It has become accepted to use the term al Qaeda when
referring to any violent Islamic grouping that appears to have a
broader organizational connection. To refine that definition there
has been added the recognition of at least three so-called
“franchises” with a national or regional orientation: al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI), al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). All have an outreach beyond their
immediate geographical area. The mistake that is made, however, is
to characterize al Qaeda as the overall operational director of
the movement.
The theoretical central control organization, al Qaeda, itself –
with Ayman al Zawahiri as its post- bin Laden leader – is
nonetheless viewed by most Western observers in a headquarters
context for broad planning, propaganda, and sometime coordination
among the several franchises. To a certain extent, central al Qaeda
reportedly has informal elements circulating as mentors among
various local popular groups.
One example of this perception was offered up in the early
stages of the “Arab Spring” as manifested in the large-scale riots
in Cairo. This concept gave way to the view that the large crowds
were influenced by large-scale Muslim Brotherhood contingents not
necessarily al Qaeda related. Later analysis has shown that these
original demonstrations were led by left-wing students, youths, and
neighborhood gangs, with Brotherhood squads later joining in.
The violent demonstrations in Cairo on Sept. 11 of this year
against the U.S. because of a video trailer produced in the U.S.
defaming the Prophet Mohammed featured a black flag similar to but
not actually an al Qaeda banner. There was no al Qaeda affiliation
as an instigating factor, according to Cairo police sources. They
said it was strictly “street” organized. In Benghazi, however, it
was quite a different story.
Benghazi has been a key jihadist recruiting ground going back
even before the American military presence in Afghanistan beginning
October 2001. As the center of Cyrenican (eastern province of
Libya) resistance against Gaddafi’s central government, local
insurgent groups eventually formed into varying-sized militias with
clan ties. Before that, however, the legends of Osama bin Laden’s
al Qaeda had encouraged the growth of a development pool of
Afghanistan-bound young men. This movement later evolved into
several anti-Gaddafi underground nets. One of these assumed the
name Ansar al Shariah, which had surfaced originally in
Yemen as part of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Why the Yemeni group nomenclature was assumed by a Libyan
organization can be explained in various ways. The predominant view
is that one or several Libyans from the Benghazi area had once
served in Yemen and carried the ethos of the group originating from
AQAP back to Libya. The question is now whether this Libyan Ansar
al Shariah will now join with the broader jihadist instrument that
refers to itself as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It is
worthwhile to note that a merger of AQIM with Algeria’s ) was
announced on Sept.11, 2006 by al Qaeda’s then No. 2, Ayman
al-Zawahiri. The GSPC had become well known for high profile
targeting and suicide bombings. This reputation instantly raised
the perception of AQIM’s lethality. More importantly, the joining
together under the al Qaeda banner of militant Islamic groups set
the tone for what would develop in the future as the so-called al
Qaeda franchises.
European analysts quickly came to a consensus that al
Qaeda-linked Islamic militants who formerly fought in Iraq would
now aim at vulnerable civilian targets in Western Europe. AQIM was
in the perfect position to organize this, it was said. For al
Qaeda- central it all fit well into the concept of expanding the
global reach of its Islamic jihadist militancy. Essentially the
ideology tended to sell itself. The Internet was used to spread the
word and recruitment followed, mostly self-initiated.
Financial support for Islamic militancy appears to have followed
in a form of logical progression. For those of Middle East descent
– either currently resident there or not – it’s just not smart
notto be at least a financial contributor to jihadist
causes. Such aid is judged very carefully against the ability to
assist. Poorer merchants are generally not pressed beyond their
means, while rich targets understand well the need for being
generous and discreet. It’s an old Mafia methodology of extortion.
Protection is offered, and thankfully received by “the chosen.”
In the past six years mergers have been initiated between al
Qaeda and various groups primarily among the exiles such as the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and similar local national
instruments of Lebanon, Syria, East Africa, and elsewhere in
Central Africa and on that continent. In most instances the
relationships simply have been a rebranding in order to emphasize
links with the broader movement for international political
purposes. Osama bin Laden wanted to create a revolution and with it
an Islamic revival. He appears to have succeeded in spite of some
politicians’ self-serving claims to the contrary.
Don’t be surprised to learn soon that a new al Qaeda franchise
has evolved in the Eastern Mediterranean including Syria, Lebanon„
and Gaza. Al Qaeda as a rallying point for a global Islamic
caliphate still has a long life ahead of it.
