The folks running the show in Mali, the landlocked West African
country that is near the top of most lists of the world’s poorest
countries, picked Cheick Modibo Diarra, a rocket scientist and the
head of one of the world’s richest companies, Microsoft, to serve
as interim prime minister until things get back on track following
a coup d’état by junior officers and the loss of nearly
half the country to secessionist desert tribesmen and holy warriors
out of shariaize the whole place. They must have figured that since
all else seemed to be failing, they might as well try somebody with
a serious résumé.
There were no reactions from France, the ex-colonial master and,
according to rumors in Bamako, the instigator of the trouble that
has led to this sorry pass, wherein anywhere from 100,000 to
150,000 people have been turned into refugees, by the ICRC’s count
and, with commerce and business at a standstill — or at least a
what-next — shortages of essential goods and foodstuffs are
becoming acute.
Dr. Diarra, 60, an astrophysicist from NASA’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, educated at Paris’s Curie Institute and Washington’s
Howard University, was the consensus choice of the putchists who
overthrew the elected government of President Amadou Toumani Touré
on March 22 and the representatives of neighboring countries’
association, ECOWAS (Economic Union of West African States, CEDEAO
by its French acronym) that responded to the coup with an embargo.
The African Union, including all the members of ECOWAS, ostracizes
regimes that come to power illegitimately. With a transition plan
announced last week and the swearing-in of an interim president,
speaker of the Assembly Dioncounda Traoré, ECOWAS is switching
gears by lifting the embargo and offering to mobilize forces to
restore governmental authority in the north. However, and evidently
without consulting either the new highest officials of the Republic
or the regional interested parties, the junta sent soldiers and
policemen to arrest public figures close to deposed President
Touré, still in hiding but reportedly safe and sound in the
Senegalese embassy. Little damage was reported, as they were
released the next day; possibly the junta simply wanted to send a
signal to the political class that it expects respect.
The junta has warned that high ranking members of the fallen
government might be charged on various counts, thus far unspecified
but presumably related to the misappropriations of public funds and
the collapse of military resistance in the north due to
“treasonable” neglect of the security situation there.
Dr. Diarra, son-in-law to the former dictator General Moussa
Traoré (no relation to Dioncounda Traoré), has been known most of
his life for his research on the outer frontiers of science. He has
been a UNESCO goodwill ambassador with the mission of promoting
education and encouraging access to advanced technology. An
American citizen (a dual national), he has been head of
Microsoft-Africa since 2006, reportedly taking leave of absence
last year to found a political party, Union for Development in
Mali, and was a candidate in the presidential election scheduled
for April 29 of this year, now postponed.
The overthrow in March of President Touré was widely perceived
as a blow to Malian democracy, touted by the U.S. as a regional
success since it was instituted in the early 1990s by Mr. Touré,
who overthrew Moussa Traoré in a 1990 coup. Mr. Touré, popularly
known as “President ATT,” ran for election in 2002 and was
re-elected in 2007. The constitution places a two-term limit on the
presidency and Mr. Touré had indicated clearly his intention to
retire from public affairs.
The motives and goals of the officers who seized power under the
command of Captain Amadou Sanogo last month remain unclear.
Initially announcing their determination to repress the northern
insurrection, or insurrections, and reconquer the territories north
of the Niger river, they did not react to the routing of the
reportedly ill-equipped garrisons defending the principal centers
and, according to unverified local eyewitness reports, the ensuring
pillaging and terrorizing of the local populations.
ECOWAS received support from France and the U.S. in its prompt
ruling that the coup would not be tolerated. France expressed
willingness to provide logistical assistance to a multilateral
force to restore Mali’s territorial integrity.
Despite this diplomatic and political support, residents of
Bamako have accused France since the beginning of the armed
insurrection in January of supporting the rebels of the MNLA, the
Azawad national liberation movement from the name of the region
that Tuareg tribesmen consider their historic homeland.
It is not entirely clear how nomadic Berbers like the Tuareg
should be able to precisely delineate the borders of a historical
homeland, but it is not in dispute that the southwestern Sahara and
its Sahelian shore, which runs through northern Mali, is inhabited
largely by Tuareg tribesmen. It is inhabited as well by Songhai,
Peuls, and Arab Moors who have indicated, politically and at times
by the organizing of local militia, their opposition to secession
during previous Tuareg revolts. These have been recurring
occurrences since independence was given to French Soudan, renamed
Mali in 1960 for its associations with the pre-colonial Malinke and
Songhai empires.
Critics of President Touré accused him when the armed rebellion
began in January — or resumed, given that a truce had been signed
in 2009 — of taking a soft line toward the Tuareg, numbers of whom
had served in the ranks of Moammar Gaddafi’s army and returned home
laden with up-to-date weapons. France is suspected of cutting a
deal with them to desert the Libyan strongman’s service, in which
some had been for years and even decades, while others were
recruited to reinforce his side when France’s President Nicolas
Sarkozy instigated hostilities against his regime in 2011. Foreign
Minister Alain Juppé, whose day job is mayor of Bordeaux,
repeatedly denied this theory, according to which the French and
their British and American allies got the upper hand against
Gaddafi by promising the Tuareg unhindered passage out of Libya and
tacit support for their territorial claims, by pointing to the long
history of Tuareg restiveness in Mali (as well as in other parts of
the Sahel, notably neighboring Niger) and to France’s firm record
of support for the principle of inviolability of post-colonial
borders.
The United States supports this principle as well, as does, of
course, ECOWAS and the African Union and indeed just about every
official national and multi-national institution in the official
international community otherwise known as the United Nations.
However, the same institutions, as well as the IMF, supported the
partition of Sudan and the breakaway of Eritrea from Ethiopia, but
observers point out that these modifications to the post-colonial
border arrangements were duly negotiated by the interested parties,
usually with honest brokers overseeing the deal-making — as
occurred in the case of Sudan under the presidency of George W.
Bush. Sudan and the young South Sudan are presently engaged in
violent hostilities evidently caused by an unresolved dispute over
the oil revenues from territory astride both nations, which were
supposed to be equitably shared.
The Tuareg revolt is viewed with a mix of revulsion and
trepidation by many, if not most, sub-Niger Malians,
Bambara-speaking Malinke and related tribal groups. They resent the
refusal of the “whites” of the north (the Tuareg are in fact rather
dark, and they often are referred to with some contempt as “blue
men,” but this just goes to show that color, as we Americans well
know, is in the head not on the skin, even if, objectively, it
often is that too) to fit into their tolerantly diverse society,
which is not entirely fair since many do fit, intermarry, serve in
the army, run small businesses, etcetera. Indeed, the
no-longer-wildly-popular President ATT is rumored to have Tuareg
family connections.
The case certainly can be made that the Berber peoples of the
Sahara, including the Tuareg, who are notoriously clannish — sort
of like the Irish, if Mr. Tyrrell will permit me to say so — do
not “fit” well with the sub-Saharans. This is evident not only in
Mali but in Mauritania, for example. But Mauritania, no less than
Mali itself, also disproves the rule, or racial cliché. Since the
consolidation of constitutional rule following a series of coups
(which to some degree could be called a game of violent musical
chairs among separate but related Moor tribes), there is a marked
amelioration of relations between the peoples north and south of
the Senegal River. Another example of the value of strong political
underpinnings in the overcoming of sectional and tribal mistrust
within a nation are the careers of Willie Morris and Tom Wicker in
that Yankee bastion, New York City.
But then, America is exceptional. What is disheartening about
the crisis in Mali is that for 20 years it has been a model of
constitutionalism in a region noted for arbitrary politics, where
security resides in the family and the clan rather than the law.
The Tuareg secession was formally proclaimed in the first week of
April by a spokesman for the MNLA, but it was immediately
contradicted by the Ansar Dine movement, a Tuareg-based Islamist
fighting force which, according to reports, controls some of the
population centers in the north, possibly more than the MNLA — no
one can say for certain. The Ansar Dine (“defenders of the faith”)
claim to be interested not in creating a new state but in imposing
Sharia throughout Mali. They may or may not be in league with the
AQIM irregulars (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). Even the most
knowledgeable specialists in the region evidently are unable or
unwilling at present to sort out who is really who and who has the
upper hand in the north of Mali. However, Berber sources familiar
with Tuareg politics believe the MNLA is resolutely anti-Islamist
and could conceivably serve as a pro-Western “aircraft carrier” in
the Sahara if it wins an independent, or even autonomous, space
that it can call its own.
Fred Farkel| 4.20.12 @ 7:22AM
Boy, I sure am glad things in Mali are better. I was really worried there for awhile. Now I can go find a good tennis tournament and doze off for a nice nap.
Ibrahim B.| 4.20.12 @ 1:29PM
Information is contradictory and short given the situation, but you are correct to at least hint that odd things have been happening in a country in which the U.S. has invested politically (and also in money for infrastructure, agricultural and I.T. development, and more), while France has a lingering neo-colonial interest, plus -- as you say - the thirst for the oil of the Sahel, unless of course it is a mirage -- an old French story in Saharan matters. But here in France, another notion circulates that I find also reflected in conversations with Malians (I am from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire). It is simpler than the by no means impossible conspiracy theory (the Lybian retreat and all that), namely: Sarkozy dislikes the ex-president, Amadou Toure, because he did not agree to be a vassal. This is far fetched, admittedly, and requires further evidence which may never surface, but it has to do with at least three important hypothetical motives: 1. Toure opposed Sarkozy on immigration, rejecting bilateral treaties that would facilitate the expulsion of Malian immigrants in France; 2. Toure would not grant France a military base or even the use of the air strip in Tessalit, one of the major objectives of the Touareg fighters, which they accomplished in February; 3. the political-business leadership in Bamako was turning away from the traditional vertical relationship with France.
This situation, with of course many differences and particularities, is at least comparable to the one in Cote d'Ivoire, where the French clearly preferred Alassane Ouatara to the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and helped replace the latter with the former. Gbagbo made it easy -- he ruled as a tyrant and blocked free elections as long as possible. It remains that he was also trying to find an independent course, outside the traditional dependence on Paris. He would have preferred to work more with Washington, but your diplomacy seems to have been reluctant to commit to this.
Is there a competition for influence in Mali? Probably. If the French undermined Toure -- completely unproven --, it does not follow they are pro-Tuareg or that Diarra is their man. They have been certainly made a clear distinction between the MNLA and the Ansar Dine, who are close to AQIM. Is a deal being made -- Diarra the "American" in exchange for a compromise with the MNLA and all-out war against the jihadists? We shall see.
Fadel| 4.21.12 @ 5:13PM
Ibrahim, all good views, but I think you are under-valuing the key realities of the Mali north. The Tuareg want it, call it the Azawad, but:
1) quite a few people, or peoples in the plural as the author of this article says, do not want them to have it, and some of these peoples have their own tribe-based military forces. As you surely know, tribal, or racial, feelings run stronger in the north than in Bamako or even Gao.
2) how much are the French involved? I doubt anyone can tell us until somebody in the French government makes "revelations." But equally important are the positions of the Mauritanian and Algerian governments. They are not likely to be the same. Consequently, they may not be able to say together, "We are going to pacify the whole area." As for
3) the Americans, they appear to be playing a shrewd game by which they do not takes sides (beyond the diplomatically required expression of support for democracy and territorial integrity), and we will, perhaps, soon know whether this is a cover for taking over the leadership of the Sahel by stealth. "Their" man, the American-trained scientist Modibo Diarra, was successfully placed at the helm -- at the moment this a nominal position, since the putschist soldiers are still keeping the civilians on notice, but if he emerges as a real leader, it may be a signal of a big American push into Mali. If this is so, they would be well advised to advise a plan for the north that would disarm both the Tuareg and their rivals, or incorporate both into the army, in return for a large dose of regional autonomy that guarantees for the Songhai, Moors, etc while making the Tuareg feel they won something. To be quite frank, this is not for tomorrow, but Mali is a place of mysteries and magic...
Occam's Tool| 4.20.12 @ 3:29PM
I expect this will turn out badly. Fred, you up for a Cub game?
cicero| 4.20.12 @ 5:32PM
The West refuses to recognize that tribalism never turns into nationalism until the tribal concept is defeated. Until that occurs, there will be continuing war and disfunction in Africa. You have nationalism in south Africa, because you had 600 years of western domination there before independence and political freedom occured in the 1990s. If you look to the new leaders who took over (Mandella and the ANC), you will see that they all, invariabley, had good, western, christian educations. That does not hold true for most of the rest of the continent.
The West did not adopt nationalism until they adopted monaorhcies that unified each country. Even then, the kings were constantly warring with one another, and their respective retainers until the people got strong enough to throuw them out, and assume domocratic control. The fact that the people are giving their power back to an aristocracy of the beaurocracy is another discussion. My point is that places like Mali will never settle down until a strong man comes along, defeats the clans, and maintains control. It looks like the generals in Mali have figured this out.
leveut| 4.20.12 @ 5:43PM
" An American citizen (a dual national)"
Oh no he isn't a dual national, unless he lied at his naturalization ceremony and falsely swore allegiance to only the US forswearing citizenship in any other country, in which case he is not an American citizen.