President Obama’s piecemeal approach to war reminds us of
nothing at all. The Iraq withdrawal, the ongoing pullout from
Afghanistan, the raid that killed Osama bin Laden and his
now-publicized “kill list” program using drones to bomb individual
terrorists appear disconnected from any overall strategy to end the
threat of Islamic terrorism.
Obama’s approach to Iran is consistent with his overall
incoherence. On one hand, he is doing everything possible to block
an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. On the other,
as we learned seventeen days ago from the New York Times,
Obama has engaged in a covert cyberwar against that same
objective.
The president would argue that under our outdated laws, a cyber
attack isn’t even an act of war. But Carl von Clausewitz’s “On War”
defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our
will.” The cyber attacks on Iran are clearly an act of force to
compel Iran to stop enriching uranium, imposing our will and
Israel’s. They were acts of war by any logical measure.
The problem that results from Obama’s lack of cohesion is
twofold. First, a covert war is most effective when it is covert,
not advertised on the Times’ front page. Second, if the
covert war is to compel a result that doesn’t disappear in a few
weeks or months, it has to be carried out until the desired goal is
achieved.
Covert operations such as the cyber attacks on Iran are
authorized by “Presidential Determinations,” which are supposed to
be shared with the chairmen and ranking minority members of the
House and Senate Intelligence Committees in recognition of
Congress’s constitutional power over the conduct of wars.
Presumably the Determination authorizing the covert cyber attack
stated the objective of blocking Iran from achieving nuclear
weapons.
But the cyber attacks, while they apparently delayed Iran’s
progress for several months, didn’t achieve more than that.
Few nations have earned our wrath more convincingly than Iran.
From the hostages taken at our Tehran embassy in 1979 to Iran’s
complicity in the 9/11 attacks (determined last December by a
federal judge) to its direct support (with the innovative
“explosively-formed penetrator” weapon) of Iraqi insurgents which
killed many U.S. troops, Iran has taken little care in even
disguising its military actions against us.
If Obama means to end our covert war with the cyber attacks, he
is intending to end or limit a conflict that cannot be ended or
limited because Iran will not let it. If we are unwilling to do
more, we could at least undertake a wider covert war.
Some Iran experts, including my friend Michael Ledeen, argue
that we need not conduct a conventional war with Iran to stop its
nuclear weapons program. They argue that support for the Iranian
opposition is a better option and would have the necessary effects
in time to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
I have never believed that the Iranian opposition could be
strong enough to topple the Tehran regime, and that military power
would have to be employed to prevent the regime from producing
nuclear weapons and the means of deploying them. Diplomacy won’t
work. No negotiation has produced any change in the Tehran regime’s
behavior since it came to power. The only questions remaining are
whether covert operations can delay Iran’s nuclear weapons program
indefinitely and whether we can obtain enough accurate intelligence
on that program to determine when the clock has run out and prompt,
decisive military action has to be taken.
Our intelligence community still lacks the detailed information
that could enable us to determine when Iran will achieve the
nuclear capability it is pursuing. Though our ability to launch
more covert operations against Iran is limited only by technology
and imagination, the persistent lack of actionable intelligence —
which is not likely to be remedied in the coming months or years —
raises the risk of indefinite delay of military action to an
intolerably high level. If we — and the Israelis — limit
ourselves to covert action indefinitely, Iran will eventually
achieve its nuclear ambitions.
The mullahs likely knew where the Stuxnet worm cyber attack came
from, but having our authorship of the attacks published
effectively dared the Iranian regime to counterattack. We don’t
know what form that response will take or how or when it will be
made or if it will succeed. We do know that the leak to the Times
makes it harder and more dangerous to do what is needed in
Iran.
Though Obama has dipped his toe into the covert war waters, he
or his successor next year face the same dilemma. Some combination
of covert actions could have the effect of delaying Iran’s nuclear
program substantially, but what should they be and how long can we
rely on them?
The limitations on our covert operations are only three:
technology, our willingness to engage in more and different kinds
of such operations, and our politics. The Obama White House leaks
on the cyber attacks on Iran, and the Obama “kill list” program of
drone attacks, are evidence of a reckless political strategy that,
if continued, could prevent any future covert operations from
succeeding. No covert agent or special operations soldier should
have to bear that burden.
We had a significant opportunity to support the Iranian
opposition in 2009 when opposition protests shook the Tehran
regime. Obama declined to support the opposition and what could
have been a revolution fizzled. We have refused to even talk to the
opposition, a position that should be reversed immediately. If
there is a substantial revolutionary movement in Iran, we should
provide it covert aid in terms of financing, communications
equipment, training and arms. CIA paramilitary groups should be
inserted into Iran to perform these tasks and to improve our
intelligence-gathering there. Sabotage against Iranian nuclear
facilities should become a commonplace occurrence.
Expanding our cyberwar operations against Iran is one of the
best options. Offensive cyberwar is far cheaper, and easier, than
the defensive. We can, and should, disrupt Iranian government and
military functions as often as we can. Iran is reportedly
developing a new computer language to make such attacks more
difficult. Our cyber warriors should be tasked to infiltrate that
project and plant malicious software — “malware” in cyber jargon
— to gather information from and at our command disrupt or destroy
the computer networks the new system runs on.
A future president — let’s hope one will take office next year
— should consider the “bad luck” option. Covert operations need
not be conducted only by special operations forces, CIA agents, or
computer warriors. We have a significant variety of stealthy
weapons and weapon platforms. That president would have the option
of making an equally large variety of Presidential Determinations
authorizing the use of those weapons against Iran’s nuclear
facilities and its intelligence and military centers.
When a target such as those blew up in the dark of night, who is
to say that it’s the fault of the Great Satan or just a bad luck
accident? The Iranian regime could become the most unlucky in the
world. Let’s make it so.
