The election for president of Mexico occurs in July and the
focus is on the plans to curb the violence that sweeps the country
as the several drug trafficking organizations battle to build their
share of “the market.”
The border zone of southwest United States and northern Mexico
from Texas to southern California has been wild and rugged for all
the generations there have been settlements of Europeans —
Hispanic and Anglo — mining, ranching and farming this vast
region. And before that, Native American tribes raided each other.
As the United States moved west, the law on both sides of the
border was at best inconsistent and most often corrupt.
There always has been commerce that has been characterized as
“illicit” across whatever was deemed the border at any given time
between the U.S. and Mexico. Perhaps the most profitable towards
the end of the 19th century was the rustling of the vast herds of
cattle owned by rich Mexican grandees of several national
backgrounds. These unbranded and rebranded cattle would be driven
north for sale. Sound familiar?
Brigadier General John Pershing and his American troops chased
Pancho Villa and other “freedom fighters” who pillaged the areas on
both sides of the border before WWI. After that war, Prohibition
and the outlawing of alcohol eventually brought the resumption of
large scale illegal border crossing. This “business” may not have
been as profitable as the narcotics trade of today, but the pattern
of corruption and payoff was similar. There seems to be a historic
(and perhaps natural) predilection for the United States’ neighbor
to the south to encourage and exploit the bad habits of the
gringos to the north.
At the same time, Mexico undermines its own society in the
process. More than at any other time in the past, Mexican political
and judicial life has become infected by the disease of its own
criminal economic ambition. The most recent example has been local
Walmart executives caught in payoffs to obtain or expedite building
permits to the tune of $24 million spread around the country. The
fact is that all aspects of commercial building are the subject of
“project participation” in virtually every Mexican community. Of
course, this process is not unknown north of the border either.
Local police have been reduced to uniformed gangsters working
for whoever is the dominant element of the moment. The reputation
of the federal police has suffered from their inability to be
effective outside of certain restricted urban areas. Selected units
of the army and marines have been in what is ultimately a
full-scale counter insurgency campaign against well-organized,
well-armed members of the drug cartels.
Other Latin American countries have run into similar problems of
having to employ military forces in battles against criminal
organizations protecting their territory. The lessons learned in
Colombia regarding special paramilitary (PM) units are now looked
upon favorably by the Mexican central government. Unfortunately
these same Colombian units are charged with extremely brutal
tactics while being effective against the drug-trafficking
insurgent forces. The proponents of the use of paramilitary units
insist these tactics are necessary to counter the terrorist
brutality of the drug criminals. Additionally, it is claimed that
the PM squads carry the advantage of traditional military
discipline and commitment while being less vulnerable to drug
organization blandishments of cash and narcotics. This would have
to be considered a relative judgment.
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that had held power
for decades before being displaced by the supposedly less corrupt
conservative National Action Party (PAN) has made a central part of
its presidential election bid the plan to form a special
paramilitary force presumably to counter the drug trafficking
insurgency. This new organization of forty thousand recruits, it’s
said, will be modeled after the similar Colombian “police”
force.
The Mexican politicos who support the creation of this new
anti-drug police group make a point in public not to discuss the
frustration of U.S. military trainers assigned to the Colombian
operation. Obviously, any presence of U.S. Special Operations
Forces in Mexico would have to be handled with great skill and
operational delicacy. In that regard, partnering with the U.S.
military within Mexico could be simultaneously of great tactical
benefit and a political disaster. It’s one of those concepts that
may look good on paper, but in practice is completely
unworkable.
Before any of this new PM organization with full police powers
is placed in the field to replace the Mexican marine and army
units, the federal police must have their hurt feelings assuaged.
This is planned to be accomplished by adding ten thousand more
federales, making this force 25 percent larger. In other
words, while admitting the existing forty thousand federal police
cannot do the job, their numbers will be increased so as to salve
their organizational conscience. One wonders how much of this will
be financed through U.S. military aid?
To build a new incorruptible military force with police powers
is a difficult job anywhere. To accomplish this in Mexico would
seem to require a complete socio-economic change throughout Mexican
political life. The first thing that is needed is strong consistent
leadership. That’s something that can come only from the indigenous
body politic, and so far there have not been any signs of a
conspicuous change in the traditional structure.
It is a good bet that the multi-billion dollar criminal
enterprises that control the trade in illegal drugs are already
laying the groundwork work for penetration of future leadership. Is
that too insulting to say or is it just recognizing historic
reality?
