What happened yesterday in Pennsylvania wasn’t just the end of
Rick Santorum’s presidential campaign. It was the conclusion of a
year-long battle between the Republican establishment and
disaffected conservatives, which culminated in the collective
failure of the candidates to the right of Mitt Romney to deny him
the nomination.
It’s a familiar ending. Gerald Ford, George H.W. Bush, Bob Dole,
and John McCain all beat back conservative insurgents to win the
Republican nomination. Only the elder Bush went on to win the White
House, and then only once. Had New Hampshire independents not
swooned for McCain in 2000, George W. Bush would have found himself
quelling a conservative insurrection led by Steve Forbes. The story
is as old as Tom Dewey and Dwight Eisenhower defeating Robert
Taft.
Movement conservatives have captured the Republican nomination
during a competitive primary process only twice: Barry Goldwater in
1964 and Ronald Reagan in 1980. After Reagan won two terms as
president — by landslide margins both times — many assumed the
conservative takeover of the GOP was complete.
These assumptions proved ill founded. In 1988, many
conservatives rallied behind Bush senior as Reagan’s loyal vice
president and heir apparent. Those who still preferred bold colors
to pale pastels split between different variants of conservatism:
religious conservatives for Pat Robertson, supply-siders for Jack
Kemp, and a smattering of conservatives who for various reasons
liked Dole, Pete DuPont, and Alexander Haig.
Bush won the nomination and the presidency, dispatching a smug,
diminutive liberal governor from Massachusetts who seemed to think
the country longed for a return to the malaise of the Carter years.
But it was a Pyrrhic victory, as Bush soon broke conservatives’
hearts: he raised taxes, rescued racial quotas, and presided over a
slow erosion of the gains from the Reagan years. By 1993, the
Democrats once again controlled both elected branches of the
federal government.
In 1996, conservatives again split. Some were resigned to Dole.
Economic conservatives liked Phil Gramm, social conservatives were
for Pat Buchanan, supply-siders were attracted to the Forbes flat
tax plan. The right made its stand against Dole in the early states
but the race was over by Super Tuesday.
Four years ago, national security hawks joined establishment
Republicans in supporting McCain. Evangelicals flocked to Mike
Huckabee while other movement conservatives split their votes
between Romney and Fred Thompson. This time the primary campaign
was effectively over after Florida.
This year the race continued past Super Tuesday. If Santorum had
held on in Pennsylvania on April 24, it might have been June before
Romney clinched. Santorum had many disadvantages: he was a
Northeastern Catholic most popular with Southern evangelicals (with
Newt Gingrich still in the race), an ex-senator who hadn’t won an
election in twelve years, an underfunded candidate who was
vulnerable to being outspent 4 or 5-1, the leader of a campaign
organization more appropriate for his previous status as an
asterisk candidate.
Yet if Santorum had done just a bit better in Michigan and Ohio,
we could be having a very different discussion right now. Santorum
showed future conservative contenders how to go hunting where the
ducks are. As the New York Times columnist Ross Douthat
observed, a
Republican like Bobby Jindal could take the Santorum coalition —
Southerners, Midwesterners, evangelicals, Catholics, and Reagan
Democrats — and build on it.
One way to build on this is to do better among these groups than
Santorum did. For example, Santorum lost Catholics — his
coreligionists — in Ohio (by thirteen points) and Michigan (by
seven). He needed a stronger showing in the Midwestern primaries
and caucuses, where he had mixed results.
Alternatively, imagine a candidate — a Kentucky senator,
perhaps — who could hold onto the Ron Paul vote while reaching
more deeply into the Republican base. A presidential contender who
could win more evangelicals, more older voters, and more partisan
Republicans while still putting up big numbers among the
independents and young.
That combination could have won Iowa this time around. It also
would have potentially made for a more competitive New Hampshire
primary, marrying votes for Paul and Jon Huntsman to the Santorum
and Gingrich voters. This hypothetical campaign wouldn’t be dead on
arrival in the South or closed primary states.
Perhaps the Pauls aren’t your cup of tea, even when served cool.
That is something a Tea Party candidate for the presidential
nomination will have to resolve early because a divided
conservative vote spells doom for a conservative insurgent. Imagine
if the same candidate had won Iowa and South Carolina.
Conservative primary voters are more discriminating than ever,
looking seriously at the flaws of old heroes like Gingrich and new
saviors like Rick Perry. They are more willing to keep the primary
contest going than before. All they need is a candidate to lead
them.
What if that candidate, come 2016 or 2020, is a current rather
than former elected official? Someone with no votes for Medicare
Part D or No Child Left Behind in his record? Someone who has
governed, without tax increases or TARP bailouts? The bench will
not be as depleted from the Bush years next time.
By winning 11 primaries and caucuses, Rick Santorum was the most
successful conservative insurgent since Ronald Reagan in 1976. But
that still isn’t good enough. The right is seeking to emulate
Reagan in 1980 instead.
