It is a tragic coda to the American presence in Afghanistan that
a veteran staff sergeant is on trial for killing sleeping civilian
villagers and their children without apparent provocation or
purpose. Some have said this incident is reflective of the
brutality of the war itself. The soldier involved seems to have
become completely unbalanced in attacking without immediate
provocation or in reference to a specific incident. That may be a
reasonable psychological assessment, but it is not something
peculiar to this particular conflict.
What is specific to Afghanistan is the incidence of combat
deaths and mutilation that have occurred from passive destruction
through the improvised explosive device (IED). The proliferation of
these mines is as if snipers were lying in wait just below the
surface of every road, village street, and hill trail. But, of
course, the snipers sometimes do exist in addition to the IEDs.
It’s not the typical warfare understood and experienced in the
Western world where large and small armies clash in determined
battle. These are Taliban tactics passed on from the Iraq war. They
were also Viet Cong tactics, North Korean tactics, Malayan
Communist tactics and, much earlier, Moro tactics in the
Philippines. The list goes on.
The Russians experienced this same form of warfare in the 1980s
during which their casualties were much higher than those of the
U.S. and NATO since 2001 (14,450 to 3,230 killed). The reporting on
Russian psychological casualties was negligible, but the impact of
these losses on Russian military confidence was obvious. According
to Pakistan’s intelligence, the functional capability of the
traditional Soviet rifle regiments was substantially reduced.
This methodology of irregular small unit combat can be defeated
tactically by imaginative counter-insurgency methods, but it cannot
be fought against effectively over an extended period by American
troops committed to traditional Geneva Convention-type rules.
Decisive victories cannot be expected when the enemy is simply
satisfied with inflicting pain, accepting pain, and rarely making
the mistake of exposing themselves in traditional efforts to “win
the field.” Eventually the American, or Russian, or British or any
other trooper of the West, will resort to similar tactics. He then
is in danger of being charged with losing his internal military
discipline and simply becoming a “uniformed killer.” The term is
unfair, but the danger is real.
In World War II and Korea the GI’s would refer to psychological
breakdown as “battle-rattle.” Sometimes it rendered the serviceman
unable to perform his military duties and made him fearful in the
face of the enemy. Other times the result of such psychic attacks
produced uncontrollable aggression. In the invasion of Normandy a
junior officer of the 101st Airborne “went off his rocker” and
“tommy-gunned” a group of surrendered and weaponless Germans for no
clear reason. A furious captain in the 82nd Airborne, himself badly
wounded, cut the throat of an injured German officer for loudly
demanding attention and treatment in a crowded aid station.
Every war has stories like these, but Iraq and Afghanistan
produced a special brand of breakdown. The enemy asked no quarter
and gave none. The American soldier or marine at first responded
with similar ferocity. However, as time wore on and America’s
civilian population became less absorbed by the military aspects of
the conflict, their politicians pressed the Pentagon to be “more
understanding” of the Afghan people in general and. oddly enough,
the enemy combatants themselves. At one point, supposedly to
protect innocent civilians, new rules of engagement were posted
that required American fighters to withhold fire unless or until an
enemy shooter was clearly identified. These rules, introduced by
Gen. Stanley McChrystal and further restricted by Gen. David
Petraeus, satisfied the politicians even though they left the
troops effectively disarmed. Air support and artillery fire were
severely limited unless identification of hostile positions was
guaranteed.
The war in Afghanistan was transformed into a nation building
and rebuilding exercise. As part of this unspoken theme, deals were
made with local insurgent leaders, some actually Taliban members.
In exchange for providing protection for reconstruction efforts,
the tribal leaders of such cooperative combatant groups benefited
handsomely. Meanwhile local Afghan officials would have dribbled
down to them the end product of the vast corruption that occurred
at provincial and federal levels. This was an environment
confusingly inconsistent with the ethical standards being preached
at the same time by well-meaning civil affairs units.
Back and forth the all-volunteer combat force rotated three-four
times or more into and out of the war theater — and the casualties
mounted. Lip service is paid to the deleterious effects of multiple
tours in combat. However, the reality is that ten plus years of
multiple rotations of units and the personnel therein may reinforce
the professionalism of the cadre, but at the same time attrition
and combat fatigue reduces the mental stability and effectiveness
of core non-commissioned ranks. Staff Sergeant Robert Bales may be
an example of this group.
The question must be asked as to whether collateral
responsibility should be adjudged by a political and military
command that has kept our military forces in the field considerably
beyond their effective psychological capability. The American
fighting man and woman deserve better than the self-absorbed
political and military leadership they have had during the past
decade.
