AS ABDELBASET AL-MEGRAHI settles in on the far side of the river
Styx, let us reflect on the scandal of his final years. It will
always be a mark on the administration of President Obama that the
Libyan died a free man. He had been convicted in the downing of Pan
American World Airways flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in
1988. There had been opportunity aplenty to act once a Scottish
judge gave him his freedom in 2009. But the American government
failed to lift so much as a finger.
The administration may-or may not-have had the power to prevent
al-Megrahi’s release from a Scottish prison or h is flight back
home to Libya, where he was greeted by adoring throngs. The judge
who freed him supposedly did so on “humanitarian” grounds, because,
even though al-Megrahi Killed 270 people, he was suffering from the
indignities of prostate cancer. If the terrorist’s release caught
Mr. Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton by surprise, as
they suggested at the time, it’s all the more shocking that there
was no attempt to seize the mass murderer after he got to
Libya.
Let those who believe that such a mission would have been
piratical take a look at the precedents established by our courts.
It strikes me as an important point, given the twilight nature of
the war in which our country has found itself. The record is clear
that if, in a lawless world, the violators of our laws are brought
back to our shores to face the music, our own be-robed justices
won’t be overly particular about the methods used to get them
here.

This has been established as precedent over a long period of
time, including as recently as 1992, in a case involving a Mexican,
Humberto Alvarez Machain. As his tale was later told by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, Alvarez had been indicted for
participating in the kidnapping and murder of a special agent o f
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Enrique
Camarena Salazar. It was a gruesome situation. As Rehnquist told
the story, Alvarez, a medical doctor, worked to prolong “agent
Camarena’s life so that others could further torture and
interrogate him.”
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, on April 2, 1990, Alvarez
was “forcibly kidnapped from his medical office in Guadalajara,
Mexico, to be flown by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he
was arrested by DEA officials,” as Rehnquist, writing from the high
bench, related the history. He noted that a United States district
court “concluded t hat DEA a gents were responsible for
respondent’s abduction, although they were not personally involved
in it.” Alvarez then tried to dismiss t he indictment, claiming, as
Rehnquist Characterized it, “that his abduction constituted
outrageous governmental conduct.”
The district court had rejected that argument, but had ordered
him sent back to Mexico nonetheless, because his abduction violated
America’s extradition treaty with Mexico. The fussbudgets on the
United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit agreed, possibly
because of all the letters of protest America had received from the
government of Mexico. But when the matter got to the Supreme Court,
as I once put it in Tablet magazine, it turned out that
the justices were made of sterner stuff.
What they did was rule that, in effect, the DEA was actually on
more solid ground in kidnapping Alvarez than in trying to fetch him
through the extradition process. Rehnquist cited United States
v. Rauscher, in which the court prohibited the prosecution of
a defendant on a charge that was different from the one for which
he was extradited, and which wasn’t covered by the extradition
treaty. More to the point, it seems that once an extradition treaty
is followed, the government’s hands are bound by the terms of the
treaty.
Rehnquist also cited another case, Ker v. Illinois,
which involved a thief named Frederick Ker, who had been convicted
in an Illinois court for larceny but was hiding out in Peru. Ker’s
“presence before the court,” as Rehnquist put it, “was procured by
means of forcible abduction from Peru.” Precisely because Ker
wasn’t brought back via an extradition process, the court decided,
Ker’s claims to rights under extradition law could be, and were,
rejected.
The Supreme Court subsequently cited Ker in upholding
Michigan’s right to try a man named Shirley Collins, whom the state
had allegedly seized, “blackjacked,” and brought back to the
Wolverine State. “This Court,” wrote Justice Hugo Black, “has never
departed from the rule announced in [Ker] that the power
of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact
that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason
of a ‘forcible abduction.’”
THAT IS THE VIEW that Chief Justice Rehnquist and most of his
colleagues took in the Mexican case. They rejected claims that the
mere existence of an extradition treaty ruled out the use of other
means to bring a fugitive to justice. Rehnquist went through a
scholarly explication. He noted that Alvarez and others who filed
briefs in his case “may be correct that respondent’s abduction was
‘shocking.’” But he concluded that Alvarez’s “forcible abduction
does not therefore prohibit his trial in a court in the United
States for violations of the criminal laws of the United
States.”
The case of United States v. Alvarez-Machain did not
have a satisfactory outcome. Attorneys gained the Supreme Court’s
sanction to try him, but the charges were dismissed for lack of
evidence. Eventually, Alvarez was sent home. It’s a cautionary
point in respect to using the courts generally to deal with
misdeeds outside our borders, since due process depends on the
court’s ability to compel the production of evidence, and producing
evidence from the far reaches of hostile or unsympathetic countries
is often impossible.
The broader point, though, is one to mark, particularly in the
midst of the kind of war in which America finds itself. When a
crime has been committed under our laws, and our country is being
mocked from the safety of a foreign shore the way it was mocked by
Scotland and Libya and Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the government of
America can act. And when it does, the Supreme Court will not stand
in its way.