Whenever the Israel-Palestine conflict is in the news, too much
ink is wasted over moralizing rather than analyzing. Instead of
trying to explain what is going on, provide proper context, and
predict reasonably what might follow, commentators bicker over who
has the moral high ground.
These endless polemics do nothing to help.
A proper analysis should begin by noting that since the start of
this year, there has been a significant increase in rocket attacks
on southern Israel from Gaza.
Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s attack on Gaza militants during
the winter of 2008-2009, proved to be damaging for Israel’s image
abroad. There was substantial loss of Palestinian civilian life and
the initial Goldstone report accused Israel of deliberately
targeting civilians. But the military operation achieved its goal
of at least substantially reducing rocket attacks from Gaza.
Not only did Hamas refrain from carrying out such attacks, but
the ruling group in Gaza also kept in check more hard-line groups
like Islamic Jihad.
The key to understanding the increase in rocket attacks this
year is the internal rivalry within Hamas. As
Hussein Ibish points out, a distinction ought to be made
between the domestic leadership of Hamas in Gaza and the officials
in exile (what Ibish terms the “Politburo”) who are responsible for
Hamas’ relations with foreign governments.
The problem for the Politburo is the
fallout from Syria and (to a lesser extent) Iran, such that
Khaled Meshaal — the official leader of Hamas — has had to
relocate from Syria to Qatar.
In turn, it should be noted — as I did in an article last year
entitled “Sunni
Realignments“— that both Turkey and Qatar have been cementing
ties with the domestic leadership in Gaza. This trend has become
all the more apparent this year.
For example, just last month
Qatar promised some $400 million to aid reconstruction efforts
in Gaza and the emir paid a visit to the territory itself. Turkish
premier Recep
Tayyip Erdogan met with the prime minister of Hamas — Ismail
Haniyeh, who is based in Gaza — at the start of this year, with
proposals to provide unspecified aid for humanitarian projects in
Gaza.
As Ibish notes, compounding this shift in alliances and internal
rivalry in Hamas was Meshaal’s announcement in September that he
would step down as Hamas leader. This means that the contest for
the leadership is between Haniyeh in Gaza, and the second most
senior official in exile, Musa Abu Marzook in Cairo.
The loss of much of the Politburo’s ties with traditional
“resistance bloc” allies Syria and Iran, and the support pledged
for the Gaza leadership by Turkey and Qatar, mean that it is in the
faction’s interest to assert itself as the true face of resistance
against Israel.
By recommencing its own rocket attacks and being much more
lenient with the hard-line groups in Gaza, the domestic leadership
has the chance to take power decisively away from the
officials-in-exile, especially regarding relations with foreign
governments.
A further incentive to assert an image of active hostility lies
in the fact that Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has
been losing its credibility. This year, Arab donors have not
followed up with aid pledges, and as a result the PA is struggling
to pay public employee salaries.
Perhaps the biggest credibility boost for Hamas (as opposed to
the PA) in adopting a stance of renewed active resistance is the
PA’s security forces close work with the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) to prevent militant attacks emanating from the West Bank.
This, of course, is the very same IDF that has now caused
Palestinian civilian casualties in Gaza with its bombing campaign
against Hamas targets.
The Israeli response to the escalation of rocket launches isn’t
a sign of opportunistic electioneering by Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu. It simply reflects a desire for Israel to reassert a
deterrence policy toward Gaza, amid complaints for months that not
enough was being done to deal with the attacks.
The likely short-term outcome of this conflict is a repeat of
the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead. Some kind of truce will be
negotiated — perhaps mediated by Egypt, whose stance towards Hamas
is much more sympathetic under Mohammed Morsi, as illustrated by
the
24/7 opening of the Rafah border crossing. Further, there will
be at least a temporary lull in rocket attacks from Gaza, as Hamas
will probably restrain itself again and revive efforts to keep more
radical militants in check.
Yet Hamas’ position in Gaza will not be weakened, and Arab
governments across the region could start providing aid to Hamas.
They could also abandon the PA, which, after its current statehood
bid at the UN that is unlikely to translate to anything practical,
may simply be left on struggling lifeline support from Israel and
the West.
The traditional “resistance bloc” may have collapsed and Hamas’
officials-in-exile may have lost much of their influence, but the
group in Gaza looks stronger than ever, and in turn, the
Palestinian movement looks to be ever more divided.
Photo by IDF
(creative commons 2.0).
