As soon as it was clear that Mohammed Morsi was going to be
Egypt’s new president, press sources in Cairo fell all over each
other trying to get information on this new star member of the
Moslem Brotherhood. He was said to have chaired the political
committee of the Brotherhood’s governing “Guidance Council,” though
no one seemed to know who else was on that committee. What was
clear was that Dr. Morsi earned his Ph.D. in engineering at the
University of Southern California, had worked in Los Angeles, and
that he was a serious man not limited in his intellectual
outlook.
At the same time there generally seemed no doubt that Khairat
el-Shater was still going to be the principal figure in the
leadership hierarchy of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood
organization after the General Guide (leader) Mohammed Badie.
Shater, however, was denied eligibility for high public office by
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on the technical basis of a
previous prison sentence during the Mubarak era. Morsi has become
the compromise candidate in the urgent search for a steadfastly
Islamic leader who also would have acceptability on the
international scene — a factor of particular importance to the
Brotherhood’s ambitions.
The reality is that Khairat el-Shater remains a principal figure
in the new formulation of Egyptian politics and a clear leader in
the Brotherhood. In an attempt to broaden their base, the Islamic
organization has created the Freedom & Justice Party as their
political vehicle, but it has little structural power as yet. There
is the mistaken belief in the non-Moslem world that the Moslem
Brotherhood in Egypt is made up of mostly poor and working class
individuals. In fact the membership is very diverse, spanning all
socio-economic sectors. The F&J Party is aimed to reflect that
fact.
The Brotherhood organization itself is very wealthy, as are many
of its top leaders. Men like el-Shater, who it is said heads the
Cairo region, is reportedly a millionaire who owns a thriving
furniture business, among other ventures. More importantly in terms
of grassroots strength is the very active program of social
services provided country-wide by the Moslem Brotherhood and
serviced by its members and supporters.
Three actions early on in the Morsi administration have shown
the aggressive priorities of the initial phases of his government.
The first thing that the newly elected president did was to fly to
Riyadh shortly after his first week in office to meet with King
Abdullah and key Saudi officials. More than anything else this
indicated the Sunni solidarity and close Egyptian/Saudi cooperation
that could be expected from the new Cairo leadership.
The next action to occur was the dismissal of the top command of
the military including the Mubarak holdover, Defense Minister
Tantawi, and Army Chief of Staff, General Sami Enan. This
definitive move, clearly with the support of the younger
commanders, restored the presidential powers just limited in the
beginning of the summer by the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces.
This action restoring civilian authority received broad popular
support. But the third action that has solidified President Morsi’s
political status was taken in Tehran where the Egyptian and Saudi
delegations to the Non-Aligned Conference formed a united front
against Iranian efforts to gain backing for the Syrian government
of Bashar al Assad and the Shia-supportive position of Iran’s
allies. This sent a message throughout the Arab world that, under
the Islamist leadership of Mohammed Morsi, Egypt would not lose any
of its regional clout nor bow to pressure from Tehran.
There are two main circumstances, however, that stand out with
negative characteristics in regard to Egypt’s future. The first is
the absence of a constitution. The newly created constitutional
assembly has not indicated when it will be able to agree upon a
draft. This leaves President Morsi in the extremely powerful
position of being able to perform his executive activities without
constitutional restraint. The potential for autocratic rule is
there in the absence of clear restraints even if the personal
proclivity of Egypt’s new president does not appear for the moment
to lean in that direction.
The second issue bothersome to many analysts is the absence of a
reasonable spectrum of political leanings in the presidential
cabinet. Mohammed Morsi has made sure that the principal posts in
his government are held by Islamists. When one recognizes that the
popular vote was only 51.73% in favor of Dr. Morsi, there is a
potential of serious popular “push back” from the lack of at least
a marginal attempt to create a unity government.
The reality would appear to be that the Egyptian military
prefers a strong central government just as long as the Armed
Forces are allowed to control their sphere of interest. Apparently
this is exactly the direction in which Mohammed Morsi and his
compatriots in the Moslem Brotherhood are aimed. Not that different
from the Mubarak example it seems — except that the Brotherhood is
now running the show. As Rafiq Khuri wrote in Beirut’s Al
Anwar, in a sense a military pharaoh has been replaced by an
Islamic one.
