military
first” policy in substance if not name. Although the ouster of army
chief of staff Ri Yong-ho may have reimposed party control over the
military, the armed services continue to consume a prodigious share
of the country’s economic resources. By one estimate the missile
launch facility, related operations, and two launches this year
cost $1.3 billion. That’s more than three percent of the country’s
estimated GDP, and enough to purchase 4.6 million tons of corn for
a starving population.
Moreover, North Korea’s nuclear program apparently continues
apace. Rumors abound of a possible nuclear test. South Koreans
worry that the North will follow its missile launch with a nuclear
blast, highlighting the threat if Pyongyang marries bomb and
rocket. Even if the military has lost clout vis-à-vis the party, it
retains its predominant position vis-à-vis the people.
Fourth, China lacks the willingness to even try to restrain
Pyongyang. Beijing blessed, however reluctantly, the monarchical
power transfer from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il. The People’s
Republic of China has done the same for the shift from Kim Jong-il
to Kim Jong-un. Indeed, Chinese investment in the DPRK has
increased in recent years. Rising academic and public debate over
the value of Beijing’s alliance with the North has not been matched
by any change in Chinese government behavior. The PRC appears to
have decided that North Korea’s survival is a vital interest, no
matter how irresponsible and provocative Pyongyang’s behavior. With
President Xi Jinping barely a month into his presidency, any switch
in official policy seems far off if ever.
Fifth, any softening of South Korean policy toward the North
would reflect the triumph of hope over experience. The “Sunshine
Policy” was a well-meaning attempt to buy liberalization in the
DPRK. Alas, the effort was a complete failure. Republic of Korea
President Kim Dae-jung bought a summit meeting that was never
reciprocated. For a decade North Korea pocketed food, money,
fertilizer, and more without moderating its splenetic rhetoric,
reducing its conventional threats, or slowing its missile and
nuclear programs. When the Lee administration finally closed the
aid spigot Pyongyang responded with attacks on a South Korean ship
and island. So continues the North’s policy today.
Sixth, it does not pay to reward the DPRK in response to its
threats. For years a pattern developed of North Korea issuing
threats and then temporarily sitting down at the negotiating table
in return for money, food, energy, and other benefits.
Unfortunately, Pyongyang has learned that it gains the most when it
threatens the most. Even with an agreement in hand earlier this
year to trade food assistance for a return to the Six Party Talks,
the North moved ahead with its rocket test, wrecking the entire
deal. Only continuing and firm Western denial will cause the DPRK
to unlearn this pattern.
Seventh, there is little positive for anyone to do with
Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership likely puts survival above
all other objectives. While economic reform might strengthen the
country, it could weaken the state, empowering anti-regime forces.
Political reform would be even more dangerous. Years of privation
and starvation have weakened government controls and exposed regime
myths. Give the North Korean people their druthers and Kim Jong-un
might end up hanging from the nearest lamppost. The DPRK is a
system without a soft landing for political losers. The risks are
far greater than the rewards of liberalization.
It is time for a change in policy. Washington should declare
that the North is East Asia’s problem. The ROK can defend itself;
American troops should come home. Deterring Pyongyang should become
South Korea’s responsibility. The U.S. should focus on
nonproliferation, warning of overwhelming retaliation should North
Korea transfer critical materials or processes to terrorist
groups.
Whoever wins the ROK’s presidential election on December 19,
Seoul should confront the DPRK without illusion. The North Koreans
may be separated brothers and sisters, but the North’s leadership
is ruthless and brutal. The only policy that Pyongyang respects is
toughness — a stronger military, better preparedness, and no
subsidies. If South Koreans prefer to go soft, that is their
choice, but they should accept the consequences. It makes no sense
for America to defend the ROK as the South underwrites the Kim
regime.
Japan should abandon the illusion that the present regime is
ready to make an accounting for those kidnapped. Tokyo’s policy has
been stuck on Pyongyang’s undeniably outrageous behavior decades
ago. But the North’s nuclear and missile programs are far more
important and pose a genuine security threat to Japan today. The
latter, which faces an election and likely power transition, must
create a more robust military capable of defending against both the
DPRK and China.
Russia should stop playing footsie with Pyongyang. Even Vladimir
Putin appears to have no interest in restoring Cold War-style ties
with the North. Moscow gains too much from its relationship with
South Korea. However, Russia has been improving its links with the
DPRK. It’s a losing game. The isolated, irresponsible Kim regime
wants to use Moscow to create some balance with China, but has
little to offer the Putin government.
Finally, the PRC should focus on its long-term interests:
stability on its border, reduced threat of conflict in the Korean
peninsula, end of nuclear proliferation that could spread to South
Korea and Japan, fewer desperate refugees crossing the Yalu,
increased trade with a wealthier united Korea, and improved claim
to regional leadership. All of these would be advanced by
transforming if not ending the Kim family criminal enterprise known
as the North Korean government.
The DPRK’s latest military adventure should surprise no one. The
time for illusion is over. Kim Jong-un is proving to be anything
but a serious reformer.
