With the upcoming referendum to begin on Saturday in Egypt
(already taking place in embassies
abroad) for the draft constitution that is primarily the work
of Islamists from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist
factions, it is worth bearing the following issues in mind:
The Military: For all intents and
purposes, the Egyptian military is interested in keeping its
distance from politics, safeguarding its interests in the country’s
economy and maintaining a degree of autonomy from civilian
government control.
The recent
call for dialogue between President Mohammed Morsi and the
opposition by the head of Egypt’s armed forces — Abdul Fatah
al-Sissi — which was welcomed by opposition leader Amr Moussa but
has led to nothing practical yet, amounts to no more than an urge
for calm in the face of rival rallies for and against the upcoming
referendum. It does not signal a renewed desire for Egyptian
military involvement in politics.
While the military, under former Supreme Council (SCAF) head
Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, did wish to contain the Brotherhood, the
fact is that the balance of power decisively shifted with Morsi’s
election and his dismissal of Tantawi in August, with Sissi being
promoted in Tantawi’s place.
It is a mistake to see the military as a bastion of Egyptian
secularism at this point. What matters for the military now is that
Morsi is not going to interfere with its economic holdings in
industry and agriculture; further,
as Eric Trager and Robert Satloff note, the draft constitution
placates the military with a number of clauses that grant the
military oversight over its budget, war policy, the appointment of
the Defense Minister, and its own independent judiciary.
Islamist Vigilantes: Besides the
desire to keep aloof of politics, the military is also aware —
along with the police — of the implications of being associated
with the deaths or injuries of rival protesters in the current wave
of rallies and counter-rallies.
In the context of this security-force vacuum,
Islamist vigilantes are simply filling the gap, with some 140
people being “arrested” by them in clashes last week. Indeed, the
Der Spiegel article’s summary point that “eyewitness
reports suggest that the police tolerated the attacks” makes
perfect sense in light of this development.
Various non-Islamist political figures have also accused
street thugs from the Muslim Brotherhood in Alexandria and
Cairo. In the case of Alexandria, one should note the
belligerent Salafist rhetoric, which may point to Salafist
responsibility in particular for violent attacks on political
opponents.
This is not to say that there has been no violence from the
opposition, but the opposition is not setting up its own
vigilantes.
The Rescinding of the November 22
Decree: Many commentators have interpreted Morsi’s
rescinding of the November 22 constitutional decree that granted
him de facto dictatorial powers as a sign of genuine
compromise owing to the pressure of opposition protests and violent
unrest. Morsi’s move is no such thing.
The decree was designed in the first place to hasten the process
of finishing the draft constitution and putting it to referendum,
sidelining the judiciary and the non-Islamist opposition in the
process, with all actions in the interim between the passing and
rescinding of the decree remaining beyond judicial review, together
with the new prosecutor general appointed by Morsi keeping his
position.
The rescinding of the decree comes in such a way that there is
nothing to stop the referendum from going ahead on Saturday —
something that is also indicated by an announcement on the part of
the
State Council’s Administrative Court that it cannot overrule
Morsi’s decision and insistence on holding the referendum this
Saturday because doing so would infringe on the president’s
sovereignty.
The Draft Constitution: The best
overview of its Islamist nature is given by
this Associated Press report, which notes that “the charter not
only makes Muslim clerics the arbiters for many civil rights, it
also could give a constitutional basis for citizens to set up
Saudi-style ‘religious police’ to monitor morals and enforce
segregation of the sexes, imposition of Islamic dress codes and
even harsh punishments for adultery and theft — regardless of what
laws on the books say.”
Indeed, one Salafist member of the Constituent Assembly, Yasser
Borhami, boasted of how the secularists and Christians who had quit
the panel over the drafting of the constitution had been persuaded
to “allow a number of crucial clauses that solidified Shariah,
either because of bargaining or because they didn’t realize the
articles’ significance.”
Morsi and Economics: Writing in the
Atlantic,
Soner Cagaptay aims to portray a contrast between Turkey and
emerging Islamist-led governments in the Arab world. In Turkey,
Soner claims, “Islamization is taking place within the constraints
of pre-existing and institutionalized Westernization,” and one
supposed aspect of this phenomenon is “Turkey’s embrace of liberal
economics.”
On the contrary, Soner’s view is off-base. Islamist ideology
outside a secular and Westernized framework and embracing
neo-liberal economic policies are by no means mutually exclusive.
Morsi’s proposed tax hikes, which he postponed at the
start of this week, as part of a plan to secure an IMF loan fit in
very well to a
neo-liberal approach in the efforts to rescue Egypt from its
economic crisis.
While one can interpret the postponement of the increases in
taxation as a sign of government indecision on how to deal with the
economic crisis, it is more likely that Morsi will simply reinstate
the tax hikes soon after the constitutional referendum is approved,
since he has realized that introducing them, which he knows will be
unpopular, at this moment would give a means for the opposition to
attract significant further support.
Indeed, it is clear that Morsi’s economic plans, which have
included a decree (passed while the November 22 constitutional
decree was in force, hence it is beyond legal challenge now) to
increase
government control over trade unions, are of grave concern to
independent labor unions, many of which are concentrated in the
industrial city of Mahalla.
Mahalla was the site of the protests that sparked the 2008
general strike in Egypt and has now seen workers throw out the head
of the local city council and declare
autonomy from the “Ikhwani state,” under the guise of the
“Independent
Republic of Greater Mahalla” (hat-tip:
Ben Jefferies in Cairo for first drawing this development to my
attention).
Of course, opposition in Mahalla to Morsi’s 22 November decree
and the Brotherhood’s Islamist ideology played a role in this
autonomy declaration too, but in this context, one should also note
the
clear tensions between Tunisia’s labor unions and the
Islamist-led government that has plans for a
neo-liberal economic approach. In Tunisia, Islamist
vigilantes have attacked the headquarters of the country’s main
trade union: the UGTT.
Voting in the Constitutional Referendum and the
Future: To conclude, while both the Islamist
factions and their rivals have rallied significant numbers of
people in support of and in opposition to the draft respectively,
it should not be inferred that the vote will be split 50-50 in the
referendum on Saturday. Rather, it is more likely that the
referendum will see a majority vote in favor of the
constitution.
The fact that the voting in the presidential race was almost
split 50-50 does not indicate that the country is equally divided
between Islamists and non-Islamists.
In the circumstances immediately leading up to the run-off
between Morsi and Ahmed Shafik, it is clear that many Islamists
would have believed the election would ultimately be rigged in the
latter’s favor, and so would not have turned up to vote.
Despite the
call by the main opposition organizations to vote “No” in the
referendum (in turn, despite the announcement by the Judges Club
that most judges will boycott the referendum,
advisers to Morsi claim they have enough judicial officials to
oversee the voting), it is clear that this decision has finally
come in the circumstances of deep division and indecision within
opposition forces as to whether to boycott the referendum or take
part in the voting.
The notion of boycotting — now declared by the National
Salvation Front to be conditional — illustrates the severe doubts
within the opposition as to whether the draft constitution can be
turned down.
Since the referendum will likely approve the constitution, there
should be new parliamentary elections within two months, which will
probably be dominated by Islamist factions as well. Even so,
instability with street clashes, rival rallies, and outbreaks of
violence will remain a staple of Egypt’s political landscape.
Further, this unrest will not be limited to discontent with
Islamist majoritarianism, but will also entail issues such as the
tax hikes and Egypt’s potential shift to
net importer of natural gas. The superior position of the
Islamist factions is unlikely to be overthrown in the near future,
but one should not discount a descent into anarchy over the course
of ten years or so.
