Could we soon begin to see the end of Fatah and the Palestinian
Authority (PA) as a coherent Palestinian national movement? There
is much evidence that appears to point in that direction.
To begin with, it is apparent that there is a deep contradiction
in the stance of Fatah and the PA.
As Avi Issacharoff notes, they feel a need to glorify
terrorists such as Dalal Mughrabi, who was one of the perpetrators
of a massacre in 1978 that killed 37 Israelis.
At the same time, the security forces maintained by the
Fatah-led PA continue their successful and close working
relationship with the IDF, begun in the summer of 2007, to prevent
the same sort of militant operations that have been idealized in
Palestinian media and culture in the West Bank as much as in
Gaza.
In a similar vein, the Fatah and PA leadership promises the
population an inalienable “right of return” to Israel proper, but
disclosures like the “Palestine Papers” show that in
private discussions with Israeli government officials,
Palestinian negotiators have declared willingness to compromise on
these issues.
For how long can these essentially absurd positions be
maintained? Issacharoff further points out: “Quite a lot of Israeli
security officials are warning that without a political horizon,
the Palestinian security forces would eventually collapse.”
This scenario — together with the demise of Fatah and the PA —
is hardly implausible when one considers other pressures weighing
down on the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank.
As Salam Fayyad indicated to Donald Macintyre in a
recent interview for the Independent, one of the
consequences of the wider regional unrest has been the increasing
marginalization of the Palestinian cause, such that the Palestinian
leadership is traveling on a “path of growing untenability.”
Indeed, the PA Prime Minister made his anxieties clear,
declaring that “when you cease to become a source of credible and
convincing answers to your people… that is really a danger zone. I
don’t have to speculate whether we will have an intifada today or
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow…because sooner or later you
[will] become completely politically untenable.”
The talk of an “intifada” here is not one of an armed struggle
against Israel, but against the PA itself. In fact,
National Public Radio (NPR) recently reported on a minor
protest at the Kalandia checkpoint between Jerusalem and Ramallah
in the West Bank, but the target of the demonstrators’ anger was PA
President Mahmoud Abbas.
As an anonymous protester who attended the rally put it, “I
think there will be an intifada, or uprising, not against the
Israelis, but against Abbas and the corrupt people around him.”
Commentators like
Michael Weiss have hailed the state-building program
spearheaded by Fayyad, and have drawn attention to the economic
benefits experienced in Ramallah, which currently hosts a
growing communications technology industry that now accounts
for more than 5% of the Palestinian economy.
A more sobering picture is offered by the Palestinian academic
Bashir Rayes, who told NPR that unemployment in the West Bank
currently stands at 24 or 25 percent. Meanwhile, the PA is
currently facing a financial crisis since it is unable to pay in
full government employee salaries that amount to $200 million on a
monthly basis.
Coming back to the interview conducted by Macintyre, it should
be noted that the financial crisis is referred to as a “function of
a distracted international community.”
This highlights a central problem with the PA’s economy: namely,
a massive dependence on foreign aid. It is therefore no surprise
that Rayes also pointed out to NPR that the PA lacks a real
economic plan to stimulate growth and is simply creating government
jobs it cannot afford.
Yes, as a
World Bank report notes, Israeli restrictions do hinder
Palestinian private sector growth significantly, but it is clear
that there has been a good degree of mismanagement on the part of
the Palestinian leadership, and a growing number of Palestinians in
the West Bank are becoming aware of this fact.
A Palestinian uprising directed at Fatah and the PA in the West
Bank — rather than Israel — is a significant possibility in the
near future. Since such a development could lead to the collapse of
the Palestinian security forces, a “third intifada” poses a
security risk to Israel, even if Israelis are not the primary
targets of protestors’ grievances.
At the minimum, one could expect the fragmentation of Fatah and
the PA, with the emergence of factions that are more overtly
rejectionist and hostile to Israel.
Since,
as Jonathan Spyer notes, the “Arab Spring” is effectively
leading to the demise of Arab nationalist regimes, and Fatah
represents an Arab nationalist outlook, the new factions could well
take on a more pan-Islamist flavor, hoping to secure the support of
the likes of Qatar, which has been undeniably pursuing a pro-Sunni
Islamist agenda, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which has
been cementing ties with Hamas in Gaza, with the result that
restrictions on the border crossing at Rafah have been eased.
Indeed,
according to one Hamas official, Gaza could soon become
connected to Egypt’s electricity grid and natural gas pipeline.
This illustrates an ever-growing divide between the West Bank and
Gaza in contrast to the agreement on
paper for a unity government between Hamas and Fatah. While
Hamas has consolidated its power in Gaza, Fatah and the PA find
themselves on increasingly shaky foundations. In short, the
traditional Palestinian national movement looks set to become
moribund.
