For any terrorist group, the ability to project destructive
power is more important than the power itself. Having a large
quantity of explosive, chemical or biological material that can be
used only in a limited target geography may be useful for attacking
that locale — but to be able to use destructive devices on a broad
international basis, however, establishes the terrorist group as a
“player” in global political terms.
This is not merely a matter of organizational egotism: It
corresponds to the terrorists’ ambition to be recognized as
representing an important ideological concept. Al Qaeda led by
Osama bin Laden had that characteristic. Somali-based Al Shabaab
does not. The result is different only in the scope of the two
organizations’ transnational terror activities and thus the
perception of danger as viewed by the world community. Al Qaeda is
now as widely known around the world as the Mafia. Al Shabaab has
that distinction only in its own region.
Such definition is not academic but rather an operational
factor. Al Shabaab has the potential of reaching out to black
Americans, but so far there has been limited evidence of this
happening. Some African-American dissidents have sought to
associate their ambitions as a fraternal outreach to their
self-proclaimed Somali cousins. Al Shabaab is not a centrally
directed organization and has at least three principal leadership
groupings. Outreach is limited by these divisions.
Although there is a growing community of former Somali fighters
now residing in Yemen, al Shabaab’s activities beyond the borders
of Somalia are restricted to eastern Africa. Its external support
structure depends heavily on financial infusions funneled by
members of the Somali diaspora through Nairobi and other centers in
East Africa as well as regular transfers from Yemen. This is along
with their traditional income from piracy, hostage-taking, and
thievery. The Nigerian Islamic terror organization, Boko Haram,
initially was said to have an al Shabaab connection, but so far
that has not proven to be the case.
The Islamic terrorist mechanism with the smallest base yet the
broadest ambitions is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
Embedded in the Yemeni community, AQAP has developed assets
stretching from the Gulf monarchies to contacts in Europe.
Uniquely, it is said to boast various participants who held
original enlistments in bin Laden’s al Qaeda who administer secret
training facilities — recently a major target of Yemeni special
forces. AQAP’s best known member currently is the “scientist”
Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri, the man credited with creating the
“underwear bomb” and other exotic devices including recent ventures
into cyberwarfare. One of the best known al Qaeda operatives, Fahd
Mohammed Ahmed al Quso, was killed in a drone attack on May 6 in
Yemen.
It is interesting that what would appear to be an otherwise
limited parochial terror affiliate of al Qaeda has assumed this
broader international role. The explanation seems to lie in the
technically sophisticated personnel hiding out in Yemen along with
Saudi AQ fighters on the run. Counteraction by the Americans,
British, and Saudis of course has centered on eliminating the
talent base, while Yemeni Army units attack defended al Qaeda and
anti-government positions in the south.
While Pakistan still harbors many former al Qaeda veterans,
other than very small groups and individuals with tribal
relationships still in Afghanistan, most of these are monitored by
ISI’s internal surveillance. Pakistan is now more of a retirement
center for actual al Qaeda “made members” than an operational hub.
Nonetheless, the country remains a principal training, recruiting
and financial source for other Islamic terrorists.
The name al Qaeda has had a value strictly by
association with its already established deeds and reputation. By
affixing “al Qaeda” to its name, any terror organization seeks to
have the ability to project an image of sophistication simply
through that presumed association. This is more or less the
background of what is referred to as al Qaeda in the Maghreb
(AQIM). One would have thought that an organization of that name
would at least have had a recognizable role not only in the
anti-Qaddafi Libyan civil war, but also to some degree throughout
the experience of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Morocco. Various
explanations have been offered, but the fact remains AQIM is not
credited with any substantial participation.
Another factor of particular importance is the automatic
assumption that terror organizations with Middle East or South
Asian connections actually have a strong Islamic commitment. In
practical terms loyalty to Islam is an initial requirement for
membership in an “Islamic” terror group, but it is not the degree
of piousness that is the determinant of leadership within that
group. In fact, as Bernard Lewis has written in The Multiple
Identities of the Middle East, “The first primal and indelible
mark of identity is race.”
In the Islamic world “race” is often interpreted in different
ways: Tribe, clan, family are often seen as the basis for the term.
Ethnicity in the Maghreb, for example, has a great deal to do with
skin color and thus the varying degree of genes inherited from the
several ancient sub-Sahara and European invasions. Islamic religion
may tend to unite the many groupings, but the separate identities
remain within and often express themselves by creating competitive
components. Sunni and Shia belief systems are only the
beginning.
While limiting this commentary to some of the Islamic-related
terror organizations, it is important to remember: “Terrorism is
the principal military weapon of a wide variety of organizations
with greatly differing characteristics,” as Graham Benton wrote in
1984 pointing to the contrasts and similarities among the Uruguayan
Tuparamos, the PLO, the IRA, the Red Brigades and the Basque ETA.
At that time only the Palestinian group had any Islamic
connections, and those were tangential. In today’s world the
emphasis is on Islam and the terror groups associated with it.
Terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorists, however, are not limited
by today’s preoccupation.
