Dubbed the “mother
of all battles” as regime forces launched a counter-offensive
against the rebels in Aleppo at the end of July, the Battle of
Aleppo has proven to be a much more protracted affair. Here are the
main observations to be drawn from the situation thus far:
Rural-Periphery-to-Center: An assessment of the nature
of the rebel fighters in Aleppo supports the general “rural-periphery-to-center”
analysis of the development of the revolt against the Assad regime,
highlighted by me and Oskar Svadkovsky back in February. That is,
beginning from the outer rural areas of the country, the unrest has
gradually crept inwards in tandem with rebel movements.
In Aleppo itself, therefore, the native rebels are mostly from
the surrounding countryside. This was somewhat apparent early on
with a
report by Hadeel al-Shalchi in early August, where the
Reuters correspondent followed a group of forty rebels, of
whom none came from Aleppo, and who were unable to navigate
properly through the streets of the city with a population of more
than 2 million.
Other dispatches from Aleppo corroborate al-Shalchi’s findings,
such as the work of the Israeli analyst Jonathan Spyer, who —
based on interviews with rebel fighters he met in Aleppo —
recently wrote in a
special report for the Weekly Standard: “Today in
Aleppo, the rebel fighters hail overwhelmingly not from the city
itself, but from the surrounding villages and towns of Aleppo
governorate.”
Local Resentment: The fact that these rural fighters
have brought the conflict to Aleppo has naturally stirred up much
animosity among city residents towards the rebels, leaving aside
pre-existing prejudices against the rebels as rural
peasants. Of course the rebels have some supporters in Aleppo,
but they’re most likely concentrated in the outer slums that have
been populated by a large number of internally displaced migrants
owing to climate change.
Before the conflict spread to Aleppo, the city was widely noted
for having a
Sunni business class (middle-class and wealthy) that supported
the regime. Now, even many pro-revolution activists based in Aleppo
— such as “Edward
Dark” — have become disillusioned with the armed opposition to
Assad on account of the rebels’ actions in Aleppo.
Take the case of the recent blazes that engulfed much of the
Aleppo’s historic souk markets in the Old City that form part of a
UNESCO World Heritage site, amid reports of clashes between rebels
and regime forces in the area as part of a major rebel offensive
through the Old City. Some
unspecified opposition activists quoted in media claimed that
regime snipers started the fire by targeting electric generators in
the souk market, and then prevented rebels and residents from
trying to contain the blaze.
Other activists, however, expressed anger at the rebels for
advancing on the souk markets. Edward Dark pinned responsibility on
the rebels, condemning them also for allegedly destroying much of
the Old City. It should also be noted that he complained that
rebels had entered some of the souks as early as 20-22 September,
which were then burnt down in that same period.
Further, the governor of Aleppo, Wahid Akkad, said that the
rebels started the fire to cover up their looting of the souk
markets, while traders in the souks — hardly likely to be
sympathetic to the rebels — told Agence France-Presse that there
was no Syrian army presence in the souk markets, and
complained of rebel infiltration.
Whatever the true cause of the fires (in my view, it could have
been a spontaneous electrical fire, a consequence of
indiscriminate rebel mortar fire — something that has been a
common complaint against the rebels in Aleppo — or deliberately
started by rebels or opportunistic thieves to cover up looting),
the incident is only likely to stir up further anti-rebel sentiment
among residents.
Regime Airstrikes: It has been noted in various reports
that the Assad regime has been increasingly
resorting to airstrikes against rebel targets, including in
Aleppo. At the same time, the
majority of air-force pilots are reported to be Sunni. Given
the elite status of serving in the air force, it is likely that
many of these pilots have been drawn from the Sunni middle classes
of Aleppo itself, and it is no coincidence that the regime’s
air-force academy is located just outside Aleppo.
Islamists and Foreign Jihadists: Given the rural
character of the rebel fighters in Aleppo, it is no surprise that
there is a strong native Islamist component embodied foremost in
the Tawheed Brigade that has spearheaded the offensive through the
Old City. There were also the recent bombings by al-Nusra, a
group that uses many of al Qaeda in Iraq’s tactics (e.g.
coordinated suicide strikes and
disguises in military uniform). Its members reportedly also
have access to al Qaeda forums, even as al-Nusra does not openly
declare allegiance.
Earlier on in the course of the conflict in Aleppo, Reuters
reported on the
emergence of Sharia courts in the south of the city. More
recently, Edward Dark reported that rebels stopped a bus for
Ebla University students
and forced the women to cover their hair, besides segregating them
from the men.
More controversial is the foreign jihadist presence in Aleppo.
One French doctor of the organization Doctors Without Borders said
that half of the anti-regime fighters he treated in Aleppo were
foreign jihadists. Exactly what proportion of fighters in
Aleppo are foreign jihadists is difficult to determine, but it is
clear that Syria is witnessing a localization of this
phenomenon.
To clarify, Iraq analysts like Michael Knights use the term to
describe how violence in Iraq today is mostly concentrated in very
specific areas. Thus, what I mean is that the foreign jihadist
presence — even if only a small minority in the anti-Assad
insurgency — is localized and primarily concentrated in
Aleppo and
Deir ez-Zor.
In light of the existence of such hardline elements, we can
appreciate better the reports of the formation of
Christian defense militias to protect Christian neighborhoods
and churches in Aleppo. In addition, there have been reports of
Christian residents fleeing from areas like Midan in Aleppo to
Beirut in Lebanon and Tartous on the Syrian
coast.
As happened in Iraq post-2003, Christians in Aleppo have been
very much caught in the middle of all the violence, facing attacks
on churches (from mortar fire) and
kidnappings. Of course, other civilians will have suffered the
latter to a degree as well.
The overall picture, where the rebels still face difficulties in
navigating through the city, growing local resentment, and
possible reinforcements for regime forces, points to an ongoing
battle that is unlikely to end soon, with perhaps slow gains on
aggregate for the rebels in a similar manner to how the Libyan
rebels’ fight against Gaddafi progressed over months during the
Libyan civil war.
A further impediment exists if rebels clash with Kurdish
militiamen (Popular Protection Units and the PKK) in Aleppo, who
are still aiming to maintain a neutral position in the conflict and
have apparently taken on
rebels and regime
forces when provoked. Pace the rebel propaganda, the
Kurdish fighters are not assisting the regime but rather simply
want the Tawheed Brigade et al. to leave the Kurdish areas of
Aleppo alone.
In the event of the regime’s downfall, a significant tension may
arise between native rebels and the foreign jihadists, perhaps
spilling into all-out conflict between the two sides in Aleppo.
In this scenario, one could see the jihadists eventually
entrenching themselves rather as al Qaeda has done in Mosul in Iraq
today: that is, establishing an extensive extortion network to fund
operations. A similar development could take place in Deir
ez-Zor.
