The proprietary manner in which Beijing treats the South China
Sea is based on strategic and economic considerations. The Chinese
want to control this large waterway as a first line of defense, and
enjoy exclusive access to minerals, oil and gas reserves, and
fishing rights. This is in addition to the leverage it seeks over
the immense shipping traffic that flows through to Japan, Korea,
Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan. Obviously none of those
countries supports the Chinese ambitions. Recently, however,
Beijing has sought to use a bit of American history as precedent
for its claims and actions.
The thesis has been put forth by Chinese academics attending
international security conferences that the PRC’s official attitude
toward the South China Sea is really no different than America’s
past perceptions of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.
Apparently they are referring to the Monroe Doctrine and the 1904
Roosevelt Corollary. The former of course was aimed at ending
European intervention in both North and South America, with
particular attention to the large body of water separating the two
continents. Teddy Roosevelt extended this policy, however, to allow
the U.S. to intervene in countries south of its borders in order to
protect its strategic interests.
The Chinese academics suggesting the relevance of this history
do so with a straight face even though the precedent they cite is
clearly a non sequitur in today’s post-colonial world.
From the Chinese point of view, though, the strategic justification
is just as strong for Beijing today as it was for President
Theodore Roosevelt’s Washington in the beginning of the 20th
century.
Recent Pentagon reports have emphasized China’s investment in
increasing the size of its navy. This theme has been repeated in
most defense publications along with warnings concerning China’s
ambition to eventually — if not sooner — dominate the Western
Pacific. This hyperbole has played right into the hands of the
PLA’s political offensive that desires to inflate the Asian and
American perception of Beijing’s naval growth.
The fact is that Beijing has not invested in a massive naval
buildup appropriate at least to nearing equality with the U.S.
Pacific Fleet, which has been the post-WW2 “protector” of that part
of the world. The prowess of Communist China’s military might is
always a prime subject of Chinese propaganda, but the reality is
that PLAN (People’s Liberation Army’s Navy) is held back by a lack
of money and talent. Naval design and engineering has played a
subordinate role to ground and air force development while China’s
space program has gobbled up the “best and the brightest” of the
country’s scientific and technological brains.
The availability of skilled and experienced maritime workers has
been limited, which has had an impact on quality control more than
production numbers. At international conferences foreign analysts
have noted they agree with their American counterparts that China
has launched about 40 new submarines (attack and SSBN) in the last
20 years. They add, though, that it does not mean these boats are
equipped with the advanced technology appropriate to modern
undersea warfare.
According to reports emanating from Russian naval sources, there
has been considerable debate/argument within Chinese naval commands
over the priorities given to the creation of the new aircraft
carrier from the old Soviet-era
ship that was towed from the Black Sea. The emphasis placed on
giving the PLAN one carrier relatively quickly has been a source of
serious conflict within professional ranks. No one can afford to
argue over the highly publicized and expensive Chinese space
program.
Perhaps of even more importance is the development of a highly
protected submarine repair and docking facility on Hainan capable
of providing berths for 20 subs. It all sounds very impressive
until one realizes that today’s missile capability is such that in
wartime these pens present an interesting target rather than a safe
harbor.
As large as the South China Sea is, it’s not the Pacific Ocean,
and that’s where the vastly superior U.S. fleet holds sway. Nothing
in the development plans of the Chinese navy indicates an ability
to seriously challenge the American control of the blue water of
the Pacific in the foreseeable future. The same can not be said for
control of the South China Sea. The Chinese have what they think is
an ace up their sleeve in that regard. China’s naval mine
technology is quite advanced and a vast store of mines is available
to blockade the principal channels of the waters off southeast
China. The Chinese have also made public their increased number of
coastal-based anti-ship missiles.
Beijing’s military aim is eventually to control the trade routes
through the South China Sea as well as use that large body of water
for forward defense purposes protecting the coastline of the PRC
from Fuzhou to the Gulf of Tonkin. This is very old-fashioned
thinking that envisions a sea borne invasion that will never occur.
Still stuck in a mentality that justifies a massive land force to
prevent attacks along its borders from India to Siberia, China
pursues a strategy that now includes a defensive posture protecting
their southeast maritime provinces.
All this would suggest a fanciful defense plan were it not based
on the political need to justify the maintenance of a vastly
over-indulged military. In the end, the PRC’s leadership depends on
the PLA to maintain the political power of the Politburo. Turning
to archaic American historical precedent may have an academic
appeal, but that’s all.
