The attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that led to the
death of the American ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens,
illustrates that despite the poor performance of Islamists in the
elections back in July, the country still faces a serious internal
terrorist threat from ideological militants who either operate with
freedom from central government control or have entered into the
ranks of the new Libyan security forces.
I had already warned
about the latter phenomenon in particular as regards attacks on
Sufi shrines in Tripoli and Zintan that were suspected to be the
work of members of the security forces.
Concerning the assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, two
American intelligence officials
revealed to the Daily Beast that members of an Islamist militia
known as the February 17th Brigade were responsible for
safeguarding the consulate, but apparently stepped aside in
anticipation of the attack, possibly on the urging of an Islamist
politician.
The Libyan government is now
trying to integrate this militia — along with another by the
name of Rafallah al-Sahati — into the security forces by
appointing army colonels to lead them, but such a move is not
likely to do away with the problems posed by these Islamist
militants.
On the contrary, they will simply use their new positions to
push their own agendas, just like the Islamist members of the
security forces who have desecrated Sufi shrines.
There is also the potential here to trigger some infighting
among the new security forces. The greatest risk is in the east of
the country where Islamist influence is strongest, even as Islamism
may not necessarily be the dominant political force on the
ground.
Indeed, the Libya Herald
recently reported that clashes broke out in the eastern town of
Marj among members of the new National Army, with no fatalities but
several wounded and requiring treatment in the local hospital.
While it has not been fully ascertained what caused this
infighting, it is not unreasonable to point to politicization of
the ranks of the security forces.
On the other hand, a possible mitigating factor exists in the
fact that there is a good deal of local resentment against Islamist
militants in particular, as evinced by a demonstration in Benghazi
numbering some 30,000 protestors, who denounced the attack on the
U.S. consulate and called for the disbanding of militias throughout
the country. Commentators like
Michael Young of the Beirut-based Daily Star
interpreted the success of the assault as evidence of widespread
anti-American sentiments in Libya. Yet the large demonstrations in
opposition to the attack — as well as a subsequent assault by
several hundred protesters on the headquarters of an Islamist
militia known as Ansar al-Shariah (suspected of links to the
assault on the consulate), which then evacuated its bases in
Benghazi — illustrate that this assessment is not wholly accurate.
At least in Benghazi, there is still considerable gratitude to NATO
for its aid in the downfall of the Gaddafi regime.
In a way, the backlash was predictable, for a precedent existed
in Rajma — a town located some 50 km southeast of Benghazi —
where residents repelled an assault on a Sufi shrine by Salafists,
without the aid of the security forces. However, in Benghazi
itself, members of the security forces took advantage of the
anti-militia sentiment and thus gained control of the bases
evacuated by militias that were that were the targets of
protesters’ anger.
Yet I say “possible mitigating factor” because there are two
further considerations to bear in mind. First, the anti-militia
sentiment displayed by the protesters could create a security
vacuum, entailing attacks on militias who have no links to
Islamists and are innocent of any wrongdoing (as
has already happened), and on members of the security forces
who may be wrongly suspected of aiding militias or Islamist
militants. Second, the militias that have disbanded have not
necessarily given up their weapons. They could instead decide to
operate underground as small insurgent units.
In short, what emerges from an analysis of the attack on the
U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the aftermath is neither a
simplistic narrative of an imminent Islamist takeover nor a
Manichaean story of a heroic victory for moderate Muslims against
Islamists in Libya.
Rather, it is evident that the problem of infiltration of the
security forces by ideologues still exists. When we also consider
the potential for the anti-militia violence of protesters to become
too generalized and the fact that disbanding does not automatically
translate to giving up one’s weapons, it is logical to conclude
that a serious terrorist threat within the country is likely to
persist for a minimum timescale of months to come, with low-level
violence in the form of insurgent bombings and shootings, mob
attacks, and internal clashes among the security forces.
